TO AMEND THE FOREIGN SERVICE ACT OF 1980

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-SEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

S. 1886

A BILL TO AMEND THE FOREIGN SERVICE ACT OF 1980 WITH RESPECT TO THE NUMBER OF CHIEFS OF DIPLOMATIC MISSION WHO ARE CAREER MEMBERS OF THE FOREIGN SERVICE

APRIL 28, 1982

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THE FOREIGN SERVICE ACT OF 1980

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 28, 1982

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS.
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:08 a.m., in room 4221, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Charles McC. Mathias, Jr., presiding.

Present: Senators Mathias and Pell.

Senator MATHIAS. The committee will come to order.

The Los Angeles Times of April 8, 1982, quoted my friend Pendleton James as saying with respect to the administration's ambassadorial appointments:

> The question is not whether we have too many political appointees. We do not have enough. I fight in every case for a political appointee instead of a career officer if the political appointee is qualified.

Now, I understand that the position of the White House and the State Department is that this is a personal view of Mr. James. But I think it does raise some disturbing questions with respect to policy, and they are perhaps best illustrated in the statistics with respect to ambassadorial appointments made since January 1980.

According to data submitted by the Department of State to the Foreign Relations Committee, as of April 19 of this year, 43 percent of the ambassadorial appointments to bilateral posts were political. If one adds in the multilateral ambassadorial appointments, the percentage of political appointees in the Reagan administration jumps to 49 percent overall. So it looks as though Mr. James is very close to winning in his position.

It was, in part, to focus attention on the issue of political versus career ambassadorial appointments that I introduced Senate bill 1886, a bill to amend the Foreign Service Act of 1980. But I think what I really wanted to do was to raise the issue of competence in Government generally and in the diplomatic service specifically.

We are at a critical juncture in the Nation's history. We are more interdependent with the rest of the world than at any time since we achieved our own national independence. The risk of catastrophe arising from an escalating regional conflict is perhaps greater than at any time in our history.

In these circumstances, it is imperative that the reporting from our posts abroad be of the highest possible order. It is vital that our Government's views be transmitted effectively around the world. We simply cannot afford second-rate representation abroad in any post.

Now, the most promising pool of talent from which to draw ambassadors is obviously the career Foreign Service. I say this recognizing full well that the State Department is not immune from mediocrity and acknowledging with great respect and admiration the fact that some of our finest, most successful, most respected ambassadors have come from outside the career service.

But I think it needs to be said, because I am afraid that many of our best professionals will not stay in Government if many of the best foreign assignments are going to be closed to them.

Mr. James' interview cannot have been very encouraging to the hundreds of highly competent professionals who serve their country at home and abroad. I am thinking now of not just the senior Foreign Service officers who see the possibility of an ambassadorial post glimmering in the far distant future as political appointments are made. I am thinking also of the junior and middle grade Foreign Service officers who see their underemployed seniors walking around the corridors of the State Department and think that if that is the end of the road, they had better take a bypass before they get to the end. Therefore they leave the Service and deprive the American people of their talents and their skills.

What this bill does is set a limit of 15 percent on political appointments. There is no magic to the proportion of 15 percent. It is just an attempt to leave flexibility to the President in appointing exceptionally distinguished Americans who can make a contribution in this cause, and to give hope to all grades in the Foreign Service that there is going to be room for them in the major ambassadorial posts when they reach that level of maturity and experience which would justify their appointment.

We have in the room today a very impressive array of talent to assess whether this is the best approach to the problem, or let me say, to correct my own impression, that there is a problem. If I am wrong, I would be happy to be corrected.

I hope that we can focus not only on the merits and demerits of this particular bill, but also reflect on the larger issue of the role of the Ambassador in modern diplomacy.

[Text of S. 1886 follows:]

II

97TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. 1886

To amend the Foreign Service Act of 1980 with respect to the number of chiefs of diplomatic mission who are career members of the Foreign Service.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

NOVEMBER 23 (legislative day, NOVEMBER 2), 1981

Mr. MATHIAS introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

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A BILL

To amend the Foreign Service Act of 1980 with respect to the number of chiefs of diplomatic mission who are career members of the Foreign Service.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That section 304(a) of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 is amended by adding at the end thereof the following:

"(5) At any time, not less than 85 per centum of the total number of positions of chiefs of mission which are occupied shall be held by career members of the Service.".

Senator **Mathias**. We are privileged today to begin this discussion with the Under Secretary of State for Management, Mr. Richard Kennedy, who will speak first.

Secretary Kennedy.

STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD T. KENNEDY, UNDER SECRETARY FOR MANAGEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Ambassador **Kennedy**. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am very pleased to be able to appear before the committee today to present the administration's views on the role of the Ambassador in today's world and to discuss Senate bill 1886, a bill which would require that not less than 85 percent of the total number of positions of Chiefs of Mission shall be occupied by career members of the Foreign Service.

This administration, Mr. Chairman, firmly believes that the best possible individuals must be appointed to represent this Nation abroad. We agree with former Ambassador Kingman Brewster that because of greatly expanded communications and complexities and need for ambassadors who can explain developments to both sides—and I quote Mr. Brewster's comments—

> The Ambassador is more important than he or she was when the Government of the United States had only one department engaged in foreign relations.

The President has recently indicated in his letter to all Chiefs of Mission the importance he attaches to the ambassadorial role. He has assigned to the Ambassador very broad responsibilities to "protect and advance the United States' interests abroad." And he has made it clear that he views the Ambassador as his personal representative to the host government.

We do not accept the sometimes stated convention that the Ambassador is just a messenger for the foreign policy decisionmakers in Washington. The ambassadorial role is multifaceted. We seek ambassadorial candidates who not only are at ease in a foreign environment, carrying out the representational functions, but who also can contribute through their perspective, reporting, and analyses to the policy deliberations in Washington. The Ambassador is not only our eyes and ears but a significant part of the brain.

It must be remembered that the Ambassador is not and never has been simply the senior Department of State official accredited to a foreign country. This factor was stressed in the 1975 report of the Commission on the Reorganization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy, the noted "Murphy Commission" report.

That Commission, composed of such distinguished persons as the late Vice President Rockefeller, Chairman Clement Zablocki, Ambassador Mike Mansfield, and former Ambassador Anne Armstrong, noted that:

> Our concept of the role of the Ambassador flows from one basic principle: the Ambassador is and must be the central representative of the United States and of the President. All other embassy personnel are extensions of the Ambassador.
>
> It is imperative for the Ambassador to serve as the representative of the President and the entire government rather than simply as the senior Department of State official, if he or she is to coordinate effectively all United States activities in the country to which he or she may be accredited. These responsibilities will require ambassadors who are at once broad-gauged and knowledgeable, who can as the head of mission fulfill both managerial and analytic roles and as personal representatives of the President, advise on policy matters.

The demands of all ambassadorial assignments are not the same. In some cases, decades of expertise in the area and in the country should be a primary criteria, while in others, it will be more important for the host government to know without question that the Ambassador does in fact speak directly for the President. We must seek to tailor our ambassadorial choice to meet the unique circumstances of our relations with a particular country.

We agree with a study prepared last year for the committee by the Congressional Research Service that said, "The issue here is qualifications, not the career or noncareer status of the candidate."

Let me now turn to our view of S. 1886, in the light of this background. The administration opposes the passage of S. 1886 for three reasons. Briefly stated, we see the bill as unnecessary, possibly counterproductive, and it can be considered to be an infringement on the constitutional authority of the President to nominate ambassadors.

We see S. 1886 as unnecessary because it is not needed either to assure the quality of ambassadorial nominees or to correct an inappropriate mix of career and noncareer appointees. The quality of ambassadorial nominees is assured by the high concern of the President himself and his foreign policy advisers to seek the most qualified persons to represent the United States abroad.

Beyond this concern, however, the Constitution provides a check-and-balance mechanism to assure that appropriate individuals are appointed. The Senate must, of course, review the President's nominations pursuant to its constitutional advise-and-consent responsibility.

The Senate, and specifically this committee, has never been other than diligent in its review of the President's nominees. Indeed, the current provisions of law provide an appropriate and helpful aid to the Senate to perform its function of advise and consent.

Specifically, section 304(a) of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 outlines the attributes that a chief of mission is expected to have, states in view of these attributes he or she normally should be a career member of the Foreign Service, and makes it clear that political contributions are not to be a factor in ambassadorial appointments.

And the act further requires that a statement shall be provided to the Senate with a report on the demonstrated competence of the nominee for the duties of the position for which he or she may be nominated.

This sort of process helps to insure ambassadorial competence while preserving the unquestioned right of the President to present his nominations to the Senate.

As to the mix of career and noncareer ambassadors, I can assure you that the record of the Reagan administration is consistent with other administrations in recent years in regard to the percentage of career officers occupying ambassadorial positions. In this light, I think it is instructive to examine the historical trend, which shows that the percentage of career officers appointed as ambassadors has risen over the past several decades.

In President Truman's administration, for example, only about 50 percent of ambassadors were career appointees. This number has risen to a range of between 65 percent to 75 percent since the administration of President Eisenhower.

As of today, 83 ambassadors to other countries are career officers, while 34 are noncareer, a mix of 71 percent career officers and 29 percent noncareer.

Indeed, I would note that the percentage of ambassadors to other countries today who are career officers in equal to or greater then that of 10 of the last 20 years from 1961 through 1980.

Additionally, the percentage of career ambassadors to other countries today is within 3 percentage points of the career percentage in an additional 5 years of the last 20 years. In short, the mix of ambassadors appointed or retained by President Reagan is consistent with the mix of all other Presidents over the last 20 years.

As to our multilateral posts, I would note that many multilateral appointments, such as to the United Nations, UNESCO and ECOSOC, are traditionally noncareer. Nonetheless, the President has nominated or retained career officers in some of the most significant multilateral posts. The President specifically has nominated Ambassador Abraham Katz to serve at the U.S. Mission to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development in Paris and Ambassador George Vest to the U.S. Mission to the European Communities in Brussels.

President Reagan has retained outstanding career officers, W. Tapley Bennett, Jr., for example, as the U.S. Ambassador to NATO and Roger Kirk as the U.S. representative to the United Nations Industrial Development Organization and Deputy U.S. representative to the IAEA in Vienna.

Other career appointments by the President to important multilateral posts include William Sherman as Deputy Representative to the U.N. Security Council. Warren Clark as Deputy Representative to ECOSOC, Maynard Glitman as Deputy Negotiator for Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces.

President Reagan's nominations of noncareer appointees to multilateral organizations and other ambassadorial appointments include such outstanding officers as Jean Kirkpatrick to the United Nations, William Middendorf to the OAS, Vernon Walters as Ambassador at Large, Paul Nitze as the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces negotiator, and Edward Rowny as head of the delegation for the START negotiations.

That the President has the highest confidence in and respect for the career service is shown by his selection of career officers to represent U.S. interests in areas and at posts where some of our most vital interests and concerns are engaged, including NATO, China, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and El Salvador. Our Embassy in New Delhi, as an example, is headed by a career officer for the first time since 1954.

Within the Department itself, the President has nominated career officers to key positions as Deputy Secretary, the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, and to four of the five regional Assistant Secretary positions. These officials are serving with the greatest distinction and have the President's fullest confidence.

The administration believes that S. 1886 could be counterproductive. It would limit the ability of the President to appoint outstanding noncareer candidates while at the same time would not necessarily contribute to arresting the alleged tendency to downgrade the importance of the position of ambassador.

Because the ambassadorial role is of such consequence, we think that it would be a serious mistake to limit those eligible for appointment to any one category of citizens. We need the David Bruces, the Ellsworth Bunkers, and the Mike Mansfields, as well as the Chip Bohlens, Llewelyn Thompsons, and Phil Habibs.

Some commentators in recent years have remarked that ambassadors today may be less important than they once were and that Washington tends to bypass them to deal directly with other governments. It can be argued that imposition on ambassadorial appointments of a set percentage of career officers, if it meant the President could not nominate his first choice to be ambassador, would tend to insure that such comments become self-fulfilling prophecies and thereby diminish the role of the Ambassador as the representative of the President to foreign countries.

S. 1886 certainly can be considered to be an infringement on the President's constitutional authority because it places an arbitrary limitation on his prerogative to nominate ambassadors.

I have not come prepared today to get into a long constitutional discussion of the details of this kind of interpretation. But I must point out, sir, that the President's ambassadorial nomination authority is founded directly on the Constitution, not on statute. Specifically, article II, section 2, provides that the President, "shall nominate and by and with the advise and consent of the Senate, shall appoint ambassadors."

The administration believes strongly that any attempt to place an arbitrary limit on the authority of the President to forward to the Senate a nomination of his own choosing raises serious constitutional questions.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, there has been consistent opposition to the enactment of an arbitrary percentage in order to encourage the nomination of career Foreign Service officers to ambassadorships. Perhaps the strongest statement is that of the Murphy Commission to which I earlier referred. The Commission stated:

> The Commission therefore believes that reserving a certain percentage for Foreign Service Officers is an inappropriate means of reaching the laudable goal of greater ambassadorial competence. While we would expect the majority, perhaps a large majority, of ambassadors to be foreign affairs professionals, we do not advocate that they necessarily be drawn from the Foreign Service. Rather, the Commission said, the individual with the best qualifications for a given position should be selected.

Even Ambassador Malcolm Toon, in his recent article in the Foreign Service Association, stated:

> I do not think that you can legislate percentages of political appointees. I think it is up to the Foreign Relations Committee and the White House to make sure the people they are sending to important posts are qualified.

Mr. Chairman, we wholeheartedly agree with both of these sentiments. And for these and the other reasons which I have outlined, we must reiterate our opposition to the arbitrary limitation that is suggested in S. 1886.

In closing, I would like also to reiterate the President's and the Secretary of State's deep personal respect for the dedication and solid professionalism of the Foreign Service.

Mr. Chairman, I would interject here to note that President Reagan, as you may know, personally calls each and every nominee before submitting the nomination of that individual to the Senate to inquire of the willingness of that individual to serve and to indicate his, the President's, interest in that service. He calls each and every one. That includes every member of the Foreign Service who is nominated by the President.

It is a clear reflection of his personal interest in and concern for the position of the Ambassador, and it is a clear reflection, in the case of the Foreign Service, of his personal regard for the members of that Service and their competence.

We recognize, Mr. Chairman, that the Service provides an outstanding cadre of experienced Foreign Service professionals for ambassadorial appointments. We recognize that the great majority of ambassadorial appointments have been in the past and will continue to be in the future drawn from the Service.

Thank you, sir, for allowing me to appear before the committee. I am ready to answer any questions.

Senator **MATHIAS**. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

I noted with interest that you quoted a portion of the report which said, in effect, that ambassadors must represent the President and the entire Government and not just the Department of State. Is that correct?

Ambassador **KENNEDY**. Yes, sir.

Senator **MATHIAS**. And that includes the legislative branch as well as the executive branch, does it?

Ambassador **KENNEDY**. Mr. Chairman, if I may point out and perhaps note in the record that the Department of State, although it is not necessarily widely understood, is only one of a great many agencies representing this Government abroad. Under the jurisdiction of chiefs of mission abroad——

Senator **MATHIAS**. I am well aware of that. That is a subject we are going to get to one of these days, and not too far off—those long corridors in U.S. Embassies around the world, with people from Commerce and Agriculture and all the other agencies of Government.

Ambassador **KENNEDY**. The Department of State is only 19.4 percent of those, Mr. Chairman.

Senator **MATHIAS**. If we can solve the problems of those 19.4 percent, then we will take on the rest, the 80.6 percent. But we will take one step at a time.

The reason I picked out that particular quotation from the report is because I think that really sets the tone for the kind of discussion we ought to have here today, that ambassadors do have to represent the entire Government.

They do represent the legislative branch and the executive branch and the American people in a very broad sense. They are not the personal representatives of the President in the sense that they reflect only the President's ideological or partisan views. They represent the Government of the United States, or at least that is my interpretation of it. How do you feel?

Ambassador **KENNEDY**. Mr. Chairman, it is perfectly clear that an ambassador must represent the United States; that is, in its broadest sense. He is indeed the United States abroad.

On the other hand, it is also a fact that constitutionally the President is responsible for the conduct of foreign policy. He does this with the advice and consent of the Senate, but nonetheless, he is responsible constitutionally for the implementation of the national policy in this regard. And in that way, the Ambassador must be his personal representative to carry out decisions and actions which the Government chooses to take.

Senator MATHIAS. You raised the possibility of a constitutional question, and I do not want to debate that with you any more than you want to debate it today.

As a practical matter, this committee has been very courteous to Presidents. It was while sitting in the spot that I am now sitting that Senator Fulbright asked an ambassadorial candidate if he knew the name of the Prime Minister of the country for which he had been nominated. And he said he knew it but he could not pronounce it. Then Senator Fulbright followed up with the question, did he know the name of the Prime Minister of India. And he said, well, he could pronounce it but he could not remember it.

Nonetheless, this committee honored the President's wishes and appointed that man to the post. In many ways, those were halcyon days for the United States. We did not realize how good we had it in those days. And these are much more dangerous times. We have just seen the fall of a foreign minister in Great Britain over questions of the proper analysis of diplomatic reporting. And I do not think we want to dwell on that, for obvious reasons, but simply to note that it is an example of how important ambassadors are in this day and age.

I am curious about the discrepancy between the figures which we got from the Department, presumably from your office, and those that you have given us today. We were told on April 19 that 43 percent of ambassadorial appointments to bilateral posts were political. Now, you say this morning that 83 ambassadors are career while 34 are noncareer, a mix of 71 percent.

Ambassador KENNEDY. I can explain that for you, if you would like, Mr. Chairman. It is correct that new appointments made through April 27 totaled 76. I emphasize that these are new appointments. They total 76, of which 44, or 58 percent, were career; 32, or 42 percent, were noncareer.

However, as to the total number of ambassadors in bilateral relations, that is, ambassadors appointed to specific countries, including those left in place—and those were conscious decisions, Mr. Chairman—the total number of career officers occuping the position of ambassador in a bilateral relationship is 83 out of a total of 117, or 71 percent, with 34 noncareer officer persons, for a total of 29 percent.

That is where the discrepancy arises. It depends on what you are talking about, whether you are talking about new appointments or the total number of ambassadors in place. And I emphasize that of those in place, there was a consideration of the country, the situation, and the person. And the decision was consciously made to leave those people in place.

Senator MATHIAS. How many Foreign Service officers of ambassadorial rank are presently assigned to the Department of State in some capacity or other?

Ambassador KENNEDY. To the Department?

Senator MATHIAS. In Washington.

Ambassador KENNEDY. I do not have that at the moment.

Senator MATHIAS. Can you provide us with that, those who are of ambassadorial rank and those who have held the rank of minister?

Ambassador KENNEDY. Yes, I will provide that information. I do not have the number here.

[The information referred to follows:]

FORMER AMBASSADORS AND CAREER MINISTERS (CM) WHO ARE ASSIGNED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND ELSEWHERE IN THE UNITED STATES (57)

A. ASSIGNED TO THE DEPARTMENT (41)

Abramowitz, Morton I., CM, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs.

Asencio, Diego C., CM, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Consular Affairs.

Bishop, James K., Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of African Affairs.

Bosworth, Stephen W., Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs.

Burke, John R., Deputy Assistant Secretary, Classification/Declassification Center.

Clark, Joan M., Director General of the Foreign Service and Director of Personnel.

Cohen, Herman J., CM, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

Crigler, Trusten Frank, Director, Office of Mexican Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs.

Crowley, Jr., John J., Senior Inspector, Office of the Inspector General.

Depree, Willard A., Executive Assistant to the Under Secretary for Management.

Eagleburger, Lawrence, CM, Under Secretary for Political Affairs.

Edmondson, William B., Senior Inspector, Office of the Inspector General.

Enders, Thomas O., CM, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs.

Fox, Jr., Richard K., Deputy Inspector General, Office of the Inspector General.

Fritts, Robert E., Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Consular Affairs.

Goodby, James E., State Department Representative and Deputy Head of U.S. Delegation to START Negotiations.

Handyside, Holsey G., Office of Management Operations.

Helman, Gerald R., Coordinator, Conference on UNISPACE, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs.

Holdridge, John H., Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs.

Isham, Heyward, Office of the Inspector General.

Jones, William B., Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

Landau, George W., Commission for Radio Broadcasting to Cuba, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs.

Linehan, Jr., John A., Senior Inspector, Office of the Inspector General.

Low, Stephen, CM, Director, Foreign Service Institute.

Lowenstein, James G., Bureau of European Affairs.

Maestrone, Frank E., Director, U.S. Sanai Support Mission.

Marks, Edward, Office for Combatting Terrorism.

Miller, Robert H., CM, Director, Office of Management Operations.

Ostrander, Nancy, Bureau of Consular Affairs.

Pelletreau, Jr., Robert, Director, Office of Arabian Peninsula Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.

Perry, Jack R., Coordinator, Executive Seminar in National and International Affairs.

Ridgway, Rozanne L., CM., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State.

Sayre, Robert M., CM, Director, Office for Combatting Terrorism.

Schneider, David T., Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.

Steigman, Andrew L., Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Personnel.

Stoessel, Jr., Walter J., CA (Career Ambassador), Deputy Secretary of State.

Tienken, Arthur T., Director, Office of Foreign Career Development and Assignments, Bureau of Personnel.

Toussaint, Donald R., Senior Inspector, Office of the Inspector General.

Twinam, Joseph W., Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.

Veliotes, Nicholas A., CM, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.

Vine, Richard D., CM, Director, Bureau for Refugee Programs.

Wisner II, Frank G., Bureau of African Affairs.

B. ASSIGNED ELSEWHERE IN THE UNITED STATES

Aggrey, Rudolph O., CM, Foreign Affairs Fellow, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.

Anderson, Robert, Special Assistant for International Affairs to Commander in Chief, Atlantic Command and to Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, Norfolk, Virginia.

Bean, Maurice D., Deputy Commandant, Air War College, Montgomery, Alabama.

Binns, Jack R., Foreign Affairs Fellow, University of California, Berkeley, California.

Bodde, Jr., William, Foreign Affairs Fellow, East/West Center, Honolulu, Hawaii.

Boeker, Paul H., CM, Leave Without Pay (At his request).

Clingerman, John R., Foreign Affairs Fellow, Redlands University, Redlands, California.

Davis, Nathaniel, CM, Deputy Commandant, Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island.

Dean, Jonathan, Foreign Affairs Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C.

Gonzalez, Raymond E., Foreign Affairs Fellow, Monterrey Institute, Monterrey, California.

Laingen, Lowell B., Vice President, National Defense University, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C.

Lane, George M., Diplomat-in-Residence, Portland State University, Portland, Oregon.

Pezzullo, Lawrence, CM, Diplomat-in-Residence, University of Georgia, Athens, Georgia.

Spain, James W., CM, Foreign Affairs Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C.

Wolle, William D., Faculty Member, Industrial College of the Armed Forces Fort McNair, Washington, D.C.

Senator MATHIAS. Can you project the number of ambassadorial vacancies that may occur within the next year? Of course, to some extent, that is subject to the vagaries of life and health, life and death, and all the rest of it.

Ambassador KENNEDY. I would estimate—and it is purely an estimate and should not be taken as any clear and positive indication of the number—but I would estimate that it may run to a total of perhaps 20.

Senator MATHIAS. Could you give us a projection as to how many of those 20 are likely to be filled out of the career service?

Ambassador KENNEDY. I can only say that career officers will be considered in the process of selecting for every one of them. It would be presumptuous of me to indicate what the President would propose.

Senator MATHIAS. Obviously, this is the President's decision.

Ambassador KENNEDY. Yes, sir.

Senator MATHIAS. I hope he will have the benefit of your good advice on the matter.

Ambassador KENNEDY. He often has the benefit, sir. Whether he takes it is his choice, and I abide by that.

In all cases, Mr. Chairman—let me make sure that the record is clear on this—in all cases, there has been a panel consideration of career officers who might be appropriate to fill every post.

Senator MATHIAS. Before I yield to Senator Pell, I am wondering if I could amend my question to you about persons now [illegible] Department who have held ambassadorial or ministerial rank. If you could also indicate what their present duties may be, we would appreciate that.

Ambassador KENNEDY. We would be very pleased to do that.

Senator MATHIAS. Thank you.

Senator Pell.

Senator PELL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am very glad and proud to join with you in cosponsoring S. 1886. As long as we have had diplomatic representation, Presidents have tended to use the post of chief of mission as a means of rewarding political cronies, friends, supporters, and contributors.

Such a practice has often done the United States some disservice in our relations abroad, and at other times a great deal of disservice. It is also an abuse freely indulged in by all previous administrations, both Democratic and Republican.

Common sense would dictate that as the times become more perilous, that United States should increasingly rely on professional skills available in our career Foreign Service. Regrettably, the present administration appears to feel otherwise. And I recognize the point that the career ambassadors who are remaining in place should be counted as being credited to the administration.

But I think we all agree that, if you look at the new appointments, the percentage is really far too high for political appointees. It is the highest percentage of actual new political appointees for the first year of any administration since that of Herbert Hoover.

Apparently, the administration feels this trend, though, has not gone far enough. And on April 7 the White House personnel director, Mr. Pendleton James, said, "The question is not whether we have too many political appointees, we do not have enough. I fight in every case for a political appointee instead of a career officer if the political officer appointee is qualified."

And he went on to give us the reasons as being the greater access the political appointee would have with the White House, with the President, and that is general the national interest would be better served by increasing the number of political appointees.

I wrote a rebuttal to this which appeared in an op-ed piece in the Los Angeles Times on April 21. I ask unanimous consent that that article be included in the record at this point.

Senator MATHIAS. Without objection.

[The article referred to follows:]

[From the Los Angeles Times, Apr. 21, 1982]

GOOD DIPLOMATS DON'T GROW ON POLITICAL PLUM TREES

(By Claiborne Pell)

To judge by comments made on April 7 by the White House personnel director, E. Pendleton James, the problem with American diplomacy is that there are too many career Foreign Service officers serving as ambassadors abroad. According to this thesis, career diplomats suffer from chronic deficiencies: They don't have direct access to the President or to his top advisers and, as professional diplomats, they are small-minded bureaucrats who represent only themselves and are fit only to tend to the minutiae of embassy operations.

Having thus consigned the career Foreign Service to the role of diplomatic hewers of wood and carriers of water, James went on to say: "The question is not whether we have too many political appointees. We don't have enough. I fight in every case for a political appointee instead of a career officer if the political appointee is qualified." Judging by the vast majority of non-career nominees who have come before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, a very easy standard of competence is applied.

As the only former career Foreign Service officer ever to sit in the Senate and as one who has personally known outstanding career diplomats such as George F. Kennan and Charles E. Bohlen and the late Llewellyn E. Thompson and W. Walton Butterworth, I consider the White House's attitude toward career diplomats not only demeaning but dangerous. In these perilous times it is essential that our country be represented abroad by the best and most experienced talent available. For the most part, that talent resides in the career Foreign Service, and to deny that this talent exists will only ensure that our brightest young people will reject careers in the Foreign Service.

This is not to say that there is no place for non-career ambassadors. John Kenneth Galbraith, Donald H. Rumsfeld and the late David K. E. Bruce were excellent non-career ambassadors, as are Arthur F. Burns and Mike Mansfield today. The point, however, is that a non-career ambassador should have clearly demonstrated talents and experience that compare favorably with the rigorous training and extensive on-the-job experience of professional diplomats.

James' allegation that career diplomats are fit only to "carry out the minutiae, the day-to-day operations of the embassy that ambassadors don't bother with" is simply not true. More often than not, a non-career ambassador is educated by the embassy's career staff, which ensures that he commits a minimum of gaffes, guides him through the language barrier and generally props him up and makes him look good.

To consider access to the inner circle of the White House the primary criterion for appointment as an ambassador is to suggest that our foreign relations are conducted on the basis of personal connections. Would a keen analysis of a foreign situation or a cogent policy recommendation be ignored unless the ambassador communicating it is a friend of Ronald Reagan or on a first-name basis with presidential counselor Ed Meese?

If political appointees are needed to improve the quality of U.S. diplomacy, why should we limit the benefits from the downgrading of career personnel to the State Department? Why not appoint advertising executives to serve as generals and admirals? Why not place washing-machine manufacturers in the top echelons of the Federal Bureau of Investigation? Why not assign soap salesmen as chiefs of Central Intelligence Agency stations abroad? Wouldn't their access to the White House inner circle improve our military preparedness, promote more effective crime control and ensure that the President is fully aware of what the Soviets are up to?

If adding more political appointees is the key to improving our diplomacy, why not unleash an army of corporate cronies, political party functionaries and assorted ideologues to carry out the President's policies at all levels of government? Why not, indeed, do away with the concept of a career government service and bring back the spoils system?

Senator PELL. I would be interested in what your reaction would be to one point I made in that article, Mr. Kennedy. I was saying, if this were really correct, then why should only the Department of State receive the benefit of having political appointees? Why should not the Army and its generals, the Navy and its admirals, and maybe the Assistant Director of the FBI also have the benefit of political appointment? Why should the political appointees not be sent there so that they could have greater access to the White House so that these benefits could be spread and not only limited to the Department of State?

I ask you as a former military man and as one for whom I have the greatest personal regard whether, Mr. Kennedy, you think it would be equally appropriate for generals and admirals to be appointed from the ranks of contributors and political supporters? What would be your reaction to that thought?

Ambassador **Kennedy**. Seriously, Senator, I do understand your concern. But facetiously, if I may be facetious, I understand that was done around the days of the Civil War. I believe that was done, and I do not think it worked out too well.

Senator **Pell**. Yes, you are right. We did do it then. Theodore Roosevelt did a pretty good job also in 1898, but they only made him a colonel.

Ambassador **Kennedy**. Senator, first of all, I think I would have to say that I am not sure that the analogy is quite the same. We are not talking about appointing officers into the Foreign Service in a political sense. We are talking about appointing people to positions which, in fact, as Senator Mathias so well pointed out, represent the entire Government of the United States.

They are not representatives of the Department of State. They are not, as I indicated in my statement, the senior Department of State official in the country.

By the way, that is something which sometimes some in the Department tend to forget, and that causes other problems here in town as we try to work through the bureaucratic maze to get decisionmaking straightened out. But they are not that. They are not the senior Department of State official there, they are the senior U.S. official. I think there is a slight difference in that respect.

Senator **Pell**. There is a slight difference, but there are also some similarities, and we will, I guess, agreeably agree to disagree on this particular point.

I guess I feel particularly strong on it, because while I never had a particularly distinguished career in the Foreign Service, I am the only Senator who I think has ever been a member of the career service which was created by the Rogers Act of 1924.

So I have followed this and seen it through the eyes of my old colleagues in the Service. I know what it does to them as they realize that the ambassador's baton is increasingly removed from their reach. It does concern me.

I would ask also in the record of this hearing if our chairman, perhaps with undue modesty did not put into the record his own article in the Foreign Service Journal.

Senator **Mathias**. No, I did not.

Senator **Pell**. With his own modesty, he did not put it in. I ask unanimous consent that we insert into the record at this point an excellent article by Senator Charles Mathias on this subject, and also one by Ambassador Malcolm Toon on the same subject. I would hope these two articles could be made a part of this hearing.

Senator **Mathias**. As long as the cover is not included. [General laughter.]

Without objection, it is so ordered.

[The articles referred to follow:]

[From the Foreign Service Journal, April 1982]

POLITICS OR MERIT?

A SENATE BILL INTRODUCED LATE LAST YEAR LIMITS THE NUMBER OF NON-CAREER AMBASSADORS

(By Charles McC. Mathias, Jr.)

For four years, from 1807 to 1811, William Pinkney, a square-shouldered, blue-eyed Annapolis lawyer, labored as the American minister in London to prevent war with England. Although Pinkney ultimately failed in his mission, his efforts inspired Henry Adams to comment that "America never sent an abler representative to the Court of London."

Pinkney was a member of that first generation of brilliant American diplomats who were drawn from public and private life briefly to represent their country abroad and afterwards returned to their law practices, their farms, and the domestic political arena. Pinkney himself returned from London to be appointed attorney general, fight in the Battle of Bladensburg, and serve as a member of the House of Representatives, minister to Russia, and finally as U.S. senator from Maryland.

Now, 160 years after William Pinkney graced the Senate with his remarkable presence, I find myself deeply engaged in an effort that seems to belie my distinguished predecessor's achievements as a citizen-soldier-diplomat-politician. In fact, in November 1981, I introduced a bill in the Senate to limit the number of non-career chiefs of diplomatic missions.

My intention in this legislation, however, is not to prevent modern day William Pinkneys from being appointed ambassadors. Rather, it is to provide a safeguard against overloading the diplomatic circuits with political patronage appointments.

Article II, Section 2, of the Constitution imposes special obligations on members of the Senate regarding the appointment of ambassadors. It specifies that: [The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors. . . ." Sharing the power of appointment with the president is not a passive role. It compels the Senate to use its authority to ensure that the United States is represented abroad by its ablest men and women.

Shaping current attitudes

To understand some of the problems about how we choose our ambassadors, it is useful to consider the unique historical experience which has shaped our attitude towards diplomacy and diplomats. When the United States won its independence, it also broke with European diplomatic practice. During the nineteenth century, while most of the countries of Europe moved toward professionalizing their diplomatic corps, the United States moved in a different direction. The newly independent republic looked upon ambassadorial rank and privilege with a jaundiced eye and found it undemocratic. It viewed European courts as nests of intrigue, and it distrusted diplomats who spent years abroad subject to foreign influences, believing they emerged tainted from the experience. As a result, the United States sent few envoys abroad and did not give even these the rank of ambassador. More importantly, the first American diplomats were consciously chosen from the mainstream of American life and, as was the case with William Pinkney, returned to other careers following their diplomatic service.

Perhaps nothing symbolizes more the uniqueness of American diplomatic practice in this period than that five of the first eight presidents (both John Adams and John Quincy Adams, Jefferson, Monroe, and Van Buren) served as American ministers resident abroad. Not only was this without parallel in Europe at the time, but, even today, it stands as unique in diplomatic history. The outstanding individuals who served the United States abroad in those early years, among them, of course, Benjamin Franklin, created a legacy which strongly reinforced the idea that a professional diplomatic crops was both unnecessary and undesirable.

Over the last two-thirds of the nineteenth century and into the early twentieth century, this legacy tended to obscure the uglier realities of the spoils system and patronage politics. Beginning with Andrew Jackson, continuing through Ulysses S. Grant and even Woodrow Wilson, chiefs of U.S. missions abroad were chosen largely from the ranks of the president's friends and supporters. With each change in party in the White House, qualified and unqualified American ministers were packed off to be replaced by others who had earned their posts through family ties, political influence, or campaign support. General Grant sent his brother-in-law to Denmark, his secretary's uncle to Belgium, and a military crony to Spain. None distinguished himself. Woodrow Wilson's appointments were described by diplomatic historian E. Wilder Spaulding as, for the most part, "a non-descript team of lame ducks, non-entities, and political innocents."

Of course, there also were some distinguished representatives during this period. Charles Francis Adams, whom President Lincoln selected to serve as minister to London during the difficult Civil War years, proved to be a superb choice. Adams' diplomatic skill in maintaining British neutrality contributed greatly to the Union victory. But, in choosing Adams, Lincoln seems to have been motivated more by domestic political considerations than by Adams' qualifications for the post. In a biography of his father, Charles Francis Adams, Jr. compares Lincoln's approach to filing this sensitive diplomatic post with the way the president would select a local postmaster.

Founding a career service

Over time, revelations of corruption and incompetence gradually nudged the country toward a career service based on merit. Meanwhile, a few skilled diplomats, such as Eugene Schuyler, William Scruggs, and Henry White, managed to survive the changes of administration to form the core of a professional diplomatic service. In 1924, passage of the Foreign Service Act was a major step toward creating a pool of experienced career diplomats from which ambassadorial appointments could be made. In that year, 18 of 51 chiefs of mission were career officers. By 1928, some 30 of 58 chiefs of mission were career. Throughout the remainder of the period between the two world wars, the career segment in the ambassadorial ranks remained close to the 50 percent mark.

The next jump in the percentage of career chiefs of mission came after World War II. As the United States assumed global responsibilities and the number of overseas missions expanded, the percentage of career chiefs of mission rose in an almost unbroken line to 71 percent by 1960. For the next 20 years, the percentage of career ambassadors hovered around the 70 percent mark. It dropped as low as 64 percent one year under President Kennedy and rose to a high of 78 percent one year under President Carter. Changes in campaign financing laws, increases in some representation allowances, and Congressional insistence on more qualified nominees have all helped to establish more firmly the career principle.

Nevertheless, no president in recent memory has resisted the temptations and pressures to make patronage appointments. While there have been such outstanding non-career appointments as Shirley Temple Black, Mike Mansfield and his predecessor in Japan, Edwin Reischauer, John Sherman Cooper, and Averell Harriman, there have also been a number of questionable choices and some real losers. President Truman sent the "Hostess with the Mostest"—the chairman of his inaugural ball—to Europe; President Eisenhower nominated a businessman who admitted in his confirmation hearing that he did not know the name of the prime minister of the country to which he was being sent; and President Nixon picked an ambassador who had donated $300,000 to his campaign.

The Reagan record

The Reagan administration is no more immune than its predecessors to criticism of its ambassadorial choices. After monitoring the new administration's appointments, the American Foreign Service Association issued a statement in October 1981 critical of the fact that then some 44 percent of the administration's first 81 appointments had come from outside the ranks of the career Foreign Service. While welcoming such non-career appointments as Arthur Burns to Bonn and Maxwell Rabb to Rome, AFSA complained that "the selection of political ambassadors continues to be a reward for party loyalty and campaign participation."

The administration defended itself by pointing to the number of career ambassadors retained at their posts. In an appearance before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last November, Secretary of State Alexander Haig argued that when the number of retained ambassadors was added to the new appointments, the administration's record was roughly the same as its predecessors. Secretary Haig also pointed out that ambassadorial assignments tend to follow a cycle. In the first years in office, a new administration typically would select a high percentage of political appointees, then, in its later years, there would be a higher percentage of career ambassadors.

In December, Assistant Secretary of State Richard Fairbanks sent Senator Charles Percy (R.-Ill.), chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, figures to support Secretary Haig's position. These statistics showed that while only 43 of 85 of the administration's new appointees were career officers, 41 career ambassadors remained at post. This brought the overall percentage of career officers up to 65 percent, considerably closer to the 76 percent figure achieved by the Carter administration.

It would appear that both AFSA and the administration have made some valid points in this debate. To the Association, the number of new appointments from the career ranks is disturbingly low. Even when the retained career ambassadors are counted, the percentage of ambassadors from the career service has dropped 11 percent in one year. This is the largest drop in career appointments for any one-year period since at least 1960.

The pattern of administration appointments in certain areas of the world also raises questions. New appointments in both Western Europe and the Caribbean seem to be heavily weighted in favor of political ambassadors. Ten of 14 ambassadors to NATO capitals, and 14 of 18 ambassadors to European OECD capitals, are political appointees. And a political ambassador has just been named to Ireland. In the Caribbean, only one of four new ambassadors is career, and it is likely that another vacancy, the Bahamas, will go to a political appointee. Though all of these non-career appointees have distinguished themselves in other fields, and some will no doubt make excellent ambassadors, it is hard to understand why there is so little room for career officers in these areas. The European alliance is the keystone to American foreign policy. With growing political and economic strains between the United States and its Western Europe allies, European capitals can no longer be regarded as comfortable posts to be filled by friends and political supporters. Rising nationalism and desperate economic problems make the Caribbean posts far too sensitive to be viewed as rewards for party and personal loyalty. Both of these regions are crucial to U.S. interests and demand the experience and skills of career ambassadors.

At the same time, the administration has made a number of valid points in defense of its appointments record. A cursory look at the Carter administration's first-year appointments to bilateral posts does lend some support to the argument made by Secretary Haig. President Carter's percentage of career appointments to bilateral posts in his first year was 65 percent, a figure below the overall level achieved later in his administration. This suggests that political considerations *do* weigh more heavily in an administration's first year. It is unfair, then, to compare President Reagan's first year with the four-year record of the Carter administration. However, the Carter first-year record for new appointments still beats the Reagan administration's by eight percentage points.

The administration has a number of other points more clearly in its favor. For example, nominating a career officer. Walter Stoessel, as deputy secretary lends credence to the administration's assurances that it values the career service and that greater numbers of career ambassadorial appointment can be expected in the future. In addition, while it is true that more posts have switched from career to non-career, a number of the most important posts, such as Moscow and Beijing, have shifted the other way. This suggests what every statistician knows: That numbers will tell you anything you want them to. It also suggests that they should not be the sole indicator of the health of the career service.

After studying the administration and AFSA arguments, my own conclusion is that both sides place too much emphasis on whether the situation is "better" or "worse" under the current administration than its predecessors. I suspect that this administration's record, after four years, probably will end up looking pretty much like those of its predecessors. But I can't take much satisfaction in that.

Ending "diplomacy by dilettantism"

Reviewing the record of the Reagan administration, as well as the record of the previous administration, convinces me that the time has come to end what George Kennan once called "diplomacy by dilettantism." The bill I have introduced, S. 1886, the Chiefs of Diplomatic Missions Bill, would help us do that. S. 1886 would amend the Foreign Service Act of 1980 to provide that not less than 85 percent of the total number of chiefs of mission be members of the career service.

The approach which this bill takes is not new. In 1973, Arkansas' J. William Fulbright, then-chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, tried unsuccessfully to pass legislation limiting the percentage of non-career ambassadors. In each of the next two years, I introduced bills placing a 20-percent limit on non-career appointments. Although neither of these measures passed, the Senate in 1976 did adopt my compromise amendment to the State Department authorization bill providing for a 25-percent limit on non-career ambassadors. In the conference with the House, the amendment was watered down to a mild statement of support for a "great number" of career ambassadors.

Obviously, limiting the percentage of non-career ambassadors does not in itself ensure that qualified ambassadors will be selected. There is no way that Congress can legislate quality appointments. Nor is it my intention to exclude qualified non-career individuals from consideration as ambassadors. The concept of the non-professional ambassador is deeply rooted in our history, and many Americans who were not professional diplomats have made outstanding contributions to American diplomacy. We will continue to need the new ideas and fresh perspective which they bring to diplomacy.

My intention in introducing S. 1886 is to control the abuse of ambassadorial appointments for patronage purposes and to strengthen the career service. To achieve these objectives, the bill would affect the nomination and confirmation process in three ways:

First, the bill, if enacted into law, would encourage more careful scrutiny of non-career appointments within the administration. A president who knows that he has a limited number of non-career appointments can be expected to make choices with considerable care;

Second, a limit on non-career ambassadors would act as a shield to protect well-intentioned administrations from the temptations and pressures of patronage politics. And it would restrain administrations more prone to spoils than to merit;

Third, a limit on non-career appointments would offset the strong bias in the Senate in favor of confirmation of nominees.

As any long-time observer of the confirmation process knows, the Senate rarely challenges a presidents' ambassadorial nominations. Most members of the Senate believe the president is entitled to have those whom he wants serving him. In general, we have neither the time nor the inclination to engage in bruising battles over a single ambassadorial nomination, unless the selection is palpably egregious. Politically, there is little to be gained from such a fight, and contrary to the stereotype, most senators do not enjoy grilling a hapless nominee in front of his family and friends. It is unrealistic, then, to expect that the confirmation process will screen out any but the most obviously unqualified nominees.

My main aim in limiting the number of non-career chiefs of mission is to strengthen the career service. Obviously, there have been career ambassadors who were not qualified for their posts. Every Foreign Service officer has a favorite horror story to tell. And it would be naive to assume that all future career ambassadors will be qualified. However, in the long run, the best hope for having consistently well-qualified ambassadors clearly lies in strengthening the career service. One of the most important ways of accomplishing this is to increase the prospect that career officers can aspire to the highest positions in their profession. Without this possibility, it is difficult to see how we can continue to attract and retain trained, dedicated individuals at a time when Foreign Service life involves increasing hardships and danger. Limiting non-career appointments is not just a matter of fairness to the career service, it is a question of the best interests of the country.

Ambassadors in an uncertain world

Whatever the fate of S. 1886, it is obvious that the United States needs more than ever to be represented abroad by the best men and women we can find. Perhaps we cannot aspire to the heights of those glorious years when future presidents represented America abroad. But we can certainly aspire to a better system than we have now. Skillful diplomacy is more important today to the security of the United States than at any time since the Republic was created. The United States now finds itself in a world in which it cannot readily impose its will on others nor retreat to the safety of isolation. Where we once could use military or economic power to work our will in the world, we now find ourselves constrained and our options limited. The United States can no longer go it alone. As crises in Poland, Afghanistan, and the Mideast show, we need the support of our allies, we need the cooperation of non-aligned countries, and we need to communicate clearly with our potential adversaries. Bargaining, negotiation, and consensus building are the order of the day. To succeed in such a world, we must ensure that our side of the table is peopled with skilled and experienced diplomats, who are imbued with a knowledge of history and who have the wisdom to understand why Napolean said: "Essentially, the great question remains 'Who will hold Constantinople?' "

[From the Foreign Service Journal, April 1982]

A Conversation With Malcolm Toon: The Foreign Service and the National Interest

When Malcolm Toon, at the time U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union, retired from the Foreign Service in 1979, the press reported that he was openly angry upon learning that his replacement was to be a political appointee. During his tenure in Moscow, Toon had made known his belief that the post should be reserved for career diplomats who spoke Russian and had had previous experience with the Soviets. Only with an ambassador possessing such qualifications, he told reporters, could the Moscow embassy fulfill its critical role and the national interests of the United States be safeguarded from Soviet opportunism. When Toon informed the Carter administration of his intention to retire, he reaffirmed this position.

But at the Vienna summit of June 1979, Toon discovered—almost at the same time that the press did—that his replacement was to be Thomas J. Watson, a former chairman of the board of IBM. Watson's appointment was interpreted by some journalists as an indication that the administration hoped to improve economic ties with the Soviets. But Watson neither spoke Russian nor had experience in dealing with the Soviets. By the time Toon left his post in the fall, his displeasure was well known.

Toon retired with a distinguished record in the Foreign Service. After joining the diplomatic corps following World War II, he held a variety of posts in Europe, including two terms in Moscow. At one time he was in charge of Soviet affairs at the State Department. He rose to the rank of ambassador in 1969, when he was sent to Czechoslovakia. Later, the press reported that he was being considered for the ambassadorship in Moscow, but at the last minute another officer went to the Soviet Union and Toon instead became ambassador to Yugoslavia. He made his only tour of duty outside of Europe when in 1975 he was named ambassador to Israel. He was appointed as interim ambassador to the Soviet Union by the outgoing Ford administration. President Carter, apparently favoring the idea of a political ambassador, initially withdrew Toon's nomination, but by the end of April 1977 the new administration had reconsidered and Toon was officially retained. He remained in Moscow until his retirement.

During his career, Toon gained a reputation as one of this country's leading professional diplomats. The New York Times, when reporting his appointment to Moscow, stated that he was regarded as the "top Soviet specialist among the senior diplomats in the career service." Earlier, the Times quoted a colleague of Toon as saying that "[Toon] always put American interests first and was not affected by 'localitis.' "

Toon also gained a reputation for candor. Hardly a story appeared about him that did not include adjectives such as "outspoken," "tart-tongued," and "tough-talking." Nor was his candor limited to the subject of non-career ambassadors in Moscow. His comments on the adversarial nature of U.S.-Soviet relations and his reputation for taking a tough view of Moscow's behavior caused the Soviet leadership to be less than enthusiastic about his appointment. When his posting to Moscow was first announced by President Ford, the Kremlin held up its approval for more than two months. Moreover, during the next few years the Soviets publicly chastised Toon for statements he made on the Soviet system.

Since his retirement, Malcolm Toon has not lapsed into silence. Far from it. He has continued to speak out on issues of importance: SALT détente, the general nature of U.S.-Soviet relations. And he has reiterated his belief in a strong career Foreign Service in hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in speeches around the country, and in interviews for the press.

Toon says he is not concerned with the morale of the Foreign Service for narrow professional considerations but rather with the effect on the national interest of having non-career persons in key diplomatic posts. As he remarks in this interview, the United States has had an imposing task entrusted to it since 1945—a task he says demands the active use of a competent and professional diplomatic corps if it is to be successful. Without qualified, experienced people as U.S. representatives abroad, Toon believes, we not only risk the disrespect of other governments but also endanger the effectiveness of U.S. policy and the safety of our national interests.

With the Reagan administration's appointments of non-career ambassadors hovering near the fifty-percent mark, Toon is concerned that the role of a professional Foreign Service may be neglected more than ever because unqualified persons may be dealing with our allies and adversaries. Moreover, he fears a growing ideological component in the selection of ambassadors and senior officials. In Toon's view it seems that political loyalty to the administration in power is becoming more important than competence and experience. By continuing to neglect its professional diplomats, Toon believes, the United States risks threatening its own national interests.

As part of the Journal's continuing presentation of a variety of views on vital professional and foreign policy issues, we bring our readers the following conversation with Malcolm Toon. —F.G.B.

Journal. There is a lot of unhappiness in the Foreign Service concerning the many senior Foreign Service officers who are without jobs and the large number of political appointments that have been made—appointments to places where they have not been made before or only rarely, such as Romania and Fiji—and to levels lower than before, levels generally reserved for career officers—such as the consul general's position in Bermuda. In the department, positions down to the level of office director have been filled with political appointments in a number of places. How do you see these developments?

Toon. Once we start to go below the ambassadorial level and appoint people who are currently in the present administration or heavy contributors to the party in power to these lower-level posts, then I think we are in trouble—not we in the Foreign Service, but we as a nation. We have abolished the spoils system as far as the civil service is concerned but we have never done it for the Foreign Service. A very bad precedent has been made in the Bermuda appointment. And when defeated congressmen and heavy contributors to the party receive ambassadorial appointments, I think the result is that, in the long run and with some exceptions, we are regarded as a bit strange, especially by our European allies. After all, we are the only major country in the world that resorts to this sort of practice. Our friends must wonder about our ability to cope with the problems we face as long as we behave this way.

Journal. Are you unhappy about the way matters have been going in this administration regarding political appointments?

Toon. I have been unhappy about other administrations as well, but this time I was surprised that Mr. Reagan went this route, particularly after his very strong statements during the campaign about relying on the professionals in government. He promised throughout his campaign that he would make sure that every appointee to every ambassadorial post would be entirely qualified. Now to me this meant he would rely primarily on the professional service. I do not think he has done that. I don't know what the exact percentages are now, but there have been reports in the Journal and in the press which indicate to me that we are worse off under this administration than we have been for years. I don't think this is a good development at all.

Journal. There are indications that the percentage of political appointees is definitely higher—currently AFSA's figures show political appointees are running at about 50 percent. Before the Carter administration the percentage used to run in the 30-percent bracket, and Carter brought it down to 27 percent. Of course the present administration has not completed its appointments; but 50 percent of the appointments they have made have been non-career ambassadors, and to places they normally have not been sent—Bucharest, the Fiji islands, and elsewhere.

Toon. I'm not terribly upset about sending a political appointee to Fiji, but to Bucharest, I think that's a mistake. Some political appointees have occasionally been credited with knowing the local language or having lived there. But I don't think this is a justification for appointing this man to this job. I see in the press this man is a close friend of Senator Jesse Helms. This is apparently a part of the political process in which we unfortunately are engaged in the State Department. I think this is a very, very bad business we are involved in—making sure that Senator Helms is satisfied by giving him the right to "appoint" certain people to certain jobs. I frankly don't think we can survive as a major power with a major leadership role in the free world so long as we behave this way. I think we have to appoint far more qualified professionals than this administration is prepared to do. I am reluctant to condemn this administration so sweepingly, but I feel very strongly about this malpractice.

JOURNAL. You mentioned Senator Helms, a man who some people have said has been unique in practically appointing people in the executive branch himself—certainly he has pressured the White House to appoint his favorites. But others have said that appointments have been made in past administrations to satisfy particular members of Congress. Do you think Senator Helms's actions are unusual from past situations or is it just a matter of degree?

TOON. It is different in the sense that I don't think we have ever had a senator who has insisted that certain people have certain qualifications and pass certain standards if he is going to vote for them. At least in my experience, this is a departure from precedent—and I think a very dangerous one, unfortunately, I do think there ought to be people in the administration, including the secretary of state and his deputies, who have enough courage to resist this sort of thing, and to say to Senator Helms, "Look, we are not going to appoint just people who are acceptable to you. We are going to appoint people who we think are qualified for the job. And you are going to have to go along with this." Frankly, I have not seen that sort of courage and forthrightness on the part of some of the people who hold responsible jobs in this administration. That distresses me as a concerned former Foreign Service officer.

JOURNAL. Does this trend toward political appointees stem from the idea that diplomacy somehow is not a profession? Is there a notion in this country that anybody with a little reading and maybe a little language training can become a diplomat?

TOON. It goes beyond that. I think there is a feeling now that not only can you become a diplomat, you can become an ambassador or a principal negotiator, so long as you have qualifications which are satisfactory politically to the administration. In other words, you have to demonstrate that you have political fidelity and loyalty above professional competence, and I think that is a very bad way to proceed.

JOURNAL. Why is it that we as a country, including the Congress, the executive branch, and the public, accept this approach to international affairs?

TOON. I think this is probably part of our isolationist background. In the Twenties and the Thirties, when people couldn't have cared less about foreign policy and about our position in the world, it made very little difference to the average American and the average Congressman who was serving where abroad. I think, unfortunately, we still have part of this basic tradition within ourselves. I don't think there is sufficient concern on the part of the public and the people on Capitol Hill about this matter. It depends on us, the professionals of the Foreign Service, and on our ability to persuade the public that this is a very bad way to run our diplomatic business.

I have done some speaking around the country and I think we are beginning to overcome the stereotype that some people have of us as striped pants, cookie-pusher types. We have tried, with some success, to get across the idea that we are reasonably intelligent, reliable people, that we understand the job we have to do, and that we have the competence to face up to that job—which I think the American public expects. I think the more we speak around the country, the more the public will have confidence in the Foreign Service. Beyond that, you've got to sell the politicians on the idea that we must have a competent professional service abroad. And we have to get across the idea that it is no longer in the national interest to use the Foreign Service as a dumping ground for people who have been defeated in elections or who have made heavy contributions to the party, because *now* these diplomatic jobs are terribly important. And if the country does not have good people in these jobs, the national interest will suffer and, in the long run, we will prove ourselves unable to cope with the job that has been foisted upon us since World War II. I think it is terribly important to have top-flight people in these jobs. And frankly—I speak subjectively, as a former career Foreign Service officer—I think the most competent people we can have for these positions come from the professional ranks.

Journal. Usually, when we use the term "national security" and "national interest" it is done in regard to the military, not diplomacy. There seems to be a lack of regard for what a well-conducted foreign policy can do for the country. Obviously, that is understood at the level of the secretary of state, but it doesn't seem to filter down below that.

Toon. That may be. Good evidence of that is that we had to resort to the ranks of the military to find a secretary of state. Don't misunderstand me, Alexander Haig has all kinds of qualifications for the job. But at the time he was appointed, I said publicly that I found it distressing that we had to rely on the military to provide possible candidates for the top job in diplomacy. We didn't look within the career Foreign Service. There has been a tendency to rely more on the military than on the professional diplomat.

Journal. Having practiced diplomacy all of your adult life, how do you compare diplomacy with the need for military force to protect the national interest and national security?

Toon. Certainly, you have to have both—a strong military to deal with the problems of the world today, particularly the Soviet menace, but at the same time a good, professional Foreign Service establishment—which I think we have. But the point is that while the military is appreciated by this administration, I don't think the professional Foreign Service is. Evidence of that is the fact that we are apparently going the route where half of our ambassadorial posts are going to political appointees. We are not relying on the professionals to man the negotiating teams and I think this is a big mistake. I think we've got to get this administration to understand that unless they make better use of what I think is the very good talent we have in the Foreign Service, we are going to get into deep trouble. Deep trouble not only in the sense that we will wind up with incompetent people dealing with adversaries, such as the Soviet Union, and around the negotiating table, but also dealing with the fundamental problems we face with the Third World and in Western Europe. In the process we will end up with a very serious lowering of morale in the Foreign Service, with the result that in the long run—I may be totally pessimistic about this—we won't have any Foreign Service at all. How can the United States face up to the problems of this world unless it has a competent, reliable, Foreign Service? I don't see how we can do it. To me the most distressing aspect of what has been going on for the last three or four years is that morale has dropped seriously and in the process the Foreign Service has been badly weakened.

Journal. Is there something that could encourage those who might be thinking of leaving the Service, or could turn around this emasculation of the Service?

Toon. I think each and every one of us in the Service has to do something which would shock the political leadership in Washington into seeing the dangers we face today as a result of this policy of ignoring the professional. Frankly, I would strongly recommend that some of the professionals who are serving on the seventh floor should resign, and when they resign they should go out slamming the door, as some people said I did when I left Moscow. I don't want to be terribly personal about this, but there are people on the seventh floor today who are responsible, in large part, for protecting the interests of the Foreign Service—and therefore the national interest—and they are not doing it. So long as they permit this thing to go on without making a big noise about it, then I think they are not doing their jobs properly. Probably what we have to do is to have a Foreign Service officer in a high position on the seventh floor resign with a bang in order to shake up these people and make them understand that if they don't pay attention to morale in the Foreign Service, and if they don't start using the Foreign Service talent which is there, then they are going to wind up with a very inadequate Foreign Service or perhaps none at all.

Journal. Is resignation necessary? Is it necessary to go outside the Service or is it simply the effect of resignation?

Toon. Somebody ought to be speaking out, and in a very strong voice, about this problem. I can do this, but I'm retired and people will claim I say this because I'm not active. But I spoke up when I was active as an ambassador. I think people who are still active in the Service have a responsibility to fulfill.

Journal. But did senior members of the Service speak up in the past?

Toon. I can only talk from my own experience. I have spoken up as an ambassador and after I retired. I testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1979 on the SALT treaty. But when I testified I was asked some very serious and searching questions by Senator Charles Percy about the Foreign Service and about my attitude toward political appointees as ambassadors.

The senator asked me if I felt that we have had good people serving as ambassadors from outside the Foreign Service—such as David Bruce, Averell Harriman. Don't we need an infusion from time to time? I said, yes, we have had topflight ambassadors brought in from the outside. I said all of us feel there is a justification and a need for new blood from time to time. But I said, for every David Bruce, you get ten Mr. Klunks. At the time I had to be careful about avoiding a libel suit against me and I couldn't name precisely and accurately those I had in mind. So I discussed the problem in general terms.

I told the senators that many years ago there was a man who was a manufacturer of ladies' dresses who was appointed to a post in the Far East. When he came before the Foreign Relations Committee he could name neither the prime minister of the country to which he was appointed nor its capital. I told the senators it was the committee's job to be selective. Of course we need blood from the outside—I think it can be useful—but we do not have to accept the poor sort of talent we have seen over the last year. We have an actor in Mexico City, a political post, the most sensitive post in the hemisphere. It is terribly important for us to have somebody there who is sensitive to Mexican concerns, but we have a Hollywood actor—and not a very good one at that. We have a man in London who owes his place in life to the fact that his parents founded a furniture polish dynasty. His only qualification for the job is that he speaks English. We have a man in Paris, a highly proficient banker, whose main qualification for his job is that he speaks French and is a friend of Giscard d'Estaing—who is out of power and is considered the arch enemy of the man who is running the country. In Germany we have a very eminent economist in a country where our problems are not really economic but primarily political. In Italy we have an equally eminent lawyer who speaks no Italian in a country where the ambassador must speak the language to have an impact. There are at least ten Foreign Service officers far more qualified for each one of these jobs than the person now occupying it. I think that is a sad state of affairs.

JOURNAL. Ase you suggesting that the Foreign Relations Committee might be the mechanism for screening out the "Mr. Klunks"?

TOON. I think that Senator Percy, the chairman, and others on the committee, Senator Baker for example, should speak up more vigorously than they have in the past. Frankly, I think we in the Foreign Service should speak up too. Beyond that, people who are senior in the Foreign Service today who are serving in the State Department ought to speak up for the career people much more vigorously than they have done so far.

JOURNAL. What should be the role of the American Foreign Service Association?

TOON. I'm glad to see that AFSA, in recent months, has spoken out much more vigorously and eloquently on this theme than it has in years. I am glad to see AFSA taking a much more active role. AFSA's job is to get the word out, get it in the *Foreign Service Journal*, and make sure it gets to the press. You have a very sympathetic audience there.

JOURNAL. At the time Ambassador Watson was assigned to Moscow, some said the Association pulled its punches. Many Foreign Service officers were upset because it seemed that unless he was totally unqualified for the Job, we could not keep him from having it. Perhaps we ought to have some positive, objective standards for appointments.

TOON. I was unhappy then too. I told President Carter and Secretary Vance in 1978 that I would be leaving my post in 1979. I had had a good career in the Foreign Service and felt it was time to move on and make room for some of the younger people in the profession. This is what I said to Carter and Vance. At the time, I thought my replacement would obviously be a career man. When I got to Vienna at the summit conference in June 1979 and discovered from Mr. Carter personally that it was going to be Thomas Watson I was disturbed, even angry. Now, don't misunderstand me. Tom Watson is a very fine guy with great ability and impressive qualifications—but as a businessman. I told the president and the secretary that of all posts, Moscow had to be manned by a professional. Their answer was that we really did not have anybody qualified for the post and there may have been some justification for that point of view. But then I began to get some criticism from the Foreign Service that really hurt me. The rationale was, why did you give up this job if you knew a nonprofessional would replace you? If I had known at the time that the job would go to an outsider, I might have stayed on for a while; until, in the view of the administration, a qualified professional was available.

The point is, we have to get AFSA, the top officers in the department, and career ambassadors around the world to speak out about this problem, not in selfish terms but in terms of the national interest. Specifically, how it is bound to suffer in the long run unless we have a Foreign Service with high morale doing the job it is supposed to do. All of us must act in unison.

JOURNAL. Many times during a change of administration, a group of Foreign Service officers becomes identified with the outgoing administration's foreign policy. Would an incoming administration be naive to expect them to be able to shift gears and accept a change in policy? Can the senior Foreign Service officers working in the department with political appointees be sheltered from political pressures so the next administration will be able to believe it can use those people effectively?

TOON. I think it is important to understand that most Foreign Service officers have been absolutely loyal to the administration that happens to be in power. As an officer, if I could not stomach the policy of an administration, I had a choice—comply, or resign and get out. Those of us who stayed in did so because we felt we could highlight the problems of the policy being promulgated, and we had an opportunity to air our opinions in the inner circles. To comply with policy or resign—that has been the role of the senior Foreign Service officer down through the years and that is the way the Foreign Service has behaved. Therefore, I think it is wrong for an incoming administration to consider that just because a person has worked under a political secretary he or she is closely identified with that administration and therefore cannot be loyal to the new administration. With some exceptions, the Foreign Service has basically been loyal to every administration.

JOURNAL. Is there room in between quitting and going along whole-heartedly with a policy you dislike? Is there a possibility for dissent within the department?

TOON. I can't speak for now, but when I was in the department, we had all kinds of opportunities to express our point of view to the assistant secretary or even to the secretary. I may have been defeated, but I was always listened to. If your views have been taken into account, cranked into the deliberations, and the decision is made to go against your recommendation, then you've got to decide whether this is a matter of deep principle to you, and then you have to get out, or whether in fact wiser heads have prevailed, and then you go along.

JOURNAL. It seems new administrations have for some time discarded people because they were associated with the ideology of the previous administration. On the other side, we now seem to be selecting people because they suit the political bent of a senator. Are we moving in the direction of a greater ideological basis to our Foreign Service appointments?

TOON. Well, that may be the case. I hate to think that is happening, but, frankly, some of the things that have happened over the past years tend to say otherwise. This whole question of officers' becoming closely identified with particular administrations and then having their careers finished is very important. I am reluctant to name personalities, but there was the case of Larry Eagleburger, who was told that if Mr. Ford lost the election, the president's people would be out, and there would be no point in Eagleburger's even showing up in the office. I thought this was the wrong attitude to take and said so at the time. It is wrong, in my view, to incriminate a loyal officer who became very closely tied to a secretary of state who is now out of power. He was simply doing his job as a Foreign Service officer. If you start crucifying Foreign Service officers because they occupied high positions in previous administrations, then how can you wind up with a good Foreign Service? You can't do it. They ought to be regarded as professionals doing a job assigned to them. We don't really make policy; policy is made by the political appointees—sometimes on the basis of our advice—and we carry it out. I said before that those who can't in good conscience stomach those policies should get out. But those who stay in should not be crucified by the next administration. I faced the same problem as ambassador to Moscow. I was appointed by Ford; Carter won the election and some of Carter's people decide to "dump Toon"—I was appointed by a Republican and therefore must be closely identified with the Republican philosophy. They were wrong, and their view did not prevail, but this is a danger we will face every four years.

JOURNAL. Senator Mathias is introducing a bill that would limit the number of political appointees to ambassadorial posts. Is it a good idea to legislate change in this area?

TOON. I don't think we should go that route. It seems to me that the Foreign Relations Committee itself should exercise its responsibility to advise the president and see to it that more competent people are appointed than in the past.

JOURNAL. There is of course language in the Foreign Service Act of 1980 that describes the qualities an ambassador ought to have: familiarity with the language, the culture, and so forth. Yet this seems to have been applied only to career officers. It also says that as far as practical, career members of the Foreign Service ought to be appointed as ambassadors. If that language were heeded more, we might move closer to the kind of goals you have expressed today.

TOON. Yes, but I think this really requires a sensible approach on the part of any incoming administration, as well as the Foreign Relations Committee. I don't think that you can legislate percentages of political appointees. I think it is up to the Foreign Relations Committee and the White House to make sure the people they are sending to important posts are qualified. I think if you followed that rule, you would end up with 85 or 90 percent of your ambassadorial posts being filled by career people. I think that's the proper approach.

We as a nation have got to get away from the idea that these posts are for heavy contributors to the party. How do you do that? Obviously, you do not work on the politicians in Washington because they have an ax to grind and certain debts to pay. I think you have to work directly on American public opinion. Frankly, I have been encouraged by the reaction I have gotten when I speak around the country on this topic. The reaction has been very positive.

I want to leave you with two points. First, the top people on active duty have got to do more. Let them resign with a bang, slam the door, make a big noise about it. Secondly, you have got to make sure that you are not just speaking to the Foreign Service community, but that you are speaking to the concerned public. And you do that by making sure what you are saying is getting to the press.

Senator PELL. I was very much struck by another point in Ambassador Toon's article. He made the point that there is an obligation on the part of the members of the career service who hold down the post of director general of the Foreign Service and those jobs within the Department representing the Service to speak up more loudly when they are concerned.

In the past few months I do not think the Foreign Service establishment within the Department has spoken up very vigorously or very loudly for the concerns of the Foreign Service. I am thinking particularly in connection with some of the more questionable appointments that have come.

I would hope that whoever is director general of the Foreign Service would really scream and shout when a particular implausible or impossible appointment is seen coming down the pike.

I think that is enough for me for the moment.

Ambassador KENNEDY. Senator, may I make just one comment?

Senator PELL. Please.

Ambassador KENNEDY. In respect to the career horizons of the Service, it is not only ambassadorial appointments which should be measured, it seems to me, but as well important positions at the policymaking level in the Department itself. I would like to have the record show that for the first time, certainly in recent memory, and certainly as far as my memory extends, the No. 2 officer of the Department, the Deputy Secretary of State is a career Foreign Service officer. The No. 3 person is a career Foreign Service officer. And I can recall a number of years in my own experience working with and around the Department that that has not been the case.

I would also note that four of the five regional Assistant Secretaries are career officers, which is twice as many as was the case in 1980.

Senator PELL. I would agree with you on that. I think that you and Secretary Haig are to be commended on this fact. I realize that those appointments were not easily achieved, and they are good appointments. You are correct. And the administration deserves praise for those appointments.

Ambassador KENNEDY. May I add to that, Senator, that I appreciate those words, because it is indeed a reflection of the administration's view of the importance of and quality of the Service.

Senator PELL. We in the Senate face a very difficult question. I had a nominee come up to see me the other day for an important job within the Department with absolutely no knowledge of the area to which he was being assigned. It was an assistant secretarial appointment. He is a fine man, an intelligent man, an honorable man, a decent man, and a good man. But should one have knowledge of the area over which one will have charge?

I am inclined to vote for the confirmation of this particular individual because he is a man of such fine character and intelligence. But I think it reflects badly on the administration to send people up who are utterly uninformed in the area in which they are being plunged. I do not quite know what the answer is on that. I think as a general rule with the Foreign Service, there should be some smattering of knowledge of any area in the world to which they are sent.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator MATHIAS. Mr. Secretary, like Secretary Haig himself, I believe that your distinguished public service included a period of time in the military.

Ambassador KENNEDY. Yes, sir.

Senator MATHIAS. Do you think that the President's wishes should be equally deferred to if he should choose someone in whom he reposes great personal confidence and nominates him to be an admiral or a general?

Ambassador KENNEDY. I could not answer that question in the abstract, Senator. I guess I would have to know who he was and what his background and competence were. It seems to me, as I indicated, the Constitution itself comprehended that question when it provided the check and balance and put into the hands of this committee the right and obligation to advise and consent.

Senator MATHIAS. I think then we get to kind of the crux of the question. What should an ambassador do in the latter part of the 20th century, what should his qualifications be? What is the job of an ambassador in the latter part of the 20th century?

And also there is the question Senator Pell just asked: Should we have a knowledge of the post to which he is going? What about factors such as language capacity? These are the tools of the trade, just as military and naval knowledge are the tools of trade of the serviceman.

Ambassador KENNEDY. Surely, we believe that language competence and understanding of the area of the country, its traditions, customs, mores, social structure, economic and political development and history, all of those things are useful and indeed are criteria which are looked for.

As I thought about the kinds of things you would want to discuss this morning and questions you might want to raise with me, I did think hard about what an ambassador does. I looked carefully through the letter which President Reagan, as all of his predecessors had, sent to ambassadors not long after taking office, giving them (A) their charge, (B) the limits of their authority and responsibility.

Drawing from that letter, the responsibilities which he outlined run about as follows: First, he would act as the President's personal representative to the Government to which he is accredited. He shares with the President and the Secretary of State the responsibility for the conduct of our relations with that country.

He exercises the full responsibility for direction, coordination, and supervision of all U.S. Government officers and employees in that country except those which might be under the command of a U.S. area military commander or someone under the authority of another chief of mission or on the staff of an international organization.

He oversees the operation of all U.S. Government programs and activities in the country other than military, and we earlier noted that that has its own connotations.

He must keep himself or herself fully informed as to what is going on in all those fields, as to all those activities and responsibilities. And he must report to the Secretary of State and the President and, therefore, through them in terms of their presentation here to the committees themselves ultimately, with directness and with candor on developments that occur in the country, and he must make recommendations for policies and courses of action, including recommendations which may effect changes in existing policy.

He or she must maintain close contact with the U.S. military commanders in the area as that might be appropriate. And in doing all of this, he must follow the highest standards of professional and personal conduct in furtherance of our broader mission of protecting and advancing our interests.

Now, that is a terse outline of all of the things which the President laid out as the responsibilities and duties of an ambassador in today's world.

Now, what does that mean? It seems to me that the Ambassador should not just be skilled in the, shall we say, diplomatic arts, although those are important—must be important.

But as well, managerial competence, broad experience, and as I mentioned earlier, understanding of the culture in its broadest aspects to which the Ambassador will be accredited is important.

Does that give you a picture of the way we look at this, Senator?

Senator MATHIAS. I think that helps to give us a picture. We are, of course, seeking extraordinarily talented men and women to fill these posts. We do not want second-raters. We want them to send the best kind of Americans, fully representative of the best of our country and with these broad capabilities.

But let me ask again what value you place on the language qualification, just for one example?

Ambassador KENNEDY. It is considered quite important, indeed. To the extent that an individual has none, the question is asked whether indeed a reasonable capability can be developed before that individual might go to post. Were that not to be the case, there would be, I think, a serious question of whether the individual could effectively complete his mission or whether there would be some, at least, diminishing effect.

It is important. Indeed, the law makes that clear. We agree with that.

Senator MATHIAS. As you have said, and I think correctly, extensive knowledge of the post, including the culture of the people to whom he or she is to be accredited is important, because without that you do not necessarily know what you are hearing. You can be told something without recognizing the importance of it. So how do you screen prospective candidates in this respect?

Ambassador KENNEDY. Each of those considerations is taken into account as one looks through the background of the individual or individuals concerned. Manifestly, as to candidates who might be proposed from the Foreign Service, the first clear rule is to pick people who have expertise or background in the area or in an area in which there will be some equivalency or common interests.

Let me just point out, however, that language qualification is not universally considered absolutely required in the Service. It is not necessarily possible when you have someone who is particularly suited to a particular job to find necessarily that that individual is qualified in that language. However, the individual concerned will immediately make every effort to develop a level of qualification that will meet the needs adequately. The same thing can be done, of course, with noncareer candidates, and is.

Senator MATHIAS. In assessing how people can meet this rather complex criteria that you have set out, can you tell us how many of the noncareer ambassadors now at post have had some previous foreign affairs experience?

Ambassador KENNEDY. Foreign affairs experience, I need to define what we mean by "foreign affairs experience."

Senator MATHIAS. Well, I am willing to be very liberal in that definition. Let us say, Ambassador Galbraith in Paris previously lived in Paris as a private banker. That is something.

Ambassador KENNEDY. A very high percentage of the individuals.

Senator MATHIAS. Could you provide us with that information for the record?

Ambassador KENNEDY. Let me just say here that a very high percentage, Mr. Chairman, have had definite relationships with the area or the country involved, in an academic role, in private business or in long direct associations. And I think all of those qualifications have been laid out in their appearances before this committee.

But I will make a point of providing you with a detailed list in all cases, representing all of them.

[The information referred to follows:]

FOREIGN AFFAIRS EXPERIENCE

[SUBMITTED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE]

The following non-career bilateral Ambassadors have previous foreign affairs experience, or have close relationship to the post in which they are currently serving:

I. BILATERAL MISSIONS

Name	Post	Experience
Thomas Aranda, Jr	Uruguay	International law practice; former legal counsel for the Mexican Department of Foreign Affairs in Phoenix, Ariz.; special assistant to President Ford on Latin American issues; special adviser to the Inter-American Defense Board; fluent Spanish.
Michael Hayden Armacost	Philippines	Former member of the policy planning staff, Department of State; former special Assistant to the Ambassador to Japan; former international relations professor; fluent German and some Japanese.
Mark Evans Austad	Norway	Former Ambassador to Finland (1975–77); former U.S. Delegate to the Conference on European Security and U.S. Delegate to the 28th United Nations General Assembly; fluent Norwegian.
H. Monroe Browne	New Zealand and Western Samoa.	Former president and chief executive officer, Institute for Contemporary Studies; background in international trade and economic issues.
Arthur F. Burns	Federal Republic of Germany.	Distinguished public servant and former university professor; some German.
John A. Burroughs, Jr	Malawi	Civil service employee of the Department of State—service in the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, the Passport Office, Office for Equal Employment Opportunity, and the Office of the Director General of the Foreign Service.
William Robert Casey, Jr	Niger	Former uranium mining engineer with Conoco; worked in Niger for Conoco (1977–79); also resided and worked in Canada and France; fair French.
Peter H. Daily	Ireland	Former president and chief executive officer of Daily International Group—a privately held multinational communications company.
John E. Dolibois	Luxembourg	Native of Luxembourg; fluent German and Letzeburgesh, and fair French.
Melvin Herbert Evans	Trinidad and Tobago	Former Governor and Delegate to Congress, The Virgin Islands.
Franklin S. Forsberg	Sweden	Director of the Swedish-American Chamber of Commerce; decorated with the Order of Vasa by the King of Sweden; lived in Sweden for 2½ years; fluent Swedish.
David B Funderburk	Romania	Editor, Journal of American-Romanian Christian Literary Studies; former Foreign Service staff officer in Romania in 1975; studied in Romania as a student and later worked as a professor in Romania: fluent Romanian, good French and German.
Evan G. Galbraith	France	International investment banking and international lawyer; worked in Paris 1963–68; fluent French.
John A Gavin	Mexico	Former special adviser to the Organization of American Stages, and member of special State Department task force on Latin America; fluent Spanish, good Italian and Portuguese, and fair French.
John Loeb, Jr	Denmark	International investment banking, including representing Loeb, Rhoades & Co. at World Bank and International Monetary Fund meetings; fluent French.
John J. Louis, Jr	United Kingdom	Former director of International Marketing, S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc.; fair French.
Michael J. Mansfield	Japan	Former U.S. Senator and member of Committee on Foreign Relations.
David C. Miller, Jr	Tanzania	International business and management background with Westinghouse Electric Corp., including 3 years in Lagos, Nigeria, managing extensive construction and training activities; some French.
Ambler Moss, Jr	Panama	Former international lawyer and Department of State employee—special assistant to the Ambassador to the Organization of American States and Deputy Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations; French, Spanish and Catalan language training.
Langhorne A. Motley	Brazil	Raised in Brazil; served in Latin America and researched bilateral United States-Brazilian defense-related issues while on active duty, U.S. Air Force; fluent Portuguese and Spanish.
Robert Dean Nessen	Australia	Former Assistant Secretary of the Navy. Former member of the Executive Committee of the Department of State National Review Board; fair French.
Herman W. Nickel	South Africa	Former director, research unit, Foreign Policy Association; former international and diplomatic correspondent and bureau chief in Europe, Asia, and Africa for Time Magazine; bilingual German and some Russian.
Keith Foote Nyborg	Finland	Lived in Finland for 3 years as a Morman missionary; taught for 8 years at the Ricks College language training mission for missionaries to Finland; fluent Finish.
Charles H. Price II	Belgium	International finance and banking background with broad experience in international economic and commercial activity.

I. BILATERAL MISSIONS—Continued

Name	Post	Experience
Maxwell M. Rabb	Italy	International lawyer; former administrative assistant to U.S. Senators Henry Cabot Lodge and Sinclair Weeks, and consultant to Secretary of Navy Forrestal; former member of Panel of Conciliators, World Bank's International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (1967–74), and U.S. Representative to the ICSID (1974–77); some French, Spanish, and German.
John Hathaway Reed	Sri Lanka	Former Governor of Maine (1960–66); former Ambassador to Sri Lanka (1976).
Joseph Verner Reed, Jr	Morocco	Former assistant to the chairman and Vice President, Chase Manhattan Bank; former assistant to the president of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development; member, Council on Foreign Relations; fluent French.
Paul H. Robinson, Jr	Canada	Former principal owner and president of Robinson, Inc. and Robinson Coulter, Ltd., an international finance company.
Robert Strausz-Hupé	Turkey	Former Ambassador to Sri Lanka, Belgium, Sweden; former U.S. Permanent Representative on the Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; former professor of political science; former Diplomat in Residence; former consultant, Foreign Policy Research Institute; fluent German and French, some Spanish and Italian.
James D. Theberge	Chile	Former Ambassador to Nicaragua; former director of Latin American studies, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University; former president of the Institute for Conflict and Policy Studies; fluent Spanish; working knowledge of French, Portuguese, Italian, and German.
Gerald E. Thomas	Guyana	Retired rear admiral, U.S. Navy; Ph. D. in diplomatic history, Yale University; fair Russian, German, French, and Spanish.
Richard L. Walker	Korea	Former professor of international relations and East Asia scholar; fluent Mandarin, good Japanese, French, and German.
Faith Ryan Whittlesey	Switzerland	Schooled at the Academy of International Law at The Hague; lived and studied in Europe; former member of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Subcommittee of the Republican Platform Committee; fluent German.

Senator MATHIAS. Senator Pell.

Senator PELL. I would add here that yours, Secretary Kennedy, is the kind of political appointment that we welcome because you bring to it a broad knowledge and experience in administration in a variety of fields. This is to be encouraged, I think, when senior Foreign Service officers and State Department people are given other responsibilities in other agencies. It is a very good thing indeed.

I am a little disappointed in the certificate of competence which came out of legislation of mine. And it has really become what you might call little novellas of fiction sometimes, I think, as they come up here. And it is really proving very little, because no matter how incompetent the nominee is, a very good fictional certificate is written, and then when we certify the person, vote on him and confirm him, that would indicate that that certificate of competence is accurate.

Do you think that this certificate of competence is a useful tool to you, or would you like to see it repealed? Because I am the author of the amendment, I am perfectly open to suggestion on it.

Ambassador KENNEDY. Senator, there is no reason to repeal that, in my judgment. We would want to provide, whether one calls it a certificate or whatever, we would want to provide that kind of information to this committee in any event.

The President would want to send to this committee the general bases on which he reached his conclusion. We do not have any trouble with that. If you believe it is fictional, that troubles me.

Senator **Pell**. Only some of them. Not all of them.

Ambassador **Kennedy**. I can assure you will not be getting fiction. If you have been getting fiction in the past, I want to look at it to find out how that is possible. You will not be getting fiction in the future. I do not believe it has been fictional. I hope it is not.

Senator **Pell**. On an informal level with your staff, I will show you an example or two of those that I consider to be fictional.

Ambassador **Kennedy**. I would like to do that. And I can assure you that no one in the administration from the President on down would want to put before this committee anything that the committee would consider fictional.

Senator **Pell**. If the chairman will excuse me, I have to go to the floor. We are voting out a bill, and there is a quorum call. I will be right back.

Senator **Mathias**. I have just a few more questions for you, Mr. Secretary. You indicated in your statement that the factor of having contributed to a Presidential campaign was not a significant factor in these appointments. I think just as a matter of record, of course, the campaign laws have been changed so that very large personal contributions would no longer be lawful. So I think there can be no real dispute about that.

But there may be a different, more subtle financial consideration which gets into the picture; and that is, not how much an ambassador can personally contribute but how much he can raise. So that the focus may have shifted from the moneygiven to the moneyraiser.

Does that create any problems in the selection process?

Ambassador **Kennedy**. Senator, I do not think it creates any problems at all.

Senator **Mathias**. It is a little harder for us to track in the confirmation process because we just do not know who raised how much. We know who gave how much. But I think that is something that we are going to have to inquire about in the future, because it seems to me that may be the new criterion, the new elite.

Ambassador **Kennedy**. Senator, I am not aware of that being an issue of any consequence. I can assure you that the committee is fully within its rights to go ahead and ask such a question if that is a troublesome one.

Let me just say that whatever one's association with fundraising, fundgiving, or whatever, that is by no means the criterion on which the decision is made as to whether that individual should be put before the President for his consideration on the one hand, or certainly by the President in deciding to recommend that individual for the consideration of the Senate. It simply is not.

Senator **Mathias**. Well, as I said, that is a possible concern that may be reflected in the future. I would hope that it would not become a problem.

Are you familiar with the practice of other governments in the appointment of ambassadors?

Ambassador **Kennedy**. As a general proposition, yes, sir. I have not studied each and every one, though.

Senator **Mathias**. What is the general practice? To give it some scope, let us just confine ourselves to the Atlantic Community.

Ambassador **Kennedy**. I think it is fair to say that within the Atlantic Community, as a general rule, although it is not by any means universal, there is a substantial reliance upon a professional service. Let me say in that connection, however, that there are frequent changes of representation from countries of the Atlantic Community to the United States, representing a desire on the part of the governments coming to power to have their own representative.

Now, whether that be from the career service or some other area of the government or outside it, it seems to me in that case is a little bit beside the point. The fact is that that government indeed does wish to have its own person in place representing the views which it is trying to convey.

Senator **Mathias**. Of course, we would not be incapable of that practice.

Ambassador **Kennedy**. Not at all.

Senator **Mathias**. A new President could choose from the career service someone to carry his commission and not necessarily utilize the services of a carryover ambassador; is that not true?

Ambassador **Kennedy**. That is correct.

Senator **Mathias**. Well, now, we have both skirted around the constitutional question. I do not really have any serious doubts on it myself.

But let us grant, for the sake of the argument, that you are right that there is a constitutional question and that a bill such as this would be unconstitutional. There is an alternative for this committee, if it gets sufficiently excited about this subject, and that is to fight every appointment, which is a kind of uncivilized and foolish way to go.

There has been a persistent concern on this subject in the Congress for some years. The Senate, as you know, passed a bill on this subject, a 75-percent bill, several years ago. If the concern is not met, we might reach that uncivilized and wasteful practice of challenging appointments here. I am not predicting that; I am just saying that that is a totally constitutional way to confront the problem, however regrettable it might be. And I think we ought to avoid that.

Do you have any suggestions?

Ambassador **Kennedy**. Well, let me say, Senator, we think so, too.

Senator **Mathias**. Well, then this brings me to my final question: Do you have any suggestions for improving the selection process?

Ambassador **Kennedy**. Senator, we are fully mindful of the concerns which underly the proposal which your bill, S. 1886 suggests, on the one hand, the reason for this hearing. We are fully mindful of that.

Let me just say, however, that there is a clear responsibility resting with us in the administration, a responsibility which we accept, acknowledge, and understand, that we should not be asking the President to put before you, and he certainly does not wish to put before you, people who are not qualified.

On the other hand, we think also that if there are serious questions in the minds of the committee, that one way or another we would hope that they could be made available to us before that confrontational sort of situation might develop.

In any event, let me just also add that I think the record on which we are resting at the moment is not a record which is in any way out of line with a quarter of century's experience. And indeed, I submit, as I have tried to point out, that as to the policymaking roles within the Department itself, the administration has bent over backward to assure the contribution of the Service. And it has placed Ambassadors of the Service in some of the most important of the posts abroad.

Now, it is to be recalled also—and I did not mention this in my statement nor earlier in comments, I believe—it is to be recalled also that this issue generally becomes of great concern on a kind of quadrennial basis; that is, at the beginning of every new administration as Ambassadors are being replaced by a new administration coming into office.

Over time, the statistics would show that the percentage of new appointments to new posts as posts become vacant through the term of that administration, the percentage of career people being appointed gradually rises, with the consequence that the percentage levels are pretty constant over the years.

For example, I have gone back over the last 20 years and looked at the range of percentages in ambassadorial appointments to countries—not the international institutions but to countries—and the career percentage has ranged between 64 percent and 78 percent, whereas the noncareer being a reciprocal, of course, is 22 percent to 36 percent over that 20 years.

We are talking now of something that is just about in the middle of that range. What I am suggesting is that it looks often at the beginning of an administration as though something terrible is happening. And in fact, that is not the case. It is simply the natural reflection of a change of an administration.

I do assure you, Mr. Chairman, that we are fully mindful of the concerns of the committee and of the Congress as outlined in the Foreign Service Act to insure competence. Obviously, it is in no one's interest to place an ambassador abroad who is not competent to do the job which that role requires. It is a very complex and difficult one, which I explained when I outlined from the President's letter.

Senator MATHIAS. You have invited the expression of concern to the committee, and I think that we have been able to express some of those concerns to you this morning. I certainly am not trying to demonstrate that this administration has a worse record than any other in the last 20 years. That is not my interest. My interest is that the total record for the last 20 years is not, in my judgment, good enough. That is the point. It is not whether you are better or worse than a bad record. The record is not good enough, and that is what has to be improved.

Now, you have stated with great force and effect the President's responsibilities in this matter. I think I have tried to express the responsibilities of the Senate, which not only shares the power of appointment of ambassadors with the President but also has a responsibility for the oversight of the conduct of foreign policy and the management of our embassies abroad.

And I must state that I have visited many ambassadors on their posts abroad, and I have found many, both career and noncareer, who were exceptionally fine representatives of the American people. They were qualified in language. They knew what they were looking at. They were obviously able to describe conditions in the country and to make some projection not only of what was happening but what was likely to happen.

But I have also, I must say to my regret, found some that were fit for social duty only. And that is the kind we have to weed out.

I appreciate your willingness to work with us in that respect, and I hope that you will further reflect on the virtues of Senate bill 1886 and perhaps revise your views about it in the fullness of time.

Senator Pell.

Senator Pell. I have one further question. Perhaps this has been covered and is in the record. What is the procedure now whereby ambassadors are selected for nomination to the Senate for confirmation? In what way does that differ from the previous administration? Has this been asked?

Senator Mathias. I think we have covered it in some measure.

Senator Pell. Then I will withdraw the question.

Ambassador Kennedy. I would be glad to introduce a small paragraph into the record to fill it out, if you would like.

Senator Pell. Yes, I would. I just want to be sure that that point is specifically covered in the hearing.

[The information referred to follows:]

SELECTION OF BILATERAL AMBASSADORS

[SUBMITTED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE]

The procedure established by this Administration for the selection of bilateral Ambassadors to be recommended to the Senate for confirmation is somewhat complex and involves several steps. When the Assistant Secretary of State for a regional bureau determines that an incumbent Ambassador's tour is nearing completion he reviews potential candidates from within the ranks of the career Foreign Service. When the bureau has compiled a series of candidates for a particular post, the Assistant Secretary requests that the country in question be placed on the agenda of the State Department Ambassadorial Selection Committee. The Committee is chaired by the Deputy Secretary and its members include the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, the Under Secretary for Management, the Director General of the Foreign Service, the Executive Secretary and the Executive Assistant to the Secretary. The regional bureaus, in conjunction with the Office of the Director General, rank the candidates for each country in order of their preference. The Selection Committee debates the recommendations and chooses one candidate for each post on the agenda. These candidates are the recommendations of the Department of State for a particular post.

At the same time, the Presidential Personnel Office, in conjunction with the Senior Staff at the White House, reviews the candidates who come from outside the ranks of the active career Foreign Service. When the White House receives the recommendation of the Department of State, the Senior White House Staff weighs the merits of the Department's candidate with the qualifications and expertise exhibited by the non-career candidates. Of course, the current political and economic situation of the country is reviewed and the status of the nation's bilateral and multi-lateral relations is taken into consideration. In most cases, the Senior Staff reaches a consensus on a candidate who is then referred to the Secretary of State for his final consideration prior to recommendation to the President for his approval.

Once the President selects a candidate, an intensive security background investigation and conflict-of-interest review is initiated. When all clearances are obtained, the Department of State requests Agreement from the government of the country where we intend to place the new Ambassador. After Agreement is received, the State Department prepares formal nomination papers. The White House announces the selection and forwards the nomination to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Senator PELL. Let me ask the chairman if he intends to have this hearing printed or not?

Senator MATHIAS. Yes.

Senator PELL. Good. Thank you.

Senator MATHIAS. Thank you, Mr. Kennedy.

Our next witness, representing the American Foreign Service Association, is Ambassador Charles Whitehouse.

Senator PELL. I have one further request of the chairman. And that is, could we submit to the administration a request that they inform us of the total amount of money that has been raised by the political ambassadors as well as contributed by them, if that figure could be made available.

Senator MATHIAS. That subject was discussed.

Senator PELL. But I do not think the specific request was made.

Senator MATHIAS. We will address that question. Perhaps you and I could sign a joint letter making that request.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

Senator MATHIAS. Ambassador Whitehouse, do you have a statement for us? Would you please proceed?

STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES S. WHITEHOUSE, PRESIDENT, AMERICAN FOREIGN SERVICE ASSOCIATION

Ambassador WHITEHOUSE. Yes, sir. My name is Charles S. Whitehouse. I am currently the president of the American Foreign Service Association.

The question of the appointment of ambassadors from outside the Foreign Service, which is addressed by your proposal, Mr. Chairman, is one which has been for years and continues to be of great interest to our association and its members. I feel personally well qualified to discuss this subject, having been twice an ambassador myself and having worked closely with career and noncareer ambassadors in the course of over 30 years in the Foreign Service.

Before addressing myself to the proposal, which the American Foreign Service Association wholeheartedly supports, that the number of political ambassadors be limited to 15 percent, may I say a few words about the general attitude of our members toward noncareer appointments.

First, we recognize that the appointment of ambassadors from outside the career is an American tradition. No other country assigns noncareer people to the extent that we do. But our membership realizes that, as a practical matter, every administration will want to appoint a certain number of ambassadors who are not Foreign Service officers.

Second, our association and its members believe that our country has been and can continue to be served by eminent and distinguished Americans from other professions, but with relevant skills and experience who are selected by the President to represent our country as ambassadors.

I served in Vietnam with Ambassador Bunker and years ago in Belgium with Admiral Kirk. They were men of great experience and ability whose performances were superb. David Bruce, George Bush, Senator Mike Mansfield, Douglas Dillon, and many others have brought to diplomacy a lifetime of responsibility in foreign affairs and a degree of intimacy with certain foreign leaders which few, if any, career officers could have acquired.

The point I am making is that the association and the officers of the Foreign Service do not oppose a reasonable number of well-qualified political appointees. The issues with which our members have difficulty are, first, the selection of individuals who are not only lacking in direct experience involving foreign affairs, but whose careers in other fields are not particularly outstanding or even relevant to effective diplomacy.

Second, the assignment of what appears to them to be an excessive number of such political appointees; and third, the increased assignment of political appointees to embassies in which personal ties to the President are not an important factor.

Members of the career Foreign Service can understand the desire of a President to have eminent Americans from outside the career service and who are close to him in a few of the more important posts. But it is hard for us to see the justification for 50 or 60 noncareer ambassadors, many to the more remote posts traditionally headed by Foreign Service officers.

We ask why? The answer we receive is that these men are loyal and have personal access to the President. But our response, in turn, is that the Foreign Service career officer is professionally committed to being loyal to the President and the country. For decades and decades this has been so. It is a strong tradition.

The commitment to a career of national service and the self-discipline which is required from the beginning permeates our professional ethic and infuses a spirit of loyalty to the Nation and to its leaders.

Our further response is that personal access to the President is really not needed in most posts, and when it is, an able career officer can establish the necessary confidence. In fact, we wonder how long the machinery of Government and of foreign policy would stay in order if every ambassador felt free to call the President at any time. Yet we see political appointees in virtually all Western European capitals and spilling over into some of the most remote Third World posts as well.

I am making these points, Mr. Chairman, as our association believes that the issues I have cited are particularly significant today. We have done a study on the number of political appointments to ambassadorial appointments going back to the Roosevelt administration. This analysis clearly demonstrates that the proportion of political ambassadors approved by the current administration is higher today than it has been at least since Herbert Hoover's day.

Of the appointments made by President Reagan, 48 percent have been political and only 52 percent career. This has to be compared with a range of 55 percent by President Roosevelt to 73 percent career by President Carter. Until the past 15 months, the trend toward greater professionalism had seemed definitely established, despite some short-term variations, particularly at the start of most new administrations.

In an increasingly complex and dangerous world, this trend toward greater professionalism in the conduct of foreign affairs should be accelerated. In the past, spokesmen for the administration have emphasized that the ratio of ambassadors currently serving abroad remains within traditional limits. In order to reach this conclusion, the administration has to adjust its figures to include ambassadors to multilateral agencies.

A very fair and clear way of looking at this statistical question is to note that 23 posts previously filled by career officers are now occupied by political appointees, and conversely, 12 previously filled by political appointees are now filled by career officers. It has therefore been a net loss of 11 ambassadorships to the Foreign Service.

It is not my purpose to make ad hominen remarks about ambassadors now serving abroad. It is the view of our membership—and we have a unique opportunity to observe them first hand—that the President's appointees are, by and large, persons less distinguished and capable than many selected by earlier Presidents, and a surprising number are being sent to embassies from which the access to high administration officials, an attribute apparently given much weight by the White House staff, is in fact irrelevant.

There are those, Mr. Chairman, who will say that a 15-percent limit on political appointees is too rigid and that any administration should be given more latitude than your proposal permits.

We believe that its very rigidity gives this proposal special merit and will impose a discipline on future administrations that will assure the appointment of carefully selected individuals for a small number of posts as envisaged by the drafters of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 rather than the ever-increasing number of poorly qualified appointees we are seeing today.

There is one final point which I believe must be reaffirmed before this committee. And that is, the effect on the Foreign Service of what appears to be an increase in the number of appointees not only to ambassadorships but also to senior positions in the Department of State.

The Foreign Service is a small service and a proud service, with a proven record of loyalty to every administration it serves. Its personnel are stationed all over the world, often under conditions of considerable danger and discomfort, separations from families are frequent.

It is our view that a lifelong apprenticeship in a variety of positions abroad and in the foreign affairs agencies in Washington best prepares individuals for great responsibility in this field.

This view is clearly stated in the Foreign Service Act of 1980, but it undermines the Service when its capable, dedicated professionals are denied appointments at the top of their profession in order for an administration to meet some domestic political obligation.

We think our country deserves the best ambassadors it can get to represent it abroad. Approval of S. 1886 would be a most significant step in that direction, as it would provide for a very high degree of professionalism in our representation abroad, while still granting the President the authority to send carefully selected noncareer ambassadors to a significant number of foreign capitals.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Mathias. Thank you very much, Ambassador Whitehouse. I really have just one question. We as a people have not only a commitment to, but an investment in, the Foreign Service. We set up the whole institution of the Foreign Service. We provide some training—not enough, I might say. I would like to see greater support for the Foreign Service Institute than for other training facilities for the Foreign Service. But nonetheless, we do make some investment there.

Perhaps more importantly, we commit our hopes to the young enlistees in the Foreign Service, to those who are willing to make a career commitment, and we say that the whole institution of our diplomatic establishment is going to rest on their shoulders throughout their professional careers.

You have said in your statement that an undue percentage of political appointments undermines this service. If the present trend continues, what do you think the long-range effects will be on the Foreign Service and on the desirability of pursuing the Foreign Service as a career?

Ambassador WHITEHOUSE. I think the comments that you made earlier, Mr. Chairman, on this subject to Under Secretary Kennedy are views that our association shares. It is obviously very disheartening to career officers to see approximately half of the embassies being given to political appointees, as they are being given today.

It is also, as you noted, extremely difficult for career officers serving all over the world to accept the point of view expressed by Mr. Pendleton James at the White House that there are not enough political officers.

The career is difficult, the career is demanding. It is an increasingly hostile environment in which many of our people live. I think one can easily anticipate a very large number of resignations and retirements as officers perceive that in their professional lives they will not receive the satisfaction of being able to reach the top of their profession and bearing the responsibilities which they seek by joining the Foreign Service.

Senator MATHIAS. Senator Pell.

Senator PELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I guess personally I am particularly glad to welcome Ambassador Whitehouse here. His father and mine passed the Foreign Service exams the same day a few years ago, but his father had a longer career in the Foreign Service than did mine, just as he had a far longer and more distinguished career in the Foreign Service than did I.

I had one thought here, and that is—and it might be little tongue-in-cheek but not entirely—people join the church not to become a bishop but because of the pastoral life as a way of life. People join the Navy, where only 3 officers, 3 graduates of Annapolis out of 100 will make admiral, because of the way of life.

Can an argument be made here that the Foreign Service really is a way of life and that the motivating force for the Foreign Service officer should probably be more to follow that way of life than to achieve the Ambassador's baton at the end?

I do not know the answer to this myself, but I think it is a thought I have always tried to inculcate young Foreign Service officers with, that they should not think as much of the baton at the end of the road as the way of life that they are entering. And just as all priests will not become bishops, all career diplomats may well not become ambassadors. But it would still be a good way of life.

What is your comment on that thought?

Ambassador WHITEHOUSE. I do think it is a way of life. It is a way of life that I have enjoyed. And my colleagues in this room waiting to testify have enjoyed it tremendously, too. But I think it denigrates the career and removes some of the satisfaction from it if the officers in it are given the sense that the highest positions in diplomacy are so easy to handle, so lacking in the need for professional background, that virtually anybody could be brought from automobile agencies, banks, businesses of various kinds and enter the career at the very top and be perceived to be as effective in it as people who have spent their life in it.

Therefore, I think while there is great satisfaction in a Foreign Service career and people should not be obsessed with promotions, and indeed I do not think that officers are, I think it detracts enormously from the sense of value of the career to see half of the embassies being filled by people whose ability, knowledge, background, language ability and so on, are far less than those of one's career colleagues.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

Senator MATHIAS. Thank you very much, Ambassador Whitehouse.

We now have a panel which represents in the aggregate a wide experience in the Foreign Service, consisting of Ambassador Malcolm Toon, Ambassador Carol Laise, Ambassador Ted Eliot, and Ambassador John Tuthill. Would you please take the stand. I do not think that Senator Pell and I would presume to indicate how such a distinguished group should proceed. Perhaps you have decided among yourselves who should be first.

STATEMENT OF HON. MALCOLM TOON, FORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR TO THE SOVIET UNION

Ambassador TOON. Carol has decided that I should be first, Mr. Chairman. I do not have any formal statement. I think my views are rather well known on this subject. They have been made a matter of record, and through the courtesy of Senator Pell, they are now included in the record of this hearing.

I would like to make one remark, however, about Mr. Kennedy's testimony. I suppose I should be flattered that he quoted me in his statement, but I am not, because he quoted me out of context. By the way, it was not an article but an interview in the Foreign Service Journal. It is true that I did say that I was not in favor of your bill, but throughout the entire interview I think it was made clear by me that I am very unhappy at the extent, the number of political appointees which this administration has made. And I am disturbed about this trend, as I know you are, Mr. Chairman.

Therefore, I think it leaves the wrong impression for Mr. Kennedy to cite me in support of his position, his statement, because I could not be more in disagreement with the thrust of his statement. And I think that is made clear by my remarks in the Foreign Service Journal.

It is my view that, frankly, any administration should take a much more responsible attitude toward the whole business of the appointment of ambassadors. And therefore, it should not be necessary for the Senate to consider such a bill as yours, Mr. Chairman.

If, in fact, that is not possible, if we cannot aspire to a situation in which we can have a much more responsible view by the administration and, with all respect, sir, by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, then I think some sort of measure such as you have in mind might be a desirable substitute.

But my own feeling is, rather than legislate percentages of political appointees versus career appointees, it would be much better to have a much more responsible attitude on the part of the administration, as well, frankly, as on the part of the Senate.

Senator **Mathias**. Thank you. I think we will withhold questions until the others have spoken. But let me just say in response that I have no pride of authorship in this particular bill. All I am searching for is the right solution. And I hope through this dialog we can get a little closer to that.

Ambassador Laise, do you have a statement?

STATEMENT OF HON. CAROL C. LAISE, FORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR TO THE KINGDOM OF NEPAL AND FORMER DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE FOREIGN SERVICE

Ambassador **Laise**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As a retired career Foreign Service officer with the rank of career minister and the former director general of the Foreign Service, I do welcome the opportunity you have afforded me to testify on your bill. I think this thoughtful discussion that we have had so far is a very salutary development. I have submitted a statement for the record, and in view of the time constraints I understand you have, I will not seek to go over the whole statement. I will just mention the salient points.

Senator **Mathias**. Without objection, your full statement will appear in the record.

Ambassador **Laise**. I would like to say that I strongly support your objective of requiring the highest standards of professional competence, integrity, and character for ambassadorial appointments. And I believe that the Foreign Service career system produces the best and most dependable reservoir of such talent.

In a dangerous, competitive, and interdependent world, the preservation of U.S. vital interests demands U.S. ambassadors of the highest order in all countries with which we have diplomatic relations. In my view, to settle for less is to court peril.

An advantage of the bill that you have introduced to solve this problem is twofold, it seems to me. It assures that at least 85 percent of ambassadorial posts would be filled by persons who have been rigorously tested in a career of diplomacy and found to have the leadership qualities required effectively to represent the President and the United States abroad.

And as a byproduct of this, the bill strengthens the incentives required to attract and retain the kind of talent that the United States must have in its diplomatic service.

The disadvantage, though, that I see in this bill is that it does not speak to how essential standards should be met for the remaining 15 percent which could include the most important ambassadorial posts. And therefore, I feel that perhaps other means need to be sought and attention given to assuring that all the ambassadorial appointments meet the required standards.

Like you, Mr. Chairman, I do not think a debate over the statistics is really the relevant point here, nor dwelling on past records. I think what we face in the future is so serious that we must improve drastically upon the record of all past and present administrations.

And to me, it seems that the major weakness in the present system is the absence of an independent process by which a respected, knowledgeable group of individuals experienced in foreign affairs are available to the President and to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in view of its increased responsibility under the Foreign Service Act of 1980, to provide a professional evaluation of the competence of noncareer candidates for ambassadorial appointment.

Now, we do have, although it was not really spelled out in the testimony of the Under Secretary, a very systematic process by which the Department and the executive branch identifies, assesses, and selects career officers for nomination by the President. But there is no comparably rigorous process today, nor has there ever really been in the past, for a review of appointments of nonprofessional people.

And it seems to me that this is a situation that needs to be remedied. For over three decades the American Bar Association has rendered such a service in respect to Federal judicial appointments. And it seems to me that given the importance of diplomatic appointments, I see every reason to develop a similar practice to strengthen the quality of U.S. diplomacy.

However, because of the differing nature of the professions, the professional organization in the field of diplomacy, the American Foreign Service Association, with membership drawn primarily from the career Foreign Service, is not, I fear, as broad gaged as the American Bar Association and probably not the natural or appropriate mechanism to undertake the functions of providing independent advice to the President and the Senate on the professional qualifications of noncareer ambassadorial candidates.

I would suggest, therefore, Mr. Chairman, that if you are in the appointment of a small, distinguished group of former foreign affairs specialists drawn from the ranks of retired ambassadors, academia, market for suggestions, consideration be given by the Senate to the international business, and organizations such as the Council on Foreign Relations to design a process on the model employed by the American Bar Association to assist the Senate to discharge its oversight responsibility for seeing that the letter and the spirit of the provisions of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 relating to ambassadorial appointments are faithfully discharged.

As in the case of judicial appointments, where the Senate led the way in seeking professional opinion on candidates' qualifications and the President followed a similar practice 4 years later, so I think one can hope that a similar sensible, practical, and beneficial process will emerge to guide the President and the Senate in the attaining of the high quality of ambassadorial appointments needed to serve U.S. interests abroad in the critical years that lie ahead.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Ambassador Laise's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. CAROL C. LAISE

As a retired career Foreign Service officer with the rank of Career Minister, I welcome the opportunity to testify on S. 1886. As I understand it, the purpose of the bill is to insure that proven competence and experience become the requirement for at least 85 percent of the Ambassadorial positions through the device of legislatively restricting the number of non-career appointments.

I strongly support the objective of requiring the highest standards of professional competence, integrity and character for Ambassadorial appointments, and I believe the foreign service career system produces the best and most dependable reservior of such talent. In a dangerous, competitive and interdependent world, the preservation of vital U.S. national interests demands U.S. Ambassadors of the highest order in all countries with which we have diplomatic relations. To settle for less is to court peril.

The advantage of S. 1886 is twofold. It assures that at least 85 percent of Ambassadorial posts will be filled by persons who have been rigorously tested in a career of diplomacy and found to have the leadership qualities required effectively to represent the President and the U.S. abroad. As a by-product of this, the bill strengthens the incentives required to attract and retain the kind of talent the United States must have in its diplomatic service. The disadvantage of S. 1886 is that it does not speak to how essential standards should be met for the remaining 15 percent, which could include the most crucial Ambassadorial appointments.

Consequently, I would urge that attention should be given to supplemental ways of assuring that *all* Ambassadorial appointments meet the required standards. Before suggesting possible lines of approach I think it would be well to review some of the important efforts that have been made in recent years to assure that the qualifications of U.S. Ambassadors are equal to their role of furthering our national interest in todays world. This will serve to demonstrate the reality that modern communications, summitry, and shuttle diplomacy have affected but are no substitute for the essential functions performed by the representative of the President on the spot.

Perhaps, the most thorough-going assessment of the U.S. foreign policy process and the importance of well qualified U.S. Ambassadors to the effective implementation of the Nation's foreign policy was initiated by the Congress in 1972 when it established a combined executive-legislative Commission (known as the Murphy Commission) to study the whole question. After 3 years of extensive investigation and hearings, the Commission reported back to the Congress among other recommendations, that as long as the world continues to be organized on the basis of nation-states, the conduct of our relations with other states through Ambassadorial representatives and Embassies remains an essential element of our diplomacy. Indeed the report found that the changing and global nature of interstate problems, the organizational strategies for dealing with them, as well as the impact of modern technology have laid additional responsibilities on the American Ambassador. It simply is not enough for the Ambassador to possess the talents to enable her/him successfully to fulfill the traditional role of negotiating disagreements and agreements with foreign states; interpreting America and American policy to the government and people of the country to which one is accredited and to interpret that country to the United States; promoting U.S. trade and commercial interests; protecting the welfare of U.S. citizens travelling abroad; and administering the laws affecting foreigners travelling to the United States. The Commission held that the Ambassador of today has the added responsibilities of: (a) giving firm direction to the activities of all U.S. agencies in the country to which he/she is accredited—political, economic, military, cultural; this entails in many cases a large managerial role; (b) synthesizing the vast amount of intelligence and information flowing to Washington from many sources into coherent analytical assessments of the issues and actions central to U.S.-host country relations which call for policy decisions; (c) keeping abreast of the global issues being negotiated in multilateral fora and relating bilateral diplomacy to the pursuit of U.S. goals in both regional and international institutions.

The Commission concluded that these responsibilities clearly required Ambassadors who not only were qualified for a specific country assignment, but also who were broad-gauged and knowledgeable on national policy matters. While it expects that such exacting criteria would dictate the appointment of foreign affairs professionals in the majority of cases, it did not recommend a quota system.

More recently, the Congress has reconfirmed its belief in the importance of demonstrated competence for Ambassadorial posts by amending the Foreign Service Act to specify the qualifications required in some detail. Moreover, the new provisions make it clear that the qualifications required normally dictate career appointments and that political contributions should not be a factor and must be revealed.

Thus, legislative actions signify the continuing importance which the Congress attaches to both the role of the Ambassador and the high competence which appointees to this post are expected to have. What then are the processes to give effect to this legislative intent? Following 6½ years in an Ambassadorial post, I served as Director General of the Foreign Service from 1975 through 1977. During that time, which spanned two Administrations, I participated in the selection process for recommending career officers for Ambassadorial appointments and at times was asked to assist in screening non-career appointees. Moreover it was part of my function to oversee the evaluation process for *all* Ambassadors as well as other officers of the Foreign Service. I can, therefore, testify from personal experience to the importance of high quality U.S. representation abroad and to the price of failure when the standards of excellence needed to further U.S. interests are not met. In the matter of career appointments, there was developed in my time, and I understand it continues to exist, a systematic process involving top management of the State Department for identifying, assessing and recommending to the Secretary and the President candidates from the career systems of the foreign affairs agencies for Ambassadorial appointment. In the area of non-career appointments, no comparably rigorous process of establishing professional competence has developed in the executive branch. In the years of 1977–80, the President created an Advisory Board on Ambassadorial appointments to assist him in the task of selecting qualified appointees for Ambassadorial jobs. The Board consisted of 20 or so representative Americans, only a few of whom had diplomatic experience. It met infrequently, for short periods of time, and had insufficient information available to it. Nevertheless it served a useful screening-out function and marked a hopeful beginning in creating a needed review process. But the current Administration has not continued this experiment.

Another safeguard for assuring quality Ambassadorial appointments has been the traditional requirement for the Presidential nomination to be submitted for the advice and consent of the Senate. Candidates may be asked to, and frequently do, appear before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to be cross-examined and to demonstrate their competence for the post in question. Clearly, the provisions of the Foreign Service Act of 1980, strengthening the requirements for Ambassadorial appointments also enlarges the oversight responsibilities of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

To me it seems that the major weakness in the present system is the absence of an independent process by which a respected, knowledgeable group of individuals experienced in foreign affairs are available to the President and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to provide a professional evaluation of the competence of non-career candidates for Ambassadorial appointment. For over three decades the American Bar Association has rendered such a service in respect of Federal judicial appointments. Given the importance of diplomatic appointments, I see every reason to develop a similar practice to strengthen the quality of U.S. diplomacy. However, because of the differing nature of the professions, the professional organization in the field of diplomacy—the American Foreign Service Association with membership drawn primarily from the career foreign service—is not as broad-gauged as the American Bar Association and probably not the natural or appropriate mechanism to undertake the function of providing independent advice to the President and the Senate on the professional qualifications of non-career Ambassadorial candidates.

I would suggest therefore that consideration be given by the Senate to the appointment of a small distinguished group of foreign affairs specialists, drawn from the ranks of retired Ambassadors, academia, international business and organizations such as the Council on Foreign Relations to design a process based on the model employed by the American Bar Association to assist the Senate to discharge its oversight responsibility for seeing that the letter and spirit of the provisions of the Foreign Service Act relating to Ambassadorial appointments are faithfully discharged. As in the case of judicial appointments where the Senate led the way in seeking professional opinion on candidates' qualifications and the President followed the practice 4 years later, so one can hope that a similar sensible, practical, and beneficial process will be developed to guide the President and the Senate in attaining the high quality of Ambassadorial appointments needed to serve U.S. interests abroad in the critical years that lie ahead.

Senator MATHIAS. Thank you, Ambassador Laise.

Ambassador Tuthill.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN WILLS TUTHILL, FORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR TO THE OECD, THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND BRAZIL

Ambassador TUTHILL. Mr. Chairman, I also have submitted a statement. I do not think you want me just to repeat it.

Senator MATHIAS. Your statement will be included in full in the record.

Ambassador TUTHILL. Thank you. I would like to make one or two comments. First, I have a lot of sympathy with the comment by Senator Pell about the Foreign Service as a way of life. And I agree with Ambassador Whitehouse's response. But I think, as Jean Monnet used to say, there are two types of people in the world: people who want to be somebody and people who want to do something. The Foreign Service, if it is to be effective, has to be primarily filled by people who want to do something.

It is nice if at the end of the road the title comes along, but there are lots of splendid Foreign Service officers who never become ambassadors. I do not think this should be just the objective of every Foreign Service officer. There are lots of responsible jobs to be done.

Let me say that I have not collaborated with Ambassador Laise in terms of her testimony, but my statement is very similar to her own. And I also have referred to the American Bar Association relationship.

I think, however, mine is a bit different, if I understood what she said. I would have the review of all nominees cover both career and noncareer. I know, and any number of us know, certain career appointments which really do not satisfy real needs in a dangerous world. So I would have it across the board and not just for political appointees.

Secondly, although I do not have any firm conviction on this second point, I had thought of a review committee of 12 distinguished persons, perhaps appointed, in part, by the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and in part, by the ranking minority member. The review committee would include people formerly in the government—from both legislative and executive branches—and from the private sector. I had thought of this review committee as reporting back to the President before a name is put before the Senate.

Mr. Chairman, I think you said this committee had been very courteous or considerate to the wishes of various Presidents. My criticism is that this committee has been unduly courteous and considerate and that the examination before this committee for advise and consent—and I have been through a number of them—have not been really searching analyses of the people both career and noncareer.

So I think my suggestion differs a little bit from yours, Carol, in that I would have the review committee perform its task before a name—career or noncareer—is sent to the Senate. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Ambassador Tuthill's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN WILLS TUTHILL

(This memorandum is concerned primarily with the selection of American Ambassadors. The broader issue of the current and future role of Ambassadors and therefore the qualities needed is not explicitly dealt with in this brief memorandum.)

While I favor a more fundamental change in the process of approving both career and political nominees as ambassadors, I feel that S. 1886 is a step in the right direction, and I support it. The United States is the democracy with greatest worldwide responsibilities and is alone in appointing its top representatives abroad in a careless and irresponsible manner. Something has to be done—and as quickly as possible.

Since World War II, the U.S. role in international affairs has exploded. Still, many of our ambassadors, who have largely been given only the most casual screening by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Senate itself, have given the rest of the world the impression that the American President, the Senate and the population itself do not take foreign affairs seriously. I think, unfortunately, that impression is basically correct—or at least as reflected in the selection of our top representatives abroad. Such appointees, all duly blessed by the "advice and consent" of the Senate and many of whom are totally unqualified for the real tasks that confront them, usually demonstrate in the performance of their duties that unqualified ambassadors can, at best, be useless and at worst positively harmful.

The most dangerous are often the energetic ones. The Prussian General Staff placed officers within two categories, i.e., intelligent or stupid, lazy or energetic. It is said that an intelligent and energetic officer might become Chief of Staff, the intelligent and lazy one could be used on the staff, and the stupid and lazy one could be assigned to the troops. The stupid and energetic officers, however, were to be removed as rapidly as possible. Would that the U.S. Foreign Service and its political appointees could be so treated!

I stated above my support for this resolution even though I am convinced that more fundamental action is needed. The action that I recommend may not require legislative action but should be taken before the 1984 election.

I favor a bipartisan review board which might consist of twelve members—four appointed by each political party and four from former Executive Branch officials, including certain retired ambassadors. All would be persons who had distinguished themselves—either in or outside of government—in the field of foreign affairs. It would be easy to identify a large number of individuals such as former members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the House Foreign Affairs Committee, former Secretaries and Deputy Secretaries of State, former Directors of AID and USIA, Presidents of Councils on Foreign Relations (and various chapters in various cities throughout the country), the President of Foreign Policy Association (again, including heads of chapters spread across the country), any number of private research institutes engaged in various aspects of international affairs (as almost all are), and a large number of prestigious citizens who have distinguished themselves in international relations from both the public and private sectors. In all probability a small (very small) staff would be necessary. Possibly it could be provided—at least as a start—from the Senate and House Committees. As for the panel itself, it might be appropriate to have its members appointed by the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Ranking Minority member.

I have in mind something patterned after the role of the American Bar Association in Presidential appointments to the Supreme Court and Federal Judges. Starting with the agreement made by President Eisenhower, all Presidents, Democratic and Republican, for the past 30 years have followed a procedure of sending the names of possible nominees to the FBI and to the ABA before sending the names to the Senate Judiciary Committee. The role of the ABA is to judge the professional qualifications of the persons. As I understand it, the ABA does not limit itself merely to the question of legal competence but goes beyond in terms of other relevant aspects which would relate to the person's ability to perform his or her functions properly. There is no legislation which requires the President to accept the ABA's opinion. In certain cases in the last 30 years various Presidents have been unhappy with positions taken by the ABA, but the Eisenhower agreement has been maintained.

The result of this 30 years of experience has been highly beneficial to the U.S. Supreme Court and Federal Judgeships. Admittedly, there is no similar professional group in international relations that would correspond with the ABA. The American Foreign Service Association would, in my view, not qualify. However, if there were a decision to form such a review board it would not be difficult for people informed and active in the field of international relations—in government or the private sector or universities—to select a panel which would not simply rubber stamp but which would perform a role in terms of ambassadorial assignments similar to that of the ABA in terms of judgeships. If such a disinterested bipartisan panel existed, a large number of thoroughly unsatisfactory appointments—again, both career and political—of the recent years would have been corrected.

Before any name would be submitted to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, this review board would pass on the qualifications of any nominee to an ambassadorial post. The review would not be pro forma. The Board would examine the training, experience, record and reputation (including indications of courage of his or her opinions as well as for intelligence) of every nominee. I would recommend that the Review Panel would not give any general appraisal of a potential nominee. Instead, it should simply indicate "Yes" or "No" as to the nominee's ability to fill a specific post. I realize that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee theoretically performs this task, but I assume that—except for a few well-publicized cases—it is recognized that the hearings before this Committee are generally superficial and in some cases farcical.

As a former career Foreign Service officer with three ambassadorial assignments, I will fight for a strong Foreign Service composed of knowledgeable individuals prepared at any time to give Washington their honest appraisals. Some career officers do not come up to this standard, and yet have drifted up towards the top of the service. Thus, I feel it essential that career as well as political nominees be subjected to the same scrutiny by a knowledgeable group of fellow citizens. If S. 1886 becomes the law of the land and the type of high-level committee supported by this memorandum were accepted, this would, in my view, strengthen the Foreign Service as it would encourage the most able and independently minded individuals to join and remain in the service.

One further comment. I am not impressed by the percentage figures as to career and political appointees. To compare the importance of Bonn, Moscow, Mexico City, Peking, Tokyo, etc., with Ouagadougou, Tegucigalpa, Freetown, Asuncion, etc., is obviously absurd. However, conditions can change—and rapidly. San Salvador must have seemed unimportant several years ago. Lisbon was a post where little could be accomplished by any American ambassador as long as Salazar ruled.

I mention these two posts in order to commend the appointment of Deane Hinton in San Salvador and that of Frank Carlucci, in the early seventies, to Lisbon. When Carlucci went to Lisbon he had the tough task of correcting the unfortunate and inaccurate assumptions of Henry Kissinger, then Secretary of State. Largely as the result of Frank Carlucci's understanding and persistence in defending what he considered the best interests of the United States, American policy was changed and we helped rather than hindered Portugal in its efforts to move in a democratic direction.

In order to reverse the irresponsible U.S. procedure for naming ambassadors, it is essential that action be taken well in advance of the next Presidential election. It would be a major assistance to the President elected in November 1984 if, well before the November elections, a system were in place which would alter the present procedures.

I believe any President would be relieved if it became known that a nonpartisan board of prestigious citizens would give him its considered judgment as to the qualifications of individual nominees before names were submitted to the U.S. Senate. In fact, many recent appointees might well have wished to withdraw rather than to have their limited qualifications given serious professional scrutiny.

The United States, as the most important country in the free world, can no longer remain the only major country to deal in such an irresponsible manner regarding its representation abroad.

Senator MATHIAS. Thank you.
Ambassador Eliot.

STATEMENT OF HON. THEODORE L. ELIOT, JR., FORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR TO AFGHANISTAN AND DEAN OF THE FLETCHER SCHOOL OF LAW AND DIPLOMACY

Ambassador ELIOT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure for me to appear before this committee to voice my support for S. 1886. It is legislation which is long overdue and very much in the national interest. I know it reflects both your, Mr. Chairman, and Senator Pell's abiding concern for the quality of American diplomacy and for the U.S. Foreign Service.

Moreover, as I understand it, the purpose of this bill is to assure a higher quality of American ambassadors. I wish there were another way to accomplish this end. The past record, however, clearly demonstrates that Presidents have been unable or unwilling to resist political pressures to nominate unqualified ambassadors, and the Senate, with all due respect, has been unable or unwilling to give nominees the scrutiny required to assure quality.

I, therefore, believe that this proposed legislation is necessary.

It will be asked whether there will be any assurance that the 15 percent of ambassadors who will be noncareer under this legislation will be of high quality. My belief is that restricting the number to a maximum of 15 percent will cause the President and the Senate to take a closer look at qualifications and make it easier for both to turn away political pressure supporting unqualified people.

The same question needs to be asked about the 85 percent who would be career Foreign Service officers. There is no guarantee that just because someone is a career officer he or she would make a quality ambassador. The Department of State and the White House clearly need to have as rigorous a selection process for career as for noncareer ambassadors.

I would like to say here also, Mr. Chairman, that I thoroughly concur with Ambassador Laise's suggestion for an outside panel based on the model of the American Bar Association and in Ambassador Tuthill's amendment of her proposal; namely that it look at both career and noncareer nominees.

On balance, I think, Mr. Chairman, that it can be said that senior career officers are likely to make better ambassadors than noncareer appointees. They have the professional training and experience, language capabilities and knowledge of foreign cultures, familiarity with diplomatic practice and with the Washington bureaucracy, understanding of American interests, and the availability of resources which only exceptional noncareer ambassadors possess.

This range of skills are among those which distinguish a professional from an amateur diplomat. And the United States can no longer afford to have amateurs manage its embassies. The international scene is too complex and America's prosperity and security too dependent upon other nations for us to entrust our relations with other nations to people who are not professionally qualified.

No other important power in the world today makes that mistake.

Moreover, the United States needs to develop and retain a professional corps of diplomats who rise through the ranks in a merit system that rewards excellence. This professional Foreign Service needs to attract the best young men and women from our universities and graduate schools. We will not have such a service nor attract such people if the top jobs, ambassadorships, are not given to career officers.

Both when I was in the Service, including a tour as inspector general and service as president of the American Foreign Service Association, and now as dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, which has trained scores of Foreign Service officers, including Ambassador Toon here at this table, I have been acutely aware of how many officers we have lost or potential officers we were never able to recruit because of the perception, and often the fact, that ambassadorial posts for which they did or might train were closed off for political reasons.

It is not only present and potential Foreign Service officers who do not understand our practice. Many of our close friends in the world do not understand either. Our practice raises guestions in their minds about the seriousness with which we approach our international responsibilities. No doubt our adversaries have similar questions, but they see advantages to themselves in our folly.

In conclusion, I would like to repeat that this bill, in my view, if enacted, will not guarantee that our ambassadors will be of higher quality. But it will make higher quality much more likely because professionals are more likely than nonprofessionals to have the expertise and competence to represent the United States abroad.

Nonprofessionals have included men and women of outstanding skills. But for every one of them, there are certainly 5⅔, the ratio in this bill, career officers who fit the bill. And to produce future professionals, the country needs to use the ones it has at the top of the profession.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Ambassador Eliot's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. THEODORE L. ELIOT, JR.

I am delighted to appear before this committee and voice my support for S. 1886. It is legislation which is long overdue and very much in the national interest.

As I understand it, the purpose of the bill is to assure a higher quality of American Ambassadors. I wish there were another way to accomplish this end. The past record, however, clearly demonstrates that Presidents have been unable or unwilling to resist political pressures to nominate unqualified Ambassadors, and the Senate has been unable or unwilling to give nominees the scrutiny required to assure quality. I therefore believe that this proposed legislation is necessary.

It will be asked whether there will be any assurance that the 15 percent of Ambassadors who will be non-career under this legislation will be of high quality. My belief is that restricting the number to a maximum of fifteen percent will cause the President and the Senate to take a closer look at qualifications and make it easier for both to turn away political pressure supporting unqualified people.

The same question needs to be asked about the 85 percent who would be career Foreign Service Officers. There is no guarantee that just because someone is a Career Officer he or she would make a quality Ambassador. The State Department and the White House need to have a rigorous selection procees, perhaps aided by a committee of former Ambassadors and monitored closely by the Senate.

But on balance it can be said that senior Career Officers are likely to make better Ambassadors than non-career appointees. They have the professional training and experience, language capabilities and knowledge of foreign cultures, familiarity with diplomatic practice and with the Washington bureaucracy, understanding of U. S. interests and the availability of resources, which only exceptional non-career Ambassadors possess. This range of skills are among those which distinguish a professional from an amateur diplomat.

And the United States can no longer afford to have amateurs manage its Embassies. The international scene is too complex and America's prosperity and security too dependent on other nations for us to entrust our relations with other nations to people who are not professionally trained. No other important power in the world today makes that mistake.

Moreover, the United States needs to develop and retain a professional corps of diplomats who rise through the ranks in a merit system that rewards excellence. This professional foreign service needs to attract the best young men and women from our universities and graduate schools. We will not have such a service nor attract such people if the top jobs, ambassadorships, are not given to Career Officers. Both when I was in the service, including a tour as Inspector General and service as President of the American Foreign Service Association, and now as Dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, which has trained scores of foreign service officers, I have been acutely aware of how many good officers we have lost or potential officers we never were able to recruit because of the perception and often the fact that ambassadorial posts for which they did or might train were closed off for political reasons.

It is not only present and potential foreign service officers who don't understand our practice of putting amateurs into ambassadorships. Many of our close friends in the world don't understand either. Our practice raises questions in their minds about the seriousness with which we approach our international responsibilities. No doubt our adversaries have similar questions, but they see advantages to themselves in our folly.

In conclusion, it needs to be repeated that this bill, if enacted, will not guarantee that our Ambassadors will be of higher quality. But it will make higher quality much more likely because professionals are more likely than non-professionals to have the expertise and competence to represent the United States abroad. Non-professionals have included men and women of outstanding skills. Names such as Bruce, Bunker, Cooper, Dillon and Mansfield come to mind. But for every one of them there are certainly 5⅔ (the ratio in this bill) career officers of the likes of Bohlen, Dubs, Dunn, Henderson, Laise, Toon and Thompson and today's Stoessel, Eagleburger, Hartman and Hummel. And to produce future professionals, the country needs to use the ones it has—at the top of the profession.

Senator MATHIAS. Thank you very much, Ambassador Eliot. I regret very much that Under Secretary Kennedy did not remain to hear the testimony of this panel, because of the fact that you have put responsibility on the Senate, where it belongs. I think the Senate really has failed the country on many occasions in its shared responsibility of appointment with the President. We have not made the searching inquiries that we might have made.

Since you have challenged the Senate to perform the confirmation function with greater care, perhaps I was not totally wrong in suggesting to Secretary Kennedy that the alternative to this bill was, in fact, a much more careful examination of the President's nominees. It may come to that.

Now, the bill has a weakness which Ambassador Toon, I think, identified, and which I am afraid to admit; and that is, it is looking for the easy answer. It is a congressional failing, I think, that we look for easy answers.

We have a constitutional amendment now pending which calls for a balanced budget because that is a sort of easy way to provide against spending money that we do not have. Last year we adopted indexing on income tax because that is an easy statistical way of avoiding making hard decisions.

Perhaps I have been guilty of the same failing in offering this bill. But at least it has helped to highlight the problem.

I think it is useful that you did identify the fact that the Senate is part of the problem here. It is not just the President that is the problem. I think we have to accept that as just criticism.

Now, it occurred to me that there is an analogy with the appointment of judges. As a member also of the Judiciary Committee, I can say that our practice was equally lax in judicial appointments. But perhaps because of the fact that judicial appointments are closer to home, for one reason or another we have not had quite the same problems with the Federal judiciary, which, by and large, has been of a very high caliber.

But we have regularized our practices in the Judiciary Committee. We now have some standard questions that are asked of all nominees, which were not done in the past. We do, as has been pointed out by Ambassador Laise, have the advice of the Bar Association. That, in turn, has generated the criticism that the Bar Association is making the judiciary a closed-shop operation. And I think we should avoid that same criticism here, as Ambassador Tuthill has, I think, proposed.

The question of timing which Ambassador Tuthill raises is a very critical one. If the President is to get any value out of the recommendations of such a board, he would have to submit his early list of potential nominees, which I think is going to be difficult to persuade Presidents generally to do.

Furthermore, he has to listen to their advice. I once asked a distinguished Washingtonian what was the most valuable attribute of a director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and he snapped back: That the President would be willing to have coffee with him at 7:30 in the morning. So the ability to get the President to listen is extremely important.

But having said all of that, let me ask any one or all of you to address Secretary Kennedy's criticism that career Foreign Service officers often believe their first allegiance is to their own career, to the Service, or perhaps to the Department of State rather than to the administration that is in power at any given moment. Is that a fair criticism?

[The following letter was subsequently supplied for the record:]

UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR MANAGEMENT,
Washington, D.C., May 12, 1982.

HON. CHARLES McC. MATHIAS, Jr.,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MATHIAS: I want to thank you for the opportunity to appear before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on April 28 to present the Administration's views on the role of the Ambassador and the appointment process for Ambassadors.

In reviewing the transcript of the hearing, however, I noted that on page 78 you referred to "Secretary Kennedy's criticism that Foreign Service Officers often believe their first allegiance is to their own career, to the Service, or perhaps to the Department of State, rather than to the Administration that is in power at any given moment." I think it important to make clear that I made no such criticism, nor even implied such.

Indeed, I noted in my testimony and in my follow-up remarks that the President and the Secretary, and certainly myself, have the highest confidence in and respect for the career service. Far from being critical, my remarks praised the

Service as constituting "an outstanding cadre of experienced Foreign Service professionals", and I reiterated the President's and the Secretary of State's deep personal respect for the dedication and solid professionalism of the Foreign Service.

In order to correct the misimpression that might mistakenly have been left, I would appreciate it if the transcript could be amended accordingly, or alternatively if this letter could be inserted in the record of the hearing.

With warm personal regards,

Sincerely,

RICHARD T. KENNEDY.

Ambassador TOON. Well, Mr. Chairman, since I am sitting in the middle, I might start off. I do not think it is a fair criticism. I frankly do not know of any ambassadors who felt uncomfortable serving under a particular administration. If, in fact, you are not in sympathy with what an administration is trying to do in a foreign policy field, then you have only one choice: you either comply or you get out.

I doubt very much whether this question of ideological loyalty, which really is the question you are raising, is one that is applicable to the career service and to the career appointees I have known in the past.

I would like to say for the record, Mr. Chairman, that I endorse Ted Eliot's statement supporting Carol Laise's proposal as amended by Jack Tuthill.

Senator MATHIAS. That is the most circuitous route to unanimity that I have ever seen.

Ambassador TOON. Well, I always behave with my customary restraint and diplomatic approach to any problem. [General laughter.]

I do think that some sort of mechanism providing for a very careful review of all ambassadorial appointments is in order. I would like to see it set up. Thank you.

Senator MATHIAS. Does anybody else want to add anything to that question of loyalty?

Ambassador LAISE. Mr. Chairman, since I have served as director general and perhaps have been in touch with all of our ambassadors on a regular basis and assessed their performance, I would like to say that I think it is a proven fact that career ambassadors are disciplined servants who follow the leadership of the President of the United States, and they can be depended upon to do that. If they cannot, they get out.

I think perhaps there may be an assumption that this might not be the case because very often Presidents coming into office, not being familiar with the field of foreign affairs or perhaps active in the field of foreign affairs, are less aware than others that in so many of the issues with which we are dealing, they are not partisan issues, as you know very well, Mr. Chairman.

Perhaps the Congress is in a better position than any to point out that nonpartisanship, if you will, is an important aspect of conducting our foreign policy because the fact of the matter is we are in contest with other countries, and that is the issue. We speak as Americans for whomever the American President is.

Ambassador ELIOT. May I also add, Mr. Chairman, that during my tour as Inspector General, where my office had to evaluate American ambassadors, both career and noncareer, my experience was the same as Ambassador Laise's when she was Director General; that is to say, our career officers were loyally carrying out and implementing the foreign policy of the United States as established by the President.

I might just add one other thing. I think sometimes Presidents get a view of the Foreign Service which results from the fact that sometimes bad news occurs overseas and the bearers of bad news are the diplomats who report it back to Washington.

Senator **Mathias**. Kill the messenger. [General laughter.]

I suspect that Senator Pell is, as I am, concerned not only about the current scene but about the continuing expertise of the Foreign Service, about the kind of people that are now just entering the Foreign Service and who may occupy the kind of positions that all of you have occupied but not for another 25 or 30 years.

What is the effect of political appointments on morale of the junior Foreign Service officers as you have observed it, and as you yourselves may have felt it at earlier points in your careers?

Ambassador **Toon**. Mr. Chairman, I might just point out that within the last week or two I received letters from three deputy chiefs of mission serving under political appointees who have almost come to the conclusion that they want to end their careers in the Foreign Service because they are thoroughly discouraged and, I would say, thoroughly disgusted by the statement made by Mr. James not long ago out of the White House.

If, in fact, that view represents the view of this administration and I recognize it has been labeled as his personal view—but so long as he retains that job, then I think it probably is the view of this administration—then I think this sort of attitude of discouragement and disillusionment which I indicated has been reported to me by three deputy chiefs of mission overseas is going to prevail in the Foreign Service.

And I would hope that some change is made, because if, in fact, this sort of thing continues, I do not believe that we have much of a chance of keeping a Foreign Service, adequate or inadequate. I would think that in the long run we probably would not have any Foreign Service at all if we continue this trend.

Senator **Mathias**. Ambassador Tuthill.

Ambassador **Tuthill**. Mr. Chairman, we already have lost a large number of first-rate senior officers from the Service in the last few years. Furthermore, there are any number that I know now who are spending most of their time looking for other jobs. So I think the rot has already begun very seriously.

I must say my oral statement must not have been clear, because Ambassador Toon turned to me and said, do you support S. 1886? Well, I do. But I would like a more fundamental change as well. I do think in view of the loss of first-rate people, and it is the first-rate people, for the most part, who can find the other jobs, I do not know whether one could start with 15 percent today. It might have to be somewhat larger, maybe 20 percent or 25 percent.

I would like to say one other thing, too, about the question of loyalty to the administration. I do not think it is just a question of accepting the administration's policy or quitting. It depends upon which part of the policy you are talking about and dealing with. Foreign policy is a multitude of decisions on individual issues.

In my prepared statement I mentioned the role of one Foreign Service officer, Frank Carlucci, when he was assigned to Lisbon. The

American Government's policy as reflected in the press was to belittle the chances of Portugal developing along democratic lines, contrary to the views and actions of the Social Democratic Party in Germany and also the Christian Democratic Parties throughout Europe.

Frank Carlucci refused to accept this as a proper analysis and not only made recommendations from Portugal but came back to Washington to fight for a change of policy. He succeeded.

I think probably my colleagues would agree there is something in between just accepting and quitting. And that is, fighting for a policy both from your post and back here in Washington.

Senator MATHIAS. Ambassador Eliot.

Ambassador ELIOT. I would like to add to or perhaps broaden your question, Mr. Chairman, to include not only members of the Foreign Service today but people such as those at the school of which I am now dean who are contemplating a Foreign Service career. Although this would be hard to prove statistically, I do not think there is any question—certainly there is no question in my mind, seeing these young people and hearing what they are saying as they try to make career choices—that the politicization of the Foreign Service is having an adverse effect on their interest in joining the Foreign Service.

Senator MATHIAS. Ambassador Laise, did you have a comment?

Ambassador LAISE. I think it also needs to be added, Mr. Chairman, that I think the consideration you are giving to this should not rest too heavily on this issue of morale, because it is a very complicated thing, as I have witnessed myself. There are many factors that contribute to disaffection, I think, in the Foreign Service, of which this may be only one.

I would like to stress the positive aspect that it is qualifications of the leadership that counts in our organization and also in attracting young people to the Service. I do not believe it is solely the question of career versus noncareer. You have here many people serving you who seek careers in foreign affairs and come to us from your side of the House. They have demonstrated their competence, and certainly won the support of others in the Service.

I would just like to make the point that it is the ability and the quality that counts more heavily than anything.

Senator MATHIAS. I think that is a thoughtful observation. Certainly, it is one with which I can identify.

Before I turn to Senator Pell, I want to be absolutely clear on what the panel's view is on the effects of this. Ambassador Tuthill has said that he knows of first-rate senior officers who are thinking of leaving the Service. Ambassador Eliot says he knows of students who might otherwise be attracted or may be turned off.

But by analogy, we were very concerned in the Congress last year with the fact that in the armed services we were losing the first lieutenants and the master sergeants and chief petty officers, those people who had a modicum of experience but in whom we had a lot of investment. That particular sort of middle-level group was leaving.

What about those people in the Foreign Service?

Ambassador LAISE. Well, I do not have the records of attrition in those ranks. I think that would be a good question to address to the Under Secretary.

Duirng my period of time as Director General in two administrations, I think it is fair to say that the confidence of the young and the opportunities they have in wide-ranging jobs to test their vital powers and to afford them scope for the exercise of those powers has been such that they will gamble and the very good ones continue to stay with the Service because they are confident that they can succeed.

The real casualties tend to come in the higher ranks. At that stage, or before that stage of the highest rank, we have attrition for lots of other reasons than just the one you are considering. The problem of attitude and the employment of wives certainly is one of the great factors as people mature in the Service.

Senator **Mathias**. Senator Pell.

Senator **Pell**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have several specific questions, but first one general question. It is sometimes said that a political appointee who is not concerned at that point with his career and with sending his children to college and so forth is more willing to resign over a matter of principle or lose his job or make a blast than one who has his children in college.

I guess I saw this in a personal way when my father got himself fired from a Department of State job over an issue. At that point he was a nonprofessional. He was a political appointee.

What do you think is the validity of that criticism? I think it is very hard for a disciplined Foreign Service officer who may ideologically disagree with a subject but who has three children in college to resign. I was very struck with Ambassador Toon's article giving that advice. As you know, I strongly support the career concept. But I wonder how one resolves this particular agonizing dilemma that a class 2 officer might well face.

Ambassador **Toon**. That certainly is a practical problem that I think a middle-grade officer at least would have to face and take into account in arriving at a decision.

Frankly, I think most Foreign Service officers that I know, if in fact they felt ideologically uncomfortable with a policy or with an administration, with the nuances that Jack Tuthill has set forth, even if it meant great personal sacrifice, I think they would get out. I think you do have that level of integrity in the Foreign Service.

Senator **Pell**. Well, now, I wonder. When I think back to Vietnam, there were some who strongly supported it, and there were really some officers whom I know strongly opposed it. One became Assistant Secretary afterward, as a reward for virtue, perhaps. But I know very few resigned over that pretty intense ideological issue.

Ambassador **Toon**. I think most of the officers, Senator, who were closely identified with the pursuit of our Vietnamese policy favored that policy and stayed in.

Senator **Pell**. But I am thinking of men in other parts of the world who had to sell that business to the receiving governments, say, in Argentina or in Australia. Do you recall any resignations over that? I do not.

Ambassador **Laise**. I do.

Ambassador **Toon**. I think there were, yes.

Ambassador **Eliot**. Yes.

Ambassador **Laise**. Definitely.

Senator **Pell**. Well, then, I stand corrected, because that was the one point in your article that I did question.

Also, Ambassador Toon, you mentioned that three DCM's [deputy chief of mission] had written to you concerning their political bosses. I thought that each political boss could choose his own DCM or that each ambassador could choose his own DCM. Has that practice changed?

Ambassador Toon. Well, Carol would know more about this than I would. But when I was serving as Ambassador, that was the only prerogative that we had, to choose our deputy chief of mission and our secretary. At one time we also had veto power over the appointment of other senior officers in the staff. But that prerogative eroded and disappeared when I was an Ambassador. I think that probably remains the case today.

Senator Pell. So these three DCM's were presumably picked by men that they find incompetent?

Ambassador Toon. I think in most cases they were on the scene when the political appointee arrived.

Senator Pell. And he just kept them on instead of picking his own?

Ambassador Toon. Perhaps if their attitude were known, their careers would have ended by now.

Senator Pell. Ambassador Laise, what do you think the role of the Director General of the Foreign Service is in this whole matter? I am a little concerned, as I brought out in my initial statement, and I do not want to get too specific in this open hearing, but I have the feeling that the Director General could make more of an issue over political appointees than is being done, and that the Director General has signed off on some appointments that are publicly opposed by the Foreign Service Association.

Do you have any thoughts in this regard? Do you consider the role of the Director General one to be sort of Horatio at the bridge and hold the line here, or is it one basically to go along?

Ambassador Laise. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think the role of the Director General today is very ambiguous and difficult. I am not sure but what the concept is somewhat anachronistic. At least I so felt during my period of time. I do not know whether the new Foreign Service Act changes this or not.

The task of the Director General of the Foreign Service, as conceived in the original Foreign Service Act, is no longer what the task of the Director General is today. The Director General is, therefore, not a political appointee of the new management of the Department of State. That resides in the Deputy Under Secretary for Management.

On the other hand, now that the American Foreign Service Association is a bargaining agent for the Foreign Service, they certainly made it very clear to me—I do not know what the stand is today—that they speak for the Foreign Service to the management, not the Director General.

So the Director General is rather in limbo and basically performs the function of Assistant Secretary of Personnel. I am talking about the structure at the present time and the anomalies that exist in it as contrasted to the symbol and the tradition attached to the role of Director General.

At the same time, I will say that since the requirement is that that be a career appointment, I can say from my own experience that a Director General who participates as does the present Director General in the process of selection of career people for nomination to the President—and I do not know to what extent this Director General participates in the screening out of noncareer people—but they certainly have an opportunity to put in their views privately into the process of selection.

I certainly did, and was successful in derailing some obvious disasters, but in many cases I was not able to do it because of political considerations at the White House. I do not know the practice in the present situation.

Senator **Pell**. Thank you very much.

I think the record should show, incidentally, that to be an ambassador, whether it is career or noncareer—well, actually, career—that there have been more ambassadors murdered or killed in the last 10 or 12 years than all the generals and admirals in the last two wars put together, Korea and Vietnam. I think I am correct in saying that it has been the career ambassadors.

We have had five career ambassadors killed. None were political appointees. I do not know if there is any lesson to be drawn from that or not. But I think the record of the hearing should show that odd statistical fact.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Senator **Mathias**. Thank you, Senator Pell.

I think as we look at this panel, we realize how difficult it would be to draw the profile of the ideal ambassador, because they obviously come in all shapes and sizes and with different personal characteristics.

But I am wondering, in light of the fact that Secretary Kennedy gave us a list of what the President looks for in terms of the ideal ambassador, if either this panel or perhaps the association might be willing to try a hand at some convenient time in really defining the modern role of the ambassador, and then defining the qualities that a man or woman might require in order to properly perform that function. That could then lead us to the kind of questionnaire, the kind of screening process which has been suggested by you and by others this morning.

Ambassador **Toon**. I think that is a very good idea. I would suggest that my good friend Ted Eliot, who perhaps is the only one here with a staff, be given the responsibility for drafting such a statement and referring it to us for proper vetting.

Senator **Mathias**. Well, I am glad Ambassador Eliot has volunteered for that process. [General laughter.]

Ambassador **Toon**. I would point out, Mr. Chairman, that I have no basic quarrel with the criteria for an ideal ambassador set forth by Mr. Kennedy this morning. The problem is that those criteria are not being observed at the present time.

Ambassador **Tuthill**. I would like to say that this is a turnaround for all of us here. We are really cross-examining the Senate Foreign Relations Committee instead of the reverse.

Senator **Mathias**. Well, now, maybe that is good for all of us.

Ambassador TUTHILL. I am sure. But it certainly is very stimulating for us.

My impression in terms of political ambassadors is this: In most countries, if things are quiet and they are nice, lazy, sociable types, they do no positive harm. The danger affairs, if something really important develops in the countries to which they are assigned. You cannot really anticipate when and where something significant may develop.

A considerable number of noncareer people who take appointments as ambassadors think of their jobs overseas as steppingstones either for political careers in the United States or of an opportunity to build up their business contacts when they return to the private sector. This has happened far too frequently. I think that this is the most dangerous type of political appointment.

Senator MATHIAS. Ambassador Laise.

Ambassador LAISE. Mr. Chairman, let me make just a suggestion as to how we might improve the information available on the qualities of an ambassador that are required for ambassadorial appointments.

First, however, I agree that Ted Eliot is the one to draft a statement, and we should all provide you an agreed general rundown. I do not think that is very difficult to do.

But at the time President Carter established an ambassadorial board to advise him on appointments in the last administration, it was the practice of the Department of State—because I did it as the Director General—to provide the board, when they were considering the candidates that were being suggested for noncareer appointments, a summary of the issues that faced our relations with the countries that were under consideration and the qualities that we looked for in an ambassador.

This tends to pinpoint it. I would think that this is the kind of information that ought normally to come to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in connection with an ambassadorial appointment and could easily be provided.

Senator MATHIAS. I think that that could be a useful process and a useful addition.

Is there anything further that any of you would like to add to this?

[No response.]

Senator MATHIAS. We will keep the record open for the information that we have requested from the Department of State which we have asked Secretary Kennedy to provide and for the additional information that Senator Pell has asked for.

I have a statement from Representative William S. Broomfield, which will be included in the record. Also, an article by Martin F. Herz entitled "Who Shall Be an American Ambassador?"; an article from Newsday by Roy Gutman entitled "A Baedeker to 'Amateur' Diplomats;" an article from the Los Angeles Times by Jack Nelson which appeared on April 8, 1982; and a written statement by J. Robert Schaetzel entitled "Is the Ambassador an Endangered Species, or Merely Obsolete?"; all of which will be included in the record at this point.

[The information referred to follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM S. BROOMFIELD, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM MICHIGAN

It is an honor to present my views before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on S. 1886.

This proposal, designed to limit to 15 percent the number of non-career appointees to ambassadorial posts, has had a measure of support over the years. It purports to increase professionalism in the Foreign Service. Likewise, S. 1886 appears to expand career opportunities to greater numbers of Foreign Service officers. Supporters of the legislation have suggested that political influence relating to the selection of ambassadors will be reduced or eliminated. While there is limited merit in these arguments and their outward appearances make them somewhat attractive, I believe that enactment of S. 1886 would damage the interests of the United States. I must register my unequivocal opposition.

At present 70 percent of the Nation's ambassadors are career Foreign Service officers. The remaining appointees, while noncareer, more often than not have years of relevant experience—assets not always available in the ranks of regular officers. The roster of non-career ambassadors who have performed brilliantly is lengthy—George Catlett Marshall, David Bruce, Averell Harriman, the former member of this committee now serving as Ambassador to Tokyo, Mike Mansfield to name a few of the recent ones—and extends back to John Jay and Benjamin Franklin in the Eighteenth Century.

Perhaps a century ago the argument might have been made more cogently that political appointees received their posts because of previous financial support of willing candidates for high office. However, today that argument is dubious at best. No President can risk the interest of the country (or his own, for that matter) simply to reward someone for past support.

The arguments against limiting the President's range of selectivity extend from the Constitution itself, through Congressional practice, to the practical requirements imposed by ambassadorial posts themselves.

The Constitution provides that the President "shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors . . ." By limiting to 15 percent of total numbers of ambassadors those that had professional origins outside the career service, the President's powers expressed in the Constitution would be subverted if not completely undermined.

Likewise, Constitutional language includes phraseology—"by and with the advice and consent of the Senate"—which makes the Legislative Branch a *coequal partner* with the President in the appointment of ambassadors. That power alone is sufficient to permit the Senate to regulate ambassadorial appointments. To expand upon it not only brings into question the independence of the President to nominate ambassadors, it also questions the powers of the Legislative Branch. As we all know from sad experience in the past, efforts by either the Executive or Legislative Branch to curtail the Constitutional powers of the other have often led to grief.

While the Constitutional arguments are perhaps ultimately the most important—we pride ourselves in finding our legal authority in the language of the Constitution—there are a number of other, more immediate matters of concern.

The ambassador is the President's personal representative (as well as the Nation's representative) to the Head of State of a foreign nation. When relations have been particularly difficult, the person appointed is often perceived as a reflection of the Administration's goals in relations with the nation in question. Thus, when President Kennedy appointed a relative as Ambassador to France, Mr. Kennedy was saying, in effect, that the United States would seek to improve relations with France and that a possible vehicle for this improved relationship was a personal relationship between President Kennedy and French President de Gaulle (through the intermediary office of the American Ambassador). It is unlikely in the extreme that the career Foreign Service would have included in its ranks a close relative of a newly-elected President immediately available for such an appointment. Indeed, such a mode for the improvement of Franco-American relations would simply not have existed. Likewise, General Gavin, a professional soldier, was appointed as Ambassador to France. Given his years of military service, especially command of the 82nd Airborne Division which jumped into Normandy in 1944, he was especially suited for a mission requiring constant contact with General de Gaulle a man of the finest sense of France's national honor as well as French national interests.

Certain individuals bring qualities and capabilities that more often than not simply do not exist in the Foreign Service. By any standard, Professor Edwin Reischauer was the most qualified American in the 1960's to represent American interests in Japan. Intimately familiar with that nation's culture, language, literature, religion, economic conditions and aspirations, Dr. Reischauer, perhaps more than any predecessor ambassador, was able to explain American objectives to the Japanese and, equally important, explain Japanese interests and goals to the President. I do not contend that someone of Professor Reischauer's eminence might not be available in the ranks of the Foreign Service. However, I find it unlikely that such a person could be expected to be present with any great measure of certainty.

Many of our Nation's ambassadors have been, in effect, men of international affairs of state. Individuals such as David Bruce and Averell Harriman have served the Nation in a number of different capacities (including both national and international service) over several decades. While not members of the Foreign Service they nonetheless accumulated years of experience in dealing with foreign leaders--experience that the United States was fortunate to have available and without which our international efforts would have been less likely of success. We should not forget that many individuals engaged in international trade, banking and finance have often had their first taste of international experience as officers in the Foreign Service. It would surely be unwise to deprive the President and the Nation of access to their talents.

Mr. Chairman, as you know, I have been for many years a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and now serve as the ranking minority member. While the committee has no jurisdiction regarding the appointment of our Nation's ambassadors (that being constitutionally limited to the Senate), it has nonetheless paid considerable attention to the manning, training and career development within the Foreign Service in carrying out its oversight function. In so doing, it would soon have become evident to me and to the other members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee if individuals appointed to ambassadorial posts were unworthy of their assignments or ineffective in the performance of duty, I would have been the first to object. This, however has not been the case. Rather, these appointees in large measure have often been among our most capable ambassadors precisely because of the specialized skills that they bring with them.

Mr. Chairman, I do not question the integrity, courage and depth of talent of our career Foreign Service Officers. As a group, they are arguably the most talented individuals serving in Government. It would be impossible for the Nation to have a functioning Foreign Service without the ranks of career officers. It is precisely in recognition of their talent, skill and dedication that it is possible to fill the majority of ambassadorial posts with persons who have risen through the ranks of the Foreign Service. However, this does not argue that there should be some numerical quota regarding ambassadorial appointments. As a Nation we are entitled, as the President is entitled, to have the flexibility to appoint those men and women most qualified to advance American interests in foreign capitals. Sad to say, S. 1886 does not assist in satisfying this pressing need.

[From Newsday, Apr. 23, 1982]

A BAEDEKER TO "AMATEUR" DIPLOMATS

(By Roy Gutman)

WASHINGTON.—After days and nights of staking out crisis talks at No. 10 Downing Street, reporters in London looked up in surprise Easter Monday as a black Cadillac pulled up and a deeply tanned man with no overcoat stepped into the chill air.

British reporters could not place him. Finally, a veteran American correspondent ventured: "That is the American Ambassador, *I think*."

John L. Louis, U.S. envoy to the Court of St. James's, had returned to London after a month-long vacation in Florida. He entered the prime minister's residence to join Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig Jr., who was meeting with Margaret Thatcher during his second round of shuttle diplomacy.

Louis' return to his post 10 days into Britain's gravest international crisis in a quarter-century is the latest example cited by career Foreign Service officers in

Washington in the growing controversy over the modern-day innocents abroad—ambassadors without diplomatic training at major embassies.

"No career diplomat would have stayed away from such a crisis," said a State Department official who asked not to be named.

The ambassador declined to comment. But an embassy spokesman said that the vacation was long-planned, that Louis was recovering from pneumonia when he left for Florida and that he had tried unsuccessfully to return several days earlier.

Measured against genuine disasters of the past and in absolute numbers, President Reagan's record of ambassadorial appointments may be no worse or better than average. But the question is increasingly being asked whether the average amateur is good enough.

Harsh rhetoric already has been exchanged. Malcolm Toon, retired ambassador to Moscow, has charged the Reagan administration with using the Foreign Service as a dumping ground for defeated politicians and campaign contributors. Toon pointed to half-a-dozen specific examples including Louis, whose "only qualification for the job," he said, "is that he speaks English."

This led to an almost unprecedented attack on the Foreign Service by White House personnel director E. Pendleton James. He told The Los Angeles Times that he strongly favored having more, not fewer, political appointees and he charged that career officers "are just perpetuating their own myth of their supreme capabilities, fostering their own promotion ladder." James also said most Foreign Service officers were Democrats.

Toon replied, "It's disgusting . . . disgraceful . . . disheartening," and said James attack would lower morale even deeper than anything previous.

James obviously went too far. Haig said he disagreed with him, and the White House said James views were only a personal opinion.

Toon clearly would prefer to have only professionally staffed embassies abroad as does, with rare exception, every other major country. But successive presidents since the founding of the Republic have preserved the political-appointee practice.

As a possible middle ground, Sen. Charles McC. Mathias (R-Md.) has suggested restricting patronage appointments to 15 per cent of top diplomatic posts, compared with the current 36 per cent. He has scheduled hearings on the proposal for next week.

Meanwhile, Louis is only one of at least a dozen appointments to raise eyebrows at the State Department and in foreign ministries abroad.

What is unusual is that unlike the past, none bought his post. Presidential campaign laws now limit contributions to $1,000. Nor could most be called "political cronies" of Reagan. Few knew him well.

Also unusual is that many have either language skills or a direct ethnic or marital tie with the country to which they have been sent. So where did the latest crop come from? Mostly self-promotion or a recommendation, it seems.

Louis, an heir to the Johnson's Wax fortune, is an example.

He recently told the New Yorker magazine that he gave more than $[illegible]50,000 to Richard Nixon's 1972 campaign—making him the fifth biggest contributor. In 1980, he gave $1,000 to Reagan and an equal amount to John Connally and George Bush. "I would have been satisfied with any of the three, so I contributed equally to all of them," he was quoted as saying.

Louis said he owed his appointment to an introduction to Reagan by Walter Annenberg, himself a major campaign contributor to Nixon who served as Nixon's ambassador to London.

About half the patronage posts, traditionally, are in western Europe. This is because the living is pleasant and few political problems are expected to crop up. In practice, of course, they do, and political ambassadors may find themselves part of the problem.

The U.S. ambassador to Finland, Keith Nyborg, is a potato farmer from Idaho. He contributed regularly to the Republican party and has long supported Reagan, his family said. Shortly after the inauguration he asked for his post.

Nyborg is fluent in Finnish, which he learned while a Mormon missionary in the early 1950s, has a Finnish wife and his ranch is named "Finlandia." How does he go over in one of Europe's most sensitive diplomatic posts? "Look, we mostly get first-rate people from the Russians," says a leading Finnish newsman in Washington, who asked not to be named. "We would like the Americans to do the same. State Department people are the sort we want to have."

The U.S. Ambassador to Norway, Mark Evans Austad, is of Norwegian stock. A former executive with Metromedia News, he too is a former Mormon missionary in Norway, where he learned the language.

Unlike Nyborg, Austad has had prior diplomatic experience, as ambassador to Finland under President Ford. Still, he wound up in a major public row when he accused the Norwegian press of lopsided reporting on American policies. He also criticized the government for not sending observers to the election in El Salvador.

"He got virtually the entire press against him," said a diplomatic source. It also led to a parliamentary debate. But Austad did not let the matter drop. He or his aides complained directly to at least two newspaper editors about the coverage provided by their reporters in the United States.

Another appointee with problems is John Loeb, ambassador to Denmark.

A Copenhagen newsman who asked not to be named said he tried once to engage Loeb in a discussion on intermediate-range nuclear weapons, the central political issue in NATO today. "He knew nothing about it and showed no interest," the newsman said.

Scandinavia has no monopoly on controversial U.S. ambassadors.

Joseph Reed, Reagan's man in Morocco, had a large, if indirect, impact on the course of U.S. diplomacy under President Carter. While personal aide to Chase Manhattan Bank president David Rockefeller in the autumn of 1979, Reed daily badgered top officials of the State Department to admit the ailing Shah of Iran into the United States for medical care, a move that led to the seizure of the U.S. Embassy. The New York Times reported recently that the Shah's heir, Reza Pahlevi, is a regular guest at Reed's residence.

And then there are David Funderburk, a history professor at a small North Carolina university, who was appointed ambassador to Romania three years after writing an anti-Communist tract called "If the Blind Lead the Blind;" William R. Casey, Jr., of Colorado, who worked in Niger as a Conoco mining engineer and is now ambassador there, and Fred J. Eckart of Rochester, a New York state senator and advertising executive who is in Fiji.

None of the critics will deny that some political appointees have made outstanding diplomats, among them Ellsworth Bunker, Averell Harriman, David Bruce, John Hay Whitney, Douglas Dillon and Mike Mansfield. But as Toon said, "For every David Bruce, you get ten Mr. Klunks."

One west European diplomat in Washington comments: "I'm not saying our system of career diplomats is foolproof. We have our disasters. But basically you can assume that someone who knows and learns enough about how to behave and react will do better than someone without any training."

However effective the political envoys now representing Reagan abroad may be, they have been relatively harmless compared with past disasters.

The whole course of U.S.-Chinese relations might have been different except for oil lawyer Patrick Hurley, who was a World War II envoy to China.

When Hurley failed to assemble a coalition government, he blamed disloyal subordinates.

Former career ambassador Martin Herz said of Hurley: "Not only did he help to bring about the ruin of a generation of China hands but he contributed massively to American public misconceptions about China and Chiang Kai-shek which placed a heavy mortgage on American policy in the Far East for decades."

There was Maxwell Gluck, owner of a ladies' dress shop chain, who was named by President Eisenhower to Ceylon (now Sri Lanka). At his confirmation hearing, Gluck was unable to name the Prime Minister of Ceylon. Asked to name the Prime Minister of India (Nehru), he said he knew it but could not pronounce the name.

The worst record for auctioning off posts was compiled by former President Nixon, according to Herz. The late Vincent de Roulet, son-in-law of the former New York Mets owner and onetime mayor of North Hills, contributed $183,000 with his father-in-law and in 1969 was appointed U.S. ambassador to Jamaica.

De Roulet's public remark that he had the prime minister in his pocket helped topple a conservative government, brought in Socialist Michael Manley and soured U.S.-Jamaican relations for nearly a decade, Herz said. After the envoy reportedly described him as "an emotional yo-yo," Manley declared de Roulet persona non grata. He was then withdrawn by Nixon.

As for the Falkland crisis, apparently Louis was not missed.

The same State Department official who called Louis' appointment "an insult to dedicated Foreign Service officers" noted that the embassy functioned "well, perhaps better" in his absence.

Some Controversial Choices

John L. Louis—Ambassador to England. An heir to the Johnson's Wax fortune; major contributor to Republican Party. Introduced to Reagan by Walter Annenberg, Nixon's ambassador to London. Absent during much of the Falkland Islands' crisis, though aides say he was ill.

Keith Nyborg—Ambassador to Finland. Potato farmer from Idaho; regular contributor to Republican party and long-time Reagan supporter. Fluent in Finnish, has Finnish wife and ranch named "Finlandia." Dismissed by some Finns as amateur when compared to Soviet diplomats.

Patrick Hurley—Ambassador to China from 1944–45. Flamboyant Oklahoma politician who ignored advice of career diplomats and failed to negotiate coalition between nationalists and Communists. Blamed failure on disloyal aides and helped stigmatize generation of China experts.

Maxwell Gluck—Ambassador to Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) under President Eisenhower. Owner of a dress shop chain, was unable to name Prime Minister of Ceylon at confirmation hearing, and when asked to name Prime Minister of India (Nehru), said he knew it but could not pronounce it.

[From the Los Angeles Times, Apr. 8, 1982]

Reagan To Name More Political Ambassadors

AIDE REBUFFS CRITICISM IN FOREIGN SERVICE, SAYS NON-CAREER ENVOYS HAVE ACCESS TO TOP LEADERS

(By Jack Nelson)

Washington.—Rebuffing criticism from career Foreign Service officers as "self-promotion," White House personnel director E. Pendleton James said Wednesday that the Reagan Administration seeks to name more—not fewer—political appointees as U.S. ambassadors instead of professional diplomats.

"The question is not whether we have too many political appointees," James said. "We don't have enough. I fight in every case for a political appointee instead of a career officer if the political appointee is qualified."

The Reagan Administration has come under fire from the American Foreign Service Assn., which includes 5,000 active-duty and 2,000 retired career officers, for naming an unusually large number of political appointees—the "vast majority" of whom the association contends are "relatively undistinguished as public figures."

Access is everything

But in an interview with the Times James argued that political appointees generally are better ambassadors because they have access to the President and White House officials. "Access is everything," James said, "and career officers don't have it."

James' remarks reflected the strongest effort of any recent President to politicize the Foreign Service. He called it part of a concerted effort to stamp Reagan's philosophy on the government and to remove from key posts all Democrats and Republicans who do not share the President's philosophy.

In the interview James was sharply critical of the career Foreign Service officers.

"They represent their own constituency and hierarchy—their fellow civil service officers," he said. "They rise through the federal civil service system, going along, not rocking the boat within the State Department."

James said he believes most career Foreign Service officers are Democrats since the Democrats have controlled the White House for 12 of the last 20 years.

"This President has done more to control the appointments process than any other President," said James, who also served as an official in the Richard M. Nixon White House personnel office.

"Nixon gave away the process to the Cabinet secretaries in the first year and tried to regain it in the second year and never did; once you lose it, it is hard to get it back. (Gerald R.) Ford never had it and (Jimmy) Carter gave it away and never got it back."

Other recent presidents also have been criticized for naming too many political appointees, but Reagan has put a larger proportion of noncareer officers in ambassadorial posts than any President since World War II, according to the American Foreign Service Assn.

Reagan, according to James, has appointed 96 ambassadors—56 (or 58%) of them career officers and 40 (or 42%) political appointees. Before the Carter Administration the percentage of political appointees averaged about 30%, according to the American Foreign Service Assn. Carter brought the figure down to 27%.

In criticizing career diplomats, James said that career officers "are just perpetuating their own myth of their supreme capabilities, fostering their own promotional ladder," when they urged that more career officers and fewer political appointees be named to ambassadorial posts.

Embassy staffs, James continued, "are loaded with career officers to carry out the minutiae, the day-to-day operations of the embassy that the ambassadors don't bother with."

James said the value in having a political appointee as an ambassador is that he can quickly communicate with the President by going directly to Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig Jr. or such top White House officials as Chief of Staff James A. Baker III, counselor Edwin Meese III or Deputy Chief of Staff Michael K. Deaver.

"Let's say you're the host country," James said. "Would you rather have a U.S. ambassador who knows the minutiae of the operations of the State Department, such as export quotas, or one who has political contacts and can get a Jim Baker or Ed Meese or Mike Deaver or Al Haig on the phone and make contact with the President?

"A career officer won't call Al Haig, he'll go through the established hierarchy and his message will be filtered down before it will get to the President."

James was particularly irked by recent statements by Malcolm Toon, former U.S. ambassador to Moscow, in an interview in the current issue of the American Foreign Service Assn. magazine, the Foreign Service Journal. Toon said the Reagan Administration was using U.S. diplomatic posts as "a bumping ground for defeated politicians and Republican financial backers."

Toon, a career diplomat who retired in 1979 after 30 years as a Foreign Service officer, said Reagan has put some of the most important U.S. embassies in the hands of "unqualified amateurs."

Toon singled out four of Reagan's appointees for particular criticism:

—The ambassador to Mexico, John Gavin, whom he called "a Hollywood actor, and not a very good one at that."

—The ambassador to Great Britain, John J. Louis, a businessman and Republican financial backer whose "only qualification for the job is that he speaks English," Toon said.

—The ambassador to France, Evan Griffin Galbraith, a financier "whose main qualification for his job is that he speaks French and is a friend of Giscard d'Estaing, who is out of power and is considered the archenemy of the man who is running the country."

The ambassador to Italy, Maxwell Rabb a New York banker "who speaks no Italian in a country where the ambassador must speak the language to have an impact."

Although it would be preferable for the ambassador to Italy to speak Italian, James said, "It is not essential." Although Italian-Americans "came out of the walls criticizing us for appointing a Jew as ambassador," he said, "Rabb's wife is a Catholic and that helps."

James said that all four ambassadors have been well received in the host countries. And interviews by Times correspondents of diplomatic official in those countries show they generally agree, except in the case of Rabb.

The assessment of the ambassadors went this way:

Gavin—Although the Mexican press at first joked about his appointment ("Why don't they send us Wonder Woman?" aked one columnist), he has established a close rapport with the Mexican government and is now regarded as a popular choice.

Louis—Generally regarded as a serious, hard-working man who tried his best to keep on top of his job. Embassy personnel say he works long hours—and has not come to London simply for the socializing.

Galbraith—Although his qualifications for the post are not evident, he gets along well with the French personally, which is important, and has a good circle of acquaintances in the business and banking world in Paris.

Rabb—Considering that his predecessor, Carter political appointee Richard N. Gardner, spoke fluent Italian, traveled widely and cultivated contacts, Rabb's impact in Rome and thus his personal power to influence people and events has been minimal. Not only is he an amateur who does not speak the language he lacks depth in international affairs.

[From the Foreign Service Journal, January 1981]

WHO SHOULD BE AN AMERICAN AMBASSADOR?

(Martin F. Herz)[1]

The question is not, and has never been, whether professionals or nonprofessionals ("political appointees") should be ambassadors. It is, rather, how one chooses or finds or trains the best people to become ambassadors.

"The best people?" Is there some undertone of *elitism* in that question? Yes and no. If it is elitism to want the best possible surgeon to operate, to want the faster-running and highest-jumping athlete to compete, to have the best-trained and temperamentally best-suited man or woman as an astronaut, then it is elitism also to want the best man or woman available to represent the United States abroad. But of course it is not elitism in the snobbish sense that is sometimes inputed to that word. It is, rather, a rational recognition that difficult and responsible tasks should be performed by the most highly qualified people.

Certainly the United States—indeed, any country with important interests abroad—requires high quality in its foreign representation. It is only good common sense to want the most vigorously selected, best trained and most highly skilled people to man that first line of defense. But high quality is not a monopoly of Foreign Service professionals.

Also, it is understood nowadays that there are no "unimportant" posts to which one can assign unqualified or poorly qualified ambassadors. As I shall demonstrate, there is plenty of damage that an unqualified man or woman can do in such a post—and in today's world there is no guarantee that an American embassy in a quiet, out-of-the-way country may not suddenly become the focal point of American interests, perhaps in a wider regional context, which requires expert work of the highest professional quality.

What, then, do we mean by professionalism? Selection, training, experience, plus character and technical skills. If I distinguish between "skills," which are highly important, and the factor of "experience" (which of course helps to develop and sharpen skills), it is because the job of an ambassador requires skills of several kinds, only some of which are transferable from other professions or can be learned rather quickly; and all of them are not always found in one individual. In recent years the managerial aspect of running a large embassy has become so important that executive experience, for instance, the running of a large university, has come to be regarded as a qualification for running an embassy. Managerial skills are certainly more readily transferable than diplomatic skills.

This aspect of the question comes down to the one that has agitated also the medical profession (which I choose for parallels that could be cited with many other professions): Should a doctor or a managerial expert be in charge of a hospital? There are good arguments on both sides, but there is no argument whether a hospital administrator or a surgeon is better qualified to perform major surgery. In diplomacy, the manager of a diplomatic mission is also the surgeon who must "operate" in his conversations with the foreign minister and other elements of the power structure of the country to which he or she is accredited. He must make difficult diagnoses, and sometimes must prescribe (or recommend) risky therapy.

We have said that the managerial functions can be more easily delegated than the diplomatic ones. To come down to specifics: To appoint the governor of a

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Middle Western state to become United States ambassador to Mexico—a man who did not speak Spanish and had no background in foreign policy in general or Latin America in particular—would be about the same as to expect the governor of a South African province to perform, in the Groote Schuur hospital in Capetown, the heart transparent surgery that was previously performed there by Dr. Christian Barnard. With the difference that the nonprofessional diplomat has at his side a team that covers up for his mistakes and prevents as many as possible; whereas the unfortunate effects of bungled open-heart surgery are more quickly apparent. But it would be appropriate to make a governor who is a good executive the director of a hospital—on the understanding, of course, that he would leave the medical work to doctors.

What is it that makes a good diplomat, and thus a good ambassador, in addition to the factors that were enumerated above? The kind of empathy which comes from years spent in cross-cultural communication, Fingerspitzengefühl (the feeling one has in the tips of one's fingers) which is sometimes acquired by amateurs but is more frequently found among people who have had a great deal of experience. To use once more the medical parallel, there are diagnosticians who use all the apparatus of tests and examinations but make their most important decisions by intuition.

A gynecologist, for instance, has a patient who is brought to the hospital because of a suspicion of ectopic pregnancy, a potentially deadly complication. All the customary tests are made, and they are negative. The old professor and chief of the department, i.e., the old professional, says, "I think, nevertheless, that hers is an ectopic pregnancy. Take her to the operating room, we'll open her up." "Which is done, and the patient turns out to have ectopic pregnancy, notwithstanding the negative indication given by the tests. The old professor is asked how he knew. He doesn't know himself. But he has over the years seen tens of thousands of pregnancy women, including large numbers whose pregnancies were ectopic. He could "smell" the symptomatology, including elements that were not tested but which probably had been present in previous cases that he had seen. Experience paid, and a life was saved.

The same very often holds in the field of diplomacy. The thing that is not present in the equation is noticed by someone who has learned to notice also what is not there; the inflection of the foreign minister in saying something signals an opening to the experienced professional which is missed by the amateur. An obscure reference to past history conjures up the memory of a useful precedent. The right tone, the right word, the right moment are utilized, not only by intellectual judgment but through familiarity with conversations of similar kinds in which things turned out right or went off the rails. A "feel" for what is about to happen may be derived from a lifetime of sniffing the political atmosphere of foreign countries. The crisis, which inevitably is the first diplomatic crisis to the newcomer, is reminiscent in many ways of crises experienced before by the professional—he knows what comes first and what not to worry about and is thus able to concentrate on what matters most. Inevitably, someone who has been through a dozen diplomatic crises behaves differently in one than sometimes who does not have that experience.

In other words, professionalism pays. One can, of course, appoint a businessman or politician to command an aircraft carrier or an armored division, and some may display gifts of strategic intuition which make a crucial difference—and most, being surrounded by professionals, will make no fatal mistakes; but the chances of getting good results are greater if an aircraft carrier or an armored division is commanded by a man with specialized military experience. It can in certain cases be only related experience; Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, who had commanded battleships, made an excellent transition to a carrier task force; and some professors of international relations or diplomatic history have made serviceable ambassadors. But the odds are that people trained for the job will give better service. There are exceptions, which we will next discuss—for there have been terrible professionals and some excellent, even very distinguished, American ambassadors who were completely, or largely, inexperienced when they came to the task.

FIRST THE GOODS NEWS

It would thus be a great mistake to say, as fewer and fewer professionals are saying, that all American ambassadors must be professionals; and some presidents have chosen wisely among non-professional candidates for ambassadorships.

Roosevelt's choice of Averell Harriman to be ambassador to the Soviet Union was such a choice. It probably helped that Stalin, believing that the United States was run from Wall Street, also believed that Harriman was one of the wire-pullers who controlled the White House. He thus accorded him access of the kind which greatly helped Harriman in the accomplishment of his mission (as did the fact tnat the U.S. was an ally of the U.S.S.R. at that time). Harriman went on to a multiplicity of diplomatic posts in which he acquired additional experience, and there is no question that he acquitted himself with distinction in all of them.

I have served under three distinguished non-professionals: David K. E. Bruce, Douglas Dillion, and Ellsworth Bunker. I have no hesitation in saying that they were more distinguished than most of my career superiors. David Bruce had been a FSO in his youth and came to his first embassy from related work in London and Paris. He was also a historian and had been a sub-cabinet officer. He thus was no neophyte in foreign affairs. He went on to become the only American to have headed our three most important missions in the West (London, Bonn and Paris) plus Peking, NATO, and a highly responsible negotiating assignment. He had ready access to the top, knew how to operate the system, and possessed a personality that radiated the best of American culture. He was a man of the world in the best sense of that term. We don't have enough of this kind, and we can never have enough of them in ambassadorial positions.

Douglas Dillon seemed a mistake when he was appointed ambassador to France. He didn't even speak the language. (His father had originally been sought for the post.) His main qualification seemed to be that his family owned a famous vineyard in the Bordeaux area. But he surprised us by being an extraordinarily quick study, displaying empathy that was equal to that of many professionals, and making decisions and recommendations that could not have been surer and wiser. He went on to become undersecretary of state and secretary of the treasury. He learned on the job, deferred to experts as long as he felt insecure, and when the first crisis came displayed excellent judgment. I would consider him to be an exception because he lacked relevant background and experience even in a related field. (A more recent exception of the same kind may be Geri Joseph, our current ambassador to the Netherlands, who seems to have a natural aptitude for diplomacy in spite of, not because of, her background in journalism.) Exceptions of that kind should make us humble about generalizing.

Ellsworth Bunker is a different case. He was chosen to be ambassador to Argentina at the age of 57, and went on to become one of our most experienced ambassadors, serving also in Rome, New Delhi, in Washington as ambassador to the OAS, then in Saigon for six grueling years, until at 79 he undertook one of the most difficult and demanding negotiating assignments in helping to bring the Panama Canal treaty to completion. I am devoted to him and believe he will not take it amiss when I remark that in his first diplomatic post, where he is credited with "masterful inactivity," he was probably less qualified than would have been a professional and also less qualified than he was in later posts. We can learn something from his case: When someone is superbly gifted in the field of diplomacy, his best accomplishments are apt to come after the customary age of retirement. I would put Bunker at 80 up against any professional aged 50. At 80, in fact, he had longer high-level diplomatic experience than any American professional has ever had at age 50 or even age 60. In his case, too, we can thus say that "experience pays."

Among more recent appointments, who could cavil at the nomination of Senator Michael J. Mansfield to the post of ambassador to Japan where by all accounts he has turned in a superior performance? It may be that a professional like Marshall Green could have done as well; certainly he knows more about Japan—but Mansfield knows more about Washington and he has had 24 years of experience in following Far Eastern affairs from Capitol Hill. (The only irony of his appointment is that Green was retired at 63 whereas Mansfield, his cumulative experience standing him in good stead, became ambassador at the age of 74.) Similarly, though not on the same level, the appointments of Kingman Brewster to London and Robert F. Goheen to New Delhi, each from positions of university president, were distinguished ones. Brewster seems to have worked out well, whereas Goheen was something of a disappointment; but no one can say that either of these men lacked stature or was appointed in return for money or as some other kind of payoff.

NOW THE BAD NEWS

Ambassadorships have also, alas, gone to people who not only lacked any visible qualifications for the job but were clearly awarded the post in return for favors financial, political or both. Let us look first at appointments of the '30s and '40s: The millionaire Joseph P. Kennedy, pro-German and isolationist, was American ambassador to Great Britain at a time when that country had to steel itself against Nazi aggression; the amateur William C. Bullitt, enthusiastic for intimate relations with the Soviet Union, first went overboard in favor of the Soviet Union—only to become so disenchanted that later, as ambassador to France and afterward, he could see Russia only as an eternal enemy. "General" Patrick J. Hurley, an oil lawyer and millionaire, who had been Hoover's secretary of war, was appointed ambassador to China during World War II under circumstances that have been most aptly summarized by Barbara Tuchman as follows:

Hurley was just what [Generalissimo] Chiang had always wanted in an envoy—a man with direct access to the president and no experience of China, who was easy to manipulate through his vanity. When Ambassador Gauss [a career professional] resigned at the time of Stillwell's departure, Chiang was only too pleased to ask for Hurley as successor . . .

The aftermath involved one of the greatest disasters of American diplomacy (all of which, however, must not be attributed to Hurley). As Tuchman summarized the situation, "Hurley accepted no guidance from his staff. Because he was over his head in the ancient and entangled circumstances which he proposed to settle, he fiercely resented and refused the counsel of anyone more knowledgeable about China than himself. When the coalition blew up in his face and he found Chinese affairs resisting his finesse, depriving him of the diplomatic success he had counted on, he could find an explanation only in a paranoid belief that he was the victim of a plot by disloyal subordinates . . ." Not only did he help to bring about the ruin of a generation of China Hands but he contributed massively to American public misconceptions about China and Chiang Kai-shek which placed a heavy mortgage on American policy in the Far East for decades.

Perhaps the most notorious appointment of an unqualified ambassador in the years immediately after World War II was President Eisenhower's nomination of Maxwell Gluck, proprietor of a chain of ladies' dress shops, as ambassador to Ceylon, now Sri Lanka; but Gluck was not the worst appointment and became notorious only because the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in a rare departure from its custom, actually inquired—very briefly—into his qualifications. Having written extensively on that appointment [*Journal*, May 1978] I wish to record here that Gluck was not even the worst ambassador the U.S. has sent to Ceylon; and many another political appointee, questioned as Gulck was questioned by Senator Fulbright, would have been shown up to be equally ignorant and perhaps even more so. Gluck was asked whether there was any connection between his nomination and the fact that he had contributed $30,000 to the political campaign; he squirmed. He was then asked about Ceylon and turned out to know virtually nothing about it. When asked the name of the prime minister of Ceylon he did not know it; and when asked who was the Prime Minister of India (Nehru) he said he knew but couldn't pronounce the name.

In the colloquy in the Foreign Relations Committee that ensued, Senator Fulbright said he had not wanted to embarrass Gluck by asking him to spell Nehru after the nominee had said he was unable to pronounce it, adding: "Anyway, I am not going to make a big fight about it. I am simply saying that—following up on the chairman's [Senator Theodore Francis Green's] letter, I think the department ought to be a little more concerned about sending—especially to India and that area, Ceylon—a man with no qualifications. That ought to be a position there for a professional man. I will grant that sending a man like that to Belgium can't do much harm, because the Belgians know us and can overlook such things. I don't think the Ceylonese or Indians will overlook a man who is totally unaware of things that are important to our relations with them."

I submit that what Fulbright said to his colleagues after the hearing was much more significant than what transpired between him and the hapless nominee, for it foreshadowed the attitiude he took when he became chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee—that there were some countries where qualified ambassadors were desirable and others where their qualifications didn't matter; and later he extended that tolerant view to one which, according to someone who was closely associated with him, boiled down to saying: If the president of the United States wants to appoint a horse's asterisk (or words to that effect) as ambassador, he is entitled to do so. The dereliction of the SFRC in that respect deserves to be highlighted, for it would not have taken many hearings like that of Gluck to persuade the Eisenhower administration—and subsequent administrations—that it is politically risky to nominate unqualified candidates for ambassadorial positions. "Senatorial courtesy" is another problem, especially when members of the committee are themselves beholden to the nominee.

AND THE WORSE NEWS

While there were shocking appointments by the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations, undoubtedly the worst record in terms of simony was established by the Nixon administration which literally auctioned off ambassadorships (or "chances" for ambassadorships) according to precise information developed in connection with the Watergate investigation. There would be no purpose in mentioning more than a few cases—they were too numerous. Arthur K. Watson, ambassador to France, contributed $300,000 to the Nixon campaign in 1971 and early 1972 but had also made earlier contributions. He was not one of our most successful ambassadors to France. Vincent De Roulet, son-in-law of the owner of the New York Mets, contributed (together with his father-in-law) some $183,000 before and after becoming ambassador to Jamaica where he did major damage to our relations due, *inter alia*, to an ill-considered public remark that he had the prime minister in his pocket, which of course led to an overturn in the political situation and other unfavorable consequences. Ruth B. Farkas, the wife of a department store executive, gave $300,000 and became ambassador to Luxembourg, following in the footsteps of such previous unqualified political appointees as Perle Mesta, the Washington hostess sent there by Harry Truman; Wiley Buchanan, the Texas millionaire and art collector sent by Eisenhower; and Kingdon Gould, the Washington parking lot magnate appointed by Nixon. (Luxembourg, by the way, had an excellent idea: It finally let it be known—discreetly, of course—that it was fed up with being a dumping ground for unqualified moneybag ambassadors—and as a result got a professional, James G. Lowenstein, who was well familiar with the concerns of that NATO ally.)

The situation had become so smelly that Jimmy Carter, during his 1976 election campaign, vowed that he would put an end to it. In an interview with C. L. Sulzberger of the New York Times in August, 1976 he said he was interested in "improving the quality of our major diplomatic appointments. I want these to depend firmly on merit. I am not under obligation to anyone, and I don't believe people should be paid off for helping elect a president by getting embassies." On November 9, 1976, after he had been elected, he said: "I plan to appoint diplomatic officials who have superb credentials, strictly on the basis of merit, not reward people for political favors. And that's a commitment that I've made on my word of honor. I'm not going to break it."

And then he nominated, among his first ambassadorial appointments, Mr. Philip H. Alston, Jr., a lawyer from Atlanta, Georgia, to be ambassador to Australia; Governor Patrick J. Lucey of Wisconsin to be ambassador to Mexico; Ms. Anne Cox Chambers, chairman of the board of Atlanta Newspapers and of the Cox Broadcasting System, to be ambassador to Belgium; and Governor John C. West of South Carolina to be ambassador to Saudi Arabia. He also appointed to Switzerland a building contractor named Marvin Warner whose only plausible claim to the position was the fact that he had made contributions to the election campaigns of both senators from Ohio plus the then chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Sparkman. ("I don't think there will be any question," one senator is supposed to have said about the impending hearings on Marvin Warner; "there better not be." Washington Post, June 7, 1977.)

As indicated earlier, some of the Carter appointments were distinguished. In addition to Mansfield, Brewster and Gooheen who have already been mentioned, the appointment of Thomas J. Watson, Jr., former president of IBM, to Moscow is interesting because of the reasoning that seems to have underlain it—that in an era of détente, the development of business relations by a businessman-ambassador would be especially felicitous. While there is no question that Mr. Watson is a person of substance, the reasoning behind his appointment overlooked these facts: 1) that even if détente had not run up against the invasion of Afghanistan, the major American concern in relations with the Soviet Union is survival, not money; 2) that sure judgment in the prediction of future Soviet behavior is among the most important contributions of an American ambassador in Moscow; and 3) that the promotion of business, as shown by the Japanese, French and German record, is more effectively entrusted to experienced diplomats than to businessmen. The business of businessmen is business; the business of diplomats is to influence foreign governments; and the "big ticket" items in business can be most effectively promoted by people with intimate knowledge of the workings of foreign governments and who are willing to use political skill to support the work of businessmen. Still, it is certainly true that a businessman-ambassador would probably have an especially high motivation to be of assistance in promoting business.

A novelty of the Carter administration was the creation of a Presidential Advisory Board on Ambassadorial Appointments, chaired first by Governor Reubin O. Askew and more recently by Clark Clifford. The board did not comment on all nominations since the president and the secretary of state decided which countries should go to career officers and which should involve multiple candidacies from non-career persons among whom the board is to choose one for recommendation to the White House. There is no doubt that the idea of the board had potential—it enabled, for one, the president to tell an insistent candidate that he personally would have loved to nominate him but that the board, to his intense regret, had chosen someone else. Also, the board itself, theoretically, could delve into the background and qualifications of nominees and advise the president to desist from sending their names to Capitol Hill (and in some cases this was apparently done). But the composition of the board, which was heavily weighted in favor of politicians, representatives of minorities, and others who knew little or nothing about diplomacy, was disappointing from the beginning, notwithstanding some excellent and well-qualified members in its ranks. The board approved, even recommended, some of the obviously unqualified appointees of the Carter administration such as the Mr. Warner mentioned above, Milton A. Wolf (a construction company president) to Vienna, and the unfortunate Richard Kneip who became ambassador to Singapore and there astounded his staff by such questions as "You mean, there has been a war between India and Pakistan?" and "Did you say there are two separate Koreas? How come?"

WHAT IS TO BE DONE?

If we don't want the best, then nothing need be done. But if we do, we—the readers of this article and others who are concerned and wish to raise a voice in favor of upgrading the quality of ambassadorial appointments—can take into account some of the following considerations:

1. Give Weight to Experience. Career officers do not have a monopoly on qualifications for ambassadorial positions. However, experience in several Foreign Service posts and positions is more likely to point to such qualifications than experience in other work: Among ten candidates from the career service, the odds are that two or three may turn out to be weak or perhaps even misfits. Among ten non-career candidates, the odds are that the number will be considerably greater, especially if they do not come from fields closely related to foreign affairs. Experience counts—therefore, to the extent that potentially outstanding chiefs of mission can be identified early in their careers, to the extent that they can count on having more than one ambassadorship, the odds on developing outstanding ambassadors improve. Bringing along the most brilliant and competent officers to responsible positions in younger years—which is increasingly happening at present—gives the best promise of good results. The same is true, of course, of non-career ambassadors. Only the most outstanding candidates should be considered. Even then, if Thomas J. Watson, Jr., for instance, could have had prior apprenticeships as ambassador to Upper Volta and Bulgaria, he no doubt would have functioned considerably better in his position in Moscow.

2. Consider Character. Nicolson's dictum about character being the most important ingredient of a successful ambassador is still true. Yes, he also has to be an operator, but there is a distinction between skill in the organization game and cutting corners or buying favors or otherwise engaging in sharp practice. Moral courage is the first requirement of a good ambassador. It is found among both career and non-career candidates—but not as often as one might think. The idea that career people are too often "bucking for promotion" (or incentive pay) whereas non-career ambassadors are past such considerations is poppycock. Non-career ambassadors are sometimes more concerned about their "image" than they should be, and too often want so desperately to "succeed" that they violate Talleyrand's warning against excessive zeal. Case studies of

ambassadorial failures on the job (career as well as non-career) would bring this out with telling conclusiveness.

3. Beware of Vanity. It is the greatest enemy of a good diplomat—and a bad one, too. Even superb professionals have fallen victim to it, letting a personal slight, for instance, color their judgment of the person who administered it; or failing to report (or reporting inaccurately) developments which cast an unfavorable light on themselves. But vanity is found less often in a disciplined career service than among non-career people some of whom become light-headed when addressed as "excellency" and begin to suspect that they are omniscient. A career officer has learned the benefits of staff work and is more likely to listen to professional advice than a non-career appointee. Some of the most horrible gaffes committed by neophyte ambassadors occurred because of their unwillingness to use their staffs. I would be less than candid, however, if I failed to note that there have also been career officers in ambassadorial positions who lost their moorings, displayed symptoms of hypomania, and began to think of themselves as a combination of Jesus Christ, Talleyrand, and Napoleon. Such men—regardless whether career or non-career—must be swiftly brought down to earth, and home.

4. Beware of Ethnic Appointments. It is a fallacy to believe that appointing an American of Polish extraction (such as former Postmaster General John A. Gronouski). to Poland will flatter the Poles; or that appointing someone of Italian descent (say, John A. Volpe) to Italy will flatter the Italians; or that appointing a black will flatter a black African country; or that appointing an American Hispanic (say Julian Nava) as ambassador to Mexico flatter the Mexicans. Whether they are flattered will depend on the qualifications of the appointee (quite aside from the question whether flattery is a good reason for any diplomatic appointment). If a Gronouski turns out not to speak Polish and a Nava turns out to know little about Latin American politics, the host country will be adversely impressed. The same goes for appointing a general to represent the United States in a country run either by a military dictator or by a political leader with a military background. When President Kennedy sent General James M. Gavin as ambassador to France for instance, he no doubt thought that de Gaulle, being a general, would appreciate having an American general to talk with—but de Gaulle did not consider himself a general. He had nothing but contempt for "mere" generals, regarding himself to be far more, namely the embodiment of La France. Charles ("Chip") Bohlen, a man who knew European history backwards and forwards, spoke French fluently, and had met most of the European movers and shakers of the last thirty years was a much more effective representative in France. He was also a more effective ambassador to the Soviet Union than any non-professional could have been at that time. It is true, on the other hand, that a person of stature will run no risk of being overly impressed by persons of high rank; so there is merit in appointing to a major post someone who has rubbed shoulders with important people. Both career and non-career candidates can fill that requirement.

5. Money is no qualification. Should the possession of money (as distinguished from the payment of it) be a qualification for appointment to the large embassies where representational requirements are important? The answer is that the United States is wealthy enough to meet the legitimate expenses of ambassadors—and that it is doing so right now in most cases. *The Economist* a few years ago, noting that Ambassador Walter Annenberg had said that he spent $250,000 a year of his own money to live in London in the ambassadorial style he considered appropriate, and that he had contributed $1.5 million to refurbish the residence, concluded that "there is no doubt that the job in London is expensive." Writing at that time under a pseudonym, since he was still on active service, the author of the present article suggested in a letter to the editor (printed in *The Economist* in January 1973) that

> None of the expensive things that Mr. Annenberg did and which you list in your article seemed essential for the functions of an ambassador, unless you regard his giving of expensive gifts and his lavish entertaining as necessary for the conduct of diplomacy with your leadership. I cannot imagine why an American ambassador needs to prove to his guests by the opulence of his table or the number of footmen that the United States is a wealthy country.

Suppose an American ambassador invited only 12 people to a dinner instead of 64—perhaps that would give him more of a chance to talk with his guests; and as for the maintenance of Winfield House I suppose that if the government had its choice between an ambassador who is an amateur but who keeps the grounds impeccably, or an experienced professional who allows them to run down a little, perhaps it would not follow your implied advice and would opt for the man of intellectual and professional substance rather than pecuniary substance.

Meanwhile all this has been proven by the successful tenure of Arthur A. Hartman, a career officer with no private fortune, as ambassador to France. Elliot Richardson, not a career officer but also without a personal fortune, was not daunted by the financial requirements in London. Mike Mansfield, and before him Douglas MacArthur II and Edwin Reischauer, managed in Tokyo without personal reserves expended by Robert Ingersoll. Chip Bohlen in Paris was able to make out, perhaps with some discreet support from the department at a time when the House appropriations subcommittee was still especially niggardly with representation funds. In any case, the burden of proof is now on those who believe that one has to be wealthy to be ambassador in one of the world capitals. If I were given such a position and found it impossible to make ends meet, I would cheerfully cancel the Fourth of July in favor of more small luncheons and dinners—without any impairment of relations.

6. Scrap the Board. The Presidential Advisory Board on Ambassadorial Nominations, so promising at first, must be judged a failure. It lacked the qualifications to determine the qualifications of ambassadors, consisting as it did of a large majority of people who never had anything to do with diplomacy (although it did, fortunately, include a few members like Averell Harriman, Dean Rusk, Carol Laise and one or two others who know from firsthand experience what the requirements are). While I have it on good authority that the board managed to serve the president as an alibi for turning aside some "terrible" wouldbe nominations, enough terrible ones have been certified to discredit the entire enterprise. If or when we have an honest and courageous president it should not be necessary to have a board to protect him against weakness, cowardice, or ignorance. Staffs are supposed to do that. If a president wishes to live up to the Carter statement that he would only appoint people with "superb credentials," "strictly on the basis of merit," he will need a body of a different composition to tell him who they are.

7. Wake Up the Senate. The Senate, and especially its Foreign Relations Committee, has been derelict in not looking into the qualifications of ambassadorial nominees and into undesirable reasons; such as political favors or campaign contributions, that might be behind their nominations. The information is available, in copious detail, that would permit at least a modicum of scrutiny to take place. It is not even necessary for this purpose that the examination of candidates be in great detail. Superficial examination, as the Gluck case and the gaffes of more recent appointees amply demonstrate, would bring out the most glaring lack of qualifications in a number of candidates. This, in turn, might lead to greater circumspection on the part of the White House and the political leadership of the State Department and would make them put the brakes on the kind of scandalous nominations that have been getting by without so much as a question. As indicated, the custom of "senatorial courtesy" is a problem. One way to solve it would be for the SFRC to adopt a rule whereby any of its members who have been recipients of money from a candidate should automatically disqualify themselves from consideration of his nomination.

Support the Chief. Finally, there is a question of the loyalty owed by the deputy chief of mission and the section chiefs and all the rest of an embassy's personnel to the ambassador who is, after all, the personal representative of the president and is entrusted with large responsibilities. This question has been raised in connection, for instance, with the publication by the Foreign Service Journal of a "whistle-blowing" article about the gaucheries, gaffes, and general incompetencies of an egregiously unsuited political appointee. The author of that article had been the ambassador's deputy. Is it right for such a man (or woman), whose very proximity to the chief of mission involves the sharing of knowledge in a position of personal trust, to lift the veil and reveal the feet of clay? In my opinion the answer is no, it is not fair, it is not right, it is an extremity to which one should resort only in desperate circumstances. Presidentially appointed chiefs of mission, even when they are incompetent, should be able to count on the loyal support and discretion of all their subordinates, and especially their DCM—unless it becomes necessary to tell the truth about their incompetence. As Winston Churchill wrote in connection with his appointment to become prime minister early in World War II:

The loyalties which centre upon number one are enormous. If he trips, he must be sustained. If he makes mistakes, they must be covered. If he sleeps, he must not be wantonly disturbed. If he is no good, he must be pole-axed. But this last extreme process cannot be carried out every day; and certainly not in the days just after he has been chosen.

In other words, loyalty to the chief of mission cannot be at the expense of the larger loyalty to the country and to those who govern it. Lest there be any misunderstanding let me make clear that "lifting the veil" on the chief has nothing to do with "lifting the veil" on policies with which one disagrees. An ambassador, or any of his subordinates, who believes such policies to be misguided has a duty to bring his views to the attention of Washington—and there are channels for this. But for the dialogue between Washington and the field to be constructive it must be confidential. "Whistleblowing" or policy criticism in a classified communication to the Department of State is one thing, public disagreement with presidentially approved policy is quite another. Those who wish to disagree in public should resign and not expect to be protected by their career status against the consequences of indiscipline. Nothing that has been said about an officer's overriding responsibility to the country should be misinterpreted as recommending license to carry policy disagreements—whether within an embassy or between an embassy and Washington—outside the official family. The president must have continuing good grounds to count on the loyalty of every one of his appointees, and of course every Foreign Service officer is a presidential appointee. The president must also be able to count on their discretion—in not, for instance, rushing into print as soon as someone has left his post and "returned to private life."

Presidential recognition of the absolute loyalty of the Service to any administration—because it is nonpolitical—will also increase presidential confidence in career officers as desirable appointees to man the country's first line of defense, our diplomatic missions abroad.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF J. ROBERT SCHAETZEL, JANUARY 14, 1975

IS THE AMBASSADOR AN ENDANGERED SPECIES, OR MERELY OBSOLETE?

The presumptive conclusion is that if the ambassador is not obsolete, he certainly is obsolescent. The more charitable notion of "an endangered species" insinuates that the ambassador, roaming his exotic habitat, is worth preserving, perhaps as an anthropological specimen. In any event the question is timely, for the ambassador, wrapped in the yellowed trappings of diplomacy, is in the way of becoming one of the modern world's striking anachronisms.

Assumptions

This appraisal of the present and possible future role of the ambassador focuses on Western Europe where my experience lies, but implicitly includes such other industrialized countries as Canada and Japan and the multilateral Atlantic organizations. I also submit that these remain the areas of fundamental interest to the United States. There are two errors of analysis—to attempt to force all foreign relations into the same matrix or, on the other extreme, to draw sharp distinctions between American foreign relations with the industrialized democracies, the communist world, the rich and the poor, developing nations and, finally, that new element on the scene, the multilateral organization. While the differences between these groups are extensive, nonetheless many of the observations to be made about the ambassadorial role in Western Europe and with respect to the multilateral organizations have applications to the role of chiefs of mission elsewhere in the world.

As a caveat and to clarify this analysis, a few remarks should be made about the developing countries. These are more suppositions and questions than assertions. These countries, containing the bulk of the world's population and most of its poverty, struggle with basic internal problems of political and economic development. Even in the expansive, self-confident days of American foreign policy under Truman and Kennedy the specific problems of these countries rarely caught and held Washington's attention. This lack of political attention and the peculiarly local nature of the problems open a special role for the American ambassador. The right man, with a feel for the people and its regime, with energy and a small competent staff, can play a remarkable and constructive role. It is a role for trained, experienced, sympathetic people who see the job as the culmination of a career dedicated to the improvement of man's lot. This definition excludes the career officer who views the assignment as a necessary purgatory or the political appointee who has contributed so little that the proffered post is in the backwaters of Africa, Central America, or nothing.

The first general assumption is the phenomenon of a constricted, interrelated world, summed up by the word "interdependence." Interdependence, which subsumes the overwhelming importance of economic factors, means that international relations have become inseparable from domestic policies and programs. Of the many implications of this fundamentally altered basic situation, one is the change it imposes on diplomacy. From the Renaissance, when modern diplomacy was born, to the Age of Enlightenment and the 19th century intrigues of Metternich and Talleyrand, diplomacy was the exclusive province of the sovereign, accepted as such by a docile public. This remoteness of foreign affairs from the daily life of the citizen is a thing of the past.

A second assumption is the sea change in the order of priorities among the several elements that make up international relations. While many of the familiar factors remain significant—political, defense, cultural—economic issues have come to dominate. This fact imposes a further set of priorities: the vital role of Western Europe and Japan, with which the United States will determine whether the world's economic and financial system works or fails. This is no classic problem in bilateral foreign relations, but a question of "system," of viable international organization.

A third assumption is that the decline in the status and authority of the State Department is irreversible. As Secretary Roger's peculiar regime illuminated this trend, Kissinger's personal, fortissimo performance temporarily obscures the Department's altered status, but does not change it. This decline only partially results from the supremacy of domestic economic and social factors. It is substantially due to the inevitable absorption by the office of the President of the tasks of intragovernmental coordination. With most domestic economic decisions profoundly affecting foreign policy and, conversely, the pursuit of foreign policy objectives requiring domestic economic adjustments or sacrifices, unless the State Department is to become a super-agency or an adjunct of the President's personal office, matters of such vital national concern must be managed at a level above that of the governmental departments. All of the major industrial nations experience similar decline in the prestige and authority of their foreign offices, and for the same reasons.

These are the primordial forces that hasten the obsolescence of traditional diplomacy and its symbolic figurehead, the ambassador.

The impact of technological change

Within a generation science and technology have had a revolutionary impact on tradition diplomacy. Electronic communication has eliminated distance. The jet aircraft has brought every capital within 24 hours of Washington. Thus the earlier isolation of the foreign mission in space and time, which enhanced the independence of the ambassador and extended his latitude for personal action, has been erased by modern technology.

The emergence of the pervasive media, visual and printed, has further circumscribed the ambassador's independence. Until the recent past governments and foreign offices had a considerable capacity to control the coverage of international affairs. In America, an isolationist tradition, a domestic press intuitively ready to accept the official dogma with respect to foreign developments changed at the end of World War II. The media became a major factor in the conduct of international affairs. What an ambassador says or does, or is reported to have done, can become instantly known and embarrassing to his government. And as the media limits dramatically the area of maneuver of the Executive, so this reporting curtails further the latitude earlier enjoyed by the ambassador.

The foregoing factors interact with the maturing of the principal of nondiscrimination as a tenet of contemporary international practice. The Hull trade agreements program, with its most-favored-nation principle, cemented nondiscrimination into American foreign policy. Discrimination was to become the unusual instrument of diplomacy, indeed a weapon. Hence, any action that favored or punished one country would, thanks to the combination of modern technology and the media, become quickly and generally known. It was no longer possible, on the basis of general instructions, for an ambassador to offer or deny economic benefits within the exclusive framework of a bilateral relationship. In short, every bilateral action now must be weighed to assess its international reverberations. This analysis and the conclusions to be drawn from it can only be done in Washington.

Multilateral diplomacy

The development of multilateral diplomacy has been as striking as the foregoing, and has had equally dramatic effect on the conduct of American foreign relations. "Multilateral" covers a variety of international institutions, some of which we belong to, others of which we do not. The distinction is important. The organizations of which we are members—the United Nations, the OAS, the OECD, the new International Energy Agency—have the general pattern of a headquarters, resident American missions and periodic conferences involving delegations dispatched from Washington for limited periods. For organizations in which we are not members, for instance the European Community, the American role is different. It is similar to that of the traditional diplomatic mission, accredited to the organization in question with the duties those of reporting, representation and negotiation.

The common denominator of the two is a sharp change from bilateral, nation-to-nation diplomacy. The areas of work tend to be specialized. It is the era of the expert, the technician who flies out from the capital for the periodic meeting and who is serviced by permanent, technical international staffs. All foreign offices have found it increasingly difficult to supervise effectively this technical work—in air safety, water pollution, allocation of broadcast frequencies—for the experts and the detailed instructions originate in the competent substantive departments and agencies. For the State Department officers responsible for overseeing this work, the greater their immersion in the technical fields the less they seem a part of the general work of the State Department. Thus, insofar as the Department is the protector of the embassies' interests, this association of the Department's specialists with the functional agencies alienates still further the ambassador and his staff.

As the incessant international conference move away from the several headquarters such as New York or Geneva and descend on one or another foreign capital, an ambassador suddenly finds his embassy crawling with experts from the Federal Aviation Agency or the National Science Foundation. He and his staff are reduced to performing service functions—administrative support, communications to and from Washington.

Another variant of multilateral diplomacy is the protracted international conference with a defined task and presumed terminal date. This device has proliferated and the meetings can end up anywhere—Helsinki, Vienna, Geneva, Paris. A similar administrative load is imposed on the ambassador and his staff, although with unpleasant variations. The agenda of some of these conferences may be at the center of political relations as distinct from the predominantly technical work referred to above. Whether the issue is Vietnam or conventional arms control, the ambassador has less excuse for unfamiliarity with the subject and the results will frequently affect his normal responsibilities. At best he will be a supernumerary and his primary obligation that of discreet host.

Thus, multilateral diplomacy accelerates the diminishing role of the resident ambassador. The national state remains a pawn on the board, but the game is elsewhere, played out by different pieces.

Why the sense of obsolescence?

The changes and innovations outlined set the framework which diminishes, inevitably, the role of the ambassador. But other, more specific developments and actions have depreciated the currency.

Like all institutions, diplomacy moves under its own inertial force. Practices once pertinent, but now irrelevant, are thoughtlessly or stubbornly continued. The most obvious is the timeless charade of formal social activity which has become synonymous with diplomacy and occupies much of the ambassador's life—the incestuous receptions and dinners within the confines of the diplomatic community. It is a subculture established by tradition and carried on by traditionalists. I once asked the wife of a British ambassador, when at a luncheon she bewailed her heavy social calendar, why she did not break the habit and restrict official entertainment to working affairs and give mixed dinners for no other purpose than to bring friends together. Two years later she was still in a state of shock at this heresy. The more irrelevant the social practice, the more frantic the pace. The indulgent public amusement of "Call Me Madam" seems lacking today.

America's peculiar process of appointing ambassadors has contributed to the sense of their obsolescence. Happily enough, no other country follows our practice of using diplomatic posts, especially in Europe, as a reward for political service or contribution or as a means of dealing with an embarrassing domestic political problem. This may be a remnant of Jacksonian cynicism, of the conviction that public service is the only profession for which neither experience nor training is required. Some of the men and women imposed as American ambassadors on helpless foreign governments lead only to the conclusion that our Presidents have not regarded these appointments as serious. Statistics frequently employed to prove that career officers hold all but 20, 25 or 30 percent of the ambassadorial posts only demonstrate again how statistics can lie. In a disproportionate number of cases the political appointee has been named to the most important, certainly the most comfortable, foreign post. Whatever his innocence of foreign affairs, the big contributor or the evicted cabinet officer knows that the good life does not lie south of the Sahara.

It is impossible to take seriously positions the President treats frivolously. Over the years our chief executives have unambiguously proven that rather than assignments for placing abroad the President's later ego, London, Paris, and Rome are regarded as overseas fringe parking areas where awkward political problems can be temporarily stored. Indifference to adverse foreign reactions adds arrogance to this peculiar practice.

In this make-believe world one illusion is carefully nurtured; the ambassador as the personal representative of the President. The notion assuages the egos of career and non-career ambassadors and is furthered by their staffs whose personal dreams require that they share the luster that surrounds this fable. Normally no more than an oddity, translated into reality the illusion can become embarrassing. For instance, Graham Martin, when ambassador to Thailand, exercise the prerogative, insisting that as person representative of the President he outranked the visiting Vice President, to Hubert Humphrey's astonishment and only subsequent irritation. Episodes such as this disclose a diplomatic nether-world and contribute to the feeling that diplomacy as presently conducted is entirely obsolete.

Personal diplomacy, whether by the head of state or foreign secretary, was not an invention of Nixon or Kissinger. But they dramatized a practice that had attracted and seduced predecessors and politicians holding similar positions abroad. There is no reason to believe that the glamour of the state visit or the excitement of personal diplomacy will diminish. Politicians have convinced themselves that the practice enhance their domestic position; it certainly provides a momentary escape from ugly realities at home. As with the diplomatic life in each capital, the state visit begets return visits. The increased tempo of these visits requires that they be described as "serious" and "working", designed to produce or seem to produce concrete results as contrasted with the formal, ceremonial excursion, without substantive pretension. Inevitably, the new genre must be intimate as well. This means the pruning of aides in attendance. More often than not, and at American initiative, the Presidential head of government tête-a-têtes or even those of visiting foreign ministers exclude the American ambassador. One result is the parallel exclusion of the ambassador of the other side. The result is devastating. Neither the American ambassador nor his foreign counterpart in Washington nor their respective staffs will have more than the most rudimentary or superficial account of the substance or the atomsphere of the discussions. No matter the ability of the American representative or his presonal status with the host government, his effectiveness cannot withstand this signal of a lack of confidence by his master. The cult of intimacy, secrecy and exclusion underscores the degree to which the ambassador has become irrelevant, particularly where serious matters are discussed. If the ambassadorial position were considered important and regarded as a consequential, continuing channel of communication, then both the President and the Secretary of State would deem it in their interest to impress upon the principal members of the other government that the ambassador was an esteemed, trusted colleague and obviously an indispensable part of the United States foreign policy machinery.

The aura of ambassadorial irrelevance is furthered by the intensified contacts between specialized ministers—especially finance and defense, but the fraternal relationship is spreading rapidly to officials in other functional fields. The generally technical nature of the business and the personal relationships developing out of attendance at international conferences and meetings, furthered by the handy telephone and airplane, lead to the present regime of personal contact. The American Secretary of Defense, meeting his counterpart at the NATO Nuclear Planning Group or at some military exercise, will generally have a closer personal relationship with these colleagues than with any American ambassador. Once again, the chief of mission is assigned the role of resort hostess for his cabinet visitor, offering his table for the working luncheon and opera seats in the evening. It is a peripheral, protocol position of unconscious humiliation.

The fact of mounting irrelevance is driven home by the ambassador's remoteness from most consequential international negotiations. Only if the matter is utterly trivial, local in nature and with few implications for general American foreign relations will the task be given to the local chief of mission, and then only under close instructions and with the physical support of Washington experts. But for the serious matters, where the side effects may be considerable, the rule is to dispatch negotiators from the capital. The ambassador, at best a silent observer, may be humored by polite inquiries about the habits of the natives, but he will not be a serious part of the delegation. Under Kissinger the practice has been refined to the point that on occasion the ambassador has been unaware of the Secretary's presence in his capital.

In a word, the ambassador is out of the serious play. He is rarely viewed as the best channel of communication with the head of government, he is not charged with the critical negotiating tasks, he is subordinated to visiting Washington officials and negotiating experts (visitors would be amazed if he had the temerity to offer substantive views), and—to make the message unmistakably clear—his expected duties are those of the hosteler.

It should be evident by now that the ambassador is not a policy officer. He is remote from the Byzantine process which evolves the broad structure of American foreign policy, policy that will encompass his domain and control his actions. Even with respect to bilateral policy his recommendations will be only part of the raw material that will finally emerge as governmental policy. If he happens to be assigned to a country which Washington has ignored or where there is some unease due to changed local situations, then, without alternative, the views of the ambassador may be sought; he may even be brought home for consultation. But the pattern is clear. The ambassador is no more than one of the many sources of data that pour into the Washington policy computer.

Whatever the general impact of these developments, the problem posed for the American ambassador in Europe is intense. He must live with the conventional wisdom that every American is born with an innate feel for relations with Europe and a complacent conviction, based on his sophomore course in 19th century European history, that he knows Europe. There is also the constant ebb and flow of American and European officials across the Atlantic and that perplexing multilateral world of the European Community, the OECD and NATO, each of which casts him deeper in the shadow. The European Community would be a hard case for the ambassador to a member state even if the Community were organized and operated in a manner consistent with its rhetoric and ambitions. Rather, it is incomplete, confused and engrossed in detail; rather than European harmony there is general dissonance. The professional obligation imposed on the ambassador is to appreciate the almost visionary political objective, accept a most limited reality and deal with this reality in such a way as to aid the Europeans as they struggle toward their grand ambitions. And this must be done against Washington's loss of faith in a united Europe, impatience with the messy institutions and constant readiness to do battle against real or presumed European economic offenses. The dimensions of this task have proven to be well beyond the interest or the capacity of almost all ambassadors.

NATO, more familiar in substance and organization, nonetheless poses for the bilateral ambassador its own set of problems. All significant security and related political issues, whether bilateral or multilateral, cannot be considered outside the NATO context. Baffled by this larger world, the bilateral ambassador inclines either to be impervious to the fact that he knows only a part of the puzzle or, if he realizes this, to resent the incursion into his fiefdom.

And in the area which would seem the last preserve of the ambassador political consultation, the multilateral inroads continue. The NATO Council, in permanent session and its subordinate sessions of political counsellors have become the significant forums for the Atlantic dialogue on political problems of concern to the member governments of the Alliance. The system has the tone and ease of any "old boys' club". The bilateral ambassador is poorly positioned to challenge this well established system.

A new complexity has been added. The European Community or, more accurately the Nine are evolving their own method of political consultation. At the official level it is conducted through the Davignon Committee, supplemented by periodic meetings of foreign ministers. As a result of the Paris summit in December 1974, three times each year the heads of government will meet, thus putting another layer on the political cake. This process is only vaguely institutionalized; rather than fixed in one site, it moves in random fashion from one capital to another. The mobility means that Washington cannot decide upon a set system in order to deal with the phenomenon. The nature of this political activity and the matters on the European agenda encourage Washington to cope with the problem by meeting between Departmental officers—such as the Assistant Secretary for European Affairs or the Counselor—and the Davignon Committee rather than using the embassies or American ambassadors.

As if this were not enough, there is the OECD with its myriad activities. For the ambassador who skims along the surface of political problems, the intricate technical business of the OECD is not merely mysterious, it is repellent. The organization has never interested the American ambassador to France, despite its location in his territory, except when the Secretary of State or perhaps the Secretary of the Treasury attended one of OECD's periodic ministerial meetings. The ambassador's involvement on those rare occasions has been invariably ceremonial. At one point the OECD ambassador was part of the NATO mission, indeed subordinate to the American chief of mission to NATO. The inability of the latter to manage such disparate functions, to say nothing of his uninterest in the economic field, led to a clean separation of the two. Thus another multilateral activity lies quite outside the range of the bilateral ambassador.

It is beyond the scope of this paper to examine the general operation of the embassies abroad. The target here is the ambassador. However, a word about the embassies' economic activities is in order. First, America's acute balance of payments problem, then the 1974 energy-related crises drew the attention of all but the most somnambulant ambassador—if these economic matters were all that important to Washington then the chief of mission should be doing something about them. As a magnetic field it has tended to attract the political ambassador even more than the career chief of mission. The latter, by and large, has been innoculated against economic matters, or finds comfort or escape in prodding his economic staff to more intense, if entirely routine activity. This staff, propelled by some inertial force, concentrates on economic reporting, servicing the demands of innumerable domestic agencies and export promotion. Indeed, the career officer who is finally established as ambassador is a testimonial to a system which rewards political specialists and penalizes the economic expert. As this is the way the promotional game is played, there is little incentive to master a difficult technical field.

Baffled by the intricacies of diplomacy, obscurely aware of being superfluous to the larger designs of Washington, almost with abandonment the political ambassador throws himself into the battle to expand exports and defend American business. These are "his people" and what could be more patriotic than the advancement of America's basic commercial interests? It is instructive that most important American concerns operating abroad are prepared and prefer to take care of themselves. Hence, the end result of ambassadorial zeal can be either irrelevance or irritation. The trade promotion and trade protection function is drifting away from the government to the hands of consultants or banks where it belongs.

This is a pessimistic judgment of the ambassador today, particularly an ambassador assigned to a national mission in one of the advanced industrialized countries. Technology, evolving diplomatic practice and multilateral activity all lead toward redundancy. Only encrusted practice obscures this irrelevance. The indifference of the Foreign Relations Committee and the Senate to the qualifications, or lack of them, of ambassadorial nominees affirms the inconsequential significance of the position. If there could be any doubt, Senator Sparkman, when Acting Chairman of the Committee, dispelled it when he commended Firestone, post-Watergate ambassadorial nominee to Belgium, for his public spiritedness in contributing over $100,000 to the Nixon campaign.

Can the Ambassador's role be redefined and redesigned so as to be useful in today's world?

Obviously, the ambassador, his functions and possible re-tooling make sense only as part of the general scheme of American foreign relations. For instance, if, by some thought process or indolence, it is decided to perpetuate the present organization and method of conduct of American foreign affairs, there is neither incentive nor need to agonize over the role of the ambassador. On the assumption, however, that substantial change in the basic structure and practice should and will be made, it should be clear from what has been said earlier in this paper that the kinds of ambassadors we appoint and their functions must change radically.

As far as the bilateral ambassador is concerned, again in the context of the advanced industrialized countries, his responsibilities should lie primarily in the analytical realm. His goal should be to know better and more intimately than any other American official the dynamics, the problems and the potentialities of the country to which he is assigned. This means the systematic development of personal contacts with the elite, those who shape opinion. "Elite", incidentally, while including ministers and their satellites in the capital, encompasses certainly those who have or may in the future have authentic influence. This description includes those out of power and, for instance in France and Italy, members of the Communist parties and Communist-dominated trade unions.

Concentration on incisive, detailed analysis and the human contacts to supplement this analysis would provide the basic material for the other significant tasks of the "new" ambassador: familiarity with the points of pressure where American policies or interests can be advanced; knowledge of the local scene so authoritative that the ambassador becomes an inevitable and indispensable part of any American negotiations which involve his country.

From these personal qualities and responsibilities flows the obligation to administer and lead an embassy of which the purpose is an extension of his own role. Rather than the present practice with the ambassador pursuing his own substantively inconsequential social business or such specific tasks as the Department and his own staff think he can perform under instruction and without endangering the Republic, the future ambassador should be in fact the senior responsible officer and the intellectual leader of his mission. This implies administrative direction of the embassy.

If this is the evolution of the job, then what is the function of the deputy chief of mission? In the past, the methodical elaboration and expansion of the role of the DCM has been partly cynical, anticipating the appointment as chief of mission the naive politician, party benefactor or career officer coasting toward retirement. More creditably, the deputy has come to be the administrator and manager of the embassy, the engineer of a ship where each section has its established and defined tasks. His concern is more to see that these tasks are accomplished than to determine whether they are worth doing or even done intelligently. In many situations, where his chief is a political appointee, the deputy may serve as chargé for a good part of the time—to the common relief of his staff and the host country. He will also have the delicate and frequently difficult job of nurturing the illusion that the ambassador is authentically in charge and understands what his embassy is doing. No one should deprecate the challenge of this asignment or fail to give credit for the admirable way in which the function is generally performed.

But under the revisionist theories advanced here the DCM's role changes. It may become even more difficult. The more the ambassador is the actual leader and administrator of the embassy, the more he reduces the heretofore central position of the deputy. Indeed, the DCM would enjoy all the frustrations that are the curse of any deputy. His primary function would be to fill in when the ambassador is away or to perform specific tasks assigned to him by his chief of mission. He would no longer be the chief executive officer of the embassy. Because of the peculiarities of the present arrangement, the myth exists that the DCM will possess those administrative skills the ambassador lacks. If future ambassadors have the intrinsic qualities premised here, they will have as much administrative ability as any deputy. In point of fact, authentic administrative talent is one of the rarest human attributes, and one should have a low level of expectation that men such as General George Marshall will appear frequently on the scene as ambassadors, deputies, or secretaries of state.

The qualifications to be sought in the ambassador would appear to be these: First, one assumes extensive and intensive experience in foreign affairs. Generally this competence will have been acquired in the career service, but it may also be the result of work outside of government—in academia, foundations, business, law. The postulate is that foreign affairs are a serious, valid, responsible field of human endeavor like medicine, law or plumbing. The notion is rejected that a successful housing contractor can pick up this expertise in on-the-job training once he arrives at his post.

Second, in addition to a general knowledge of foreign affairs the future ambassador will have to be well grounded in international economics. It should be emphasized that there is no necessary correlation between business experience and the kinds of economic knowledge which will be a prerequisite to the modern ambassador's effective performance.

Third, he must also know and have a feel for the way the American government works—the mechanics of the State Department, the interdepartmental relationships and pressures, the White House and, perhaps of greatest importance, the workings of the Congress. And this least static of all fields will require constant up-dating, necessitating frequent visits to Washington, contacts with each point of political power and, again, especially with the Congress.

Fourth, another essential area of knowledge is the multilateral system. He must know what it is, how it is supposed to operate, how it actually works, why it is important, what American policy is toward the system; and, specifically, he must appreciate how bilateral relations fit into this system. Granted this is like insisting that a Catholic priest know and sympathize with an evolving ecumenical congress. In Europe, for example, the bilateral ambassador must recognize that in certain areas, frequently the most critical, he must work for the subordination of the national and bilateral interests within the multilateral system. He may find even more difficult the need to accommodate himself to the superior substantive knowledge of the multilateral ambassador and accept the latter's judgment on tactics.

The bilateral ambassador is part of a complex, dynamic process of change in which the multilateral system grows in importance at the expense of the nation state and, coincidentally, of that notable symbol of national sovereignty, the ambassador. Furthermore, this icon of sovereignty must henceforth see himself as one part of a field operation, of a team, with others directing the pay.

Fifth, this prescription assumes that the ambassador will possess the qualities definitely innumerated by Harold Nicolson, especially the diplomatic temperament. At heart, this is the capacity to understand the other man's point of view, his goals, interests, problems and frustrations without losing sight of American interests and policies. It is the command of this material, conveyed persuasively to Washington, that establishes the limits and opportunities of American policy. As economic and social factors increase in importance, the ambassador must extend the range of his interest well beyond the fusty embassy-foreign office connection to the whole field of governmental ministries and programs.

The foregoing might seem to ignore the classical diplomatic problems. In fact, any ambassador must be equipped to cope with an internal political upheaval, war, the evacuation of American citizens, etc. While the likelihood may be remote, he and his staff must be prepared to meet such crises.

The ambassador assigned to one of the multilateral organization must have all of the foregoing qualities, skills and more. The NATO job demands an extensive knowledge of military strategy, hardware and organization, as well as a sophisticated grasp of the major political issues and policies that impinge on the Alliance. Assignments to NATO have been taken seriously by other governments, with ambassadors kept in place for considerable periods of time. Almost without exception other members of the Alliance have nominated senior career officials. The United States has generally turned to non-career people, partly to insure status and access to the President. What Ellsworth and Rumsfeld lacked in knowledge and experience they made up in proven political skill, intelligence, the capacity to learn and their standing in Washington's political hierarchy. David Kennedy proved that an ambassador could lack all of these and, in addition, have slight interest in the job.

The ambassador to the European Community must know intimately the goals, personalities, organization and involved procedures of the Community. To be effective he must be more than the detached observer of a complex economic-political entity; he must be intellectually sympathetic to a great European experiment. As much of the work of the Community is economics at its most technical and complicated, his interest in and mastery of this art form are essential.

The OECD job calls for many of the qualities of the ambassador to the Community but needs, in addition, the forbearance of a man who derives much of his professional satisfaction from directing the performance of others. In oversimplified terms, the OECD is no more than a forum or a device for dealing with major economic problems. It is a continuing process bringing ministers or high officials of the member governments together to examine economic issues, seek out possible solutions and attempt to develop a consensus among the advanced industrial countries. The theory is that common policies may emerge from the involvement and give-and-take of officials from capitals charged with similar responsibilities. The OECD ambassador is the producer and director of the American side of this economic repertory theater. Yet only part of his duty is the management of the Washington contingent. If the OECD is to be effective the American ambassador must inspire, lead and organize the other delegations. Without American leadership the organization will be lifeless.

The OECD operation is unique and can only be handled effectively by a man experienced in the workings of the American government, respected by Washington cabinet officers and senior officers for his economic competence and knowledge of the OECD mechanism. If the OECD man is without standing and authority, he will be unable to attract his American colleagues to OECD meetings, and without their presence the organization loses its meaning. Up until 1972 the United States assigned experienced officers, competent in economics, to the OECD position. The position was then left vacant for over a year. After this hiatus a non-career ambassador was appointed, innocent of knowledge of the OECD or Washington. All of this gave further evidence that Washington had no interest in the organization.

There are certain things the future ambassador should not be and should not do. He is not America's public relations officer, roaming the foreign countryside selling himself and the United States. Large, complicated and dynamic foreign societies are highly resistent to PR campaigns. Indeed, intensive pools of European opinion about the United States show an extraordinary propensity of the European to ignore the persistent urgings of his own government and national media as to what his attitude should be toward the United States. After years of Gaullism and its open animus toward many things American, the Frenchman stubbornly clung to his own, peculiarly friendly regard for the United States. The public relations gambit is an easy escape for the non career ambassador, for as a businessman or politician it is a familiar way of life. It can consume all the energy of the most insatiable ambassador. It is an activity to which the resources of the embassy can be easily rallied. If one concludes that the objective of the foreign policy is good relations, then the techniques of the advertising agency become the new tools of diplomacy. Good relations may be abstractly desirable but as a practical matter irrelevant. We should have learned this, if nothing more, from a decade of General de Gaulle. If the ambassador should perform the tasks outlined here, the public relations function is distinctly secondary. In this new role of ambassador he may establish the image of a serious, competent and responsible representative of the United States and coincidentally grace the profession and his country. At the same time he will in all probability frustrate and irritate the garden clubs and diplomatic community by his unavailability for the spring tours and national days.

It must be accepted that under the best of circumstances the ambassador will be only peripherally involved in the design and direction of American foreign policy. On the other hand, he should be given a significant role with respect to tactics, an element critical to the effectiveness of foreign relations. In recent years the leash has been short and the ambassador on a choke collar. It has become habitual for Washington to issue instructions to an ambassador in the same painstaking detail normally used in parental guidance of very young and potentially wayward children. It is essentially absurd to believe that the blueprint for tactics can be intelligently formulated in some Washington darkroom. The management of American interests with the foreign government is the one area where the knowledgeable and experienced embassy should have primacy. Contrariwise, precise, inflexible Washington instructions, written by officers and committees whose attention is riveted on interdepartmental competition and the effect of any action on the array of Congressional pressures and interest groups, will invariably subordinate the chances of actually achieving the American objective to the making of a domestic record.

Within the broad framework of responsibility for tactics the ambassador must regain control of visiting delegations. Today, as hosteler, he is subject to laws which insist that he accept all those who seek bed and board. He must be able to object to a proposed delegation and indicate why its despatch or its composition or its timing may be adverse to American interests and even contrary to the purpose of the enterprise. Obviously, in certain circumstances there may be overriding reasons, known only to Washington, dictating the onslaught despite the valid objections of the ambassador.

There are related dangers in this absent-minded conversion of the ambassador into a passive, acquiescent clerk. As America becomes more inward-oriented, quasi-isolationist, the inclination to solve or ease domestic tensions by exporting them can take on epidemic proportions. It is routine in the trade field to attack foreign behavior and practices in order to curry domestic favor, to show stoutheartedness and American bravado. Those few who are honest enough to admit the excess of the American charge or the likely outcome of harmed relations insist that this is the price to be paid to placate domestic forces. Any democracy will demand some of this. The risk is real that the anti-internationalist trend in the United States will encourage even greater use of this nasty practice. The ambassador should be one brake on the excesses of this habit.

Earlier reference was made to the puffery of the ambassador as the "personal representative of the President". This is, today, quite clearly a conceit. The demands on the President's time are such, his taste for personal diplomacy so highly cultivated, that any reversal of this situation to the relationship between Renaissance prince and royal agent is entirely improbable. Should a well placed and feisty ambassador decide to appeal over the head of the Secretary of State to the President he would do so at considerable peril. Only a Roosevelt, with a Florentine taste for intrigue and contrived confusion, would decide to embarrass his senior and resident foreign affairs adviser. It would have to be the most arrogant or obtuse ambassador who would wish to alienate the man who controls and supervises his daily life.

One argument for perpetuating the myth is to enhance the ability of the ambassador to control those officers on his staff who are employees of one or another domestic agencies and to strengthen his hand against invasions of Washington delegations. This is not a particularly persuasive argument. Short of sustaining illusion, there would seem to be other means of achieving these worthy objectives. The President and the Secretary of State can lay down and enforce the rule: the ambassador on the ground has full authority. If the chief of mission is experienced and competent, exercises his command intelligently and is supported by the President and Secretary, the shaky crutch of "personal representative" could be gently discarded.

Conclusions

A subordinate but recurrent theme in this dirge is the casual manner in which the Congress accepts and even abets a system within which the ambassador has become an expensive anachronism. At a time when the nation questions all government, looks hopefully for both honesty and competence in its elected and appointed officials, the Senate could assist greatly in the responsible conduct of foreign relations (and its own image) by indicating its intention to infuse the words "advise and consent" with meaning and that in the future the Committee will confirm only fully qualified nominations. As I have proposed elsewhere, the Foreign Relations Committee could borrow from the procedures developed by the American Bar Association to review, informally proposed nominations to the judiciary. The Foreign Relations Committee could establish a senior, nonpartisan panel of private experts to review presidential nominations prior to formal consideration by the Committee. The panel would be expected to advise the Committee whether the candidates met minimum qualifications for confirmation. The first act of such a panel would be to develop in cooperation with the Committee the criteria to be used subsequently in judging the nominations. When the Committee under Senator Fulbright made a timid and more limited effort toward this objective it encountered Administration resistance and the reform movement collapsed. It would be nice if the Senate were to take seriously its Constitutional duties. But it seems unlikely that anything of the sort suggested here will be initiated by the Congress in the absence of interest and support of the Executive Branch.

An objective appraisal of world trends and present American instincts and practices leads to the conclusion that the ambassador of the future will play a more limited role than the pompous illusion of the President's alter ego abroad, or the inflated image of a policy-maker working in tight partnership with the Secretary of State. If the new ambassador is to be useful he must be a modern, highly professional man, knowledgeable in economics, expert at his business, particularly with respect to the country or organization to which he is accredited. This implies a considerable time in place. From this base he should become a major source of information and insight and, thus, an important part, but only a part, of the policy-making process. His impact on policy will derive from his mastery of his profession and sure knowledge of his specific assignment, not from his title or social graces.

A reconstructed embassy, with different, more limited and specialized functions, and a renovated, modernized ambassador will be exceedingly difficult goals to achieve. All of this change goes against tradition and the momentum of the service. It would cause reexamination of shabby domestic political mores to determine whether the interests of the country are actually served by a process of appointment which puts knowledge and competence at the bottom of the list of qualifications. Such a revolution must work against a massive, silent conspiracy among all diplomatic establishments, whose self-interest it is to perpetuate and enjoy their baronial gentile obsolescence. The best that might be hoped for would be to set a new direction. Even this modest goal has not the slightest chance of success in the absence of conviction on the part of the President and the Secretary of State, supported by the Senate, that American foreign relations demand a new orientation and approach.

Senator MATHIAS. Also, a statement from Representative Derwinski will be included in the record at this point.

[Representative Derwinski's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD J. DERWINSKI, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM ILLINOIS

Mr. Chairman I appreciate the opportunity to express my views on S. 1886. I want to commend you for raising the issue of the selection process for American ambassadors as I believe it is essential from time to time that an objective review of the policy for filling ambassadorial posts be conducted.

In any Administration, the President's prerogative is to appoint whom he wants, and the degree to which one President, more than another, utilizes noncareer employees is a decision to be made by that particular President for which he is obviously responsible.

Congress exercises oversight of developments in foreign policy, and we should not enact restrictions which would tie the hands of any Administration. The full spotlight on the selection procedure for ambassadorial appointments is necessary and should continue.

To compare how procedures for ambassadorial appointments work, you have to study the French system. There are a number of examples in Africa, in former French colonies, where the rulers were educated in France. The French Government sends as Ambassadors former classmates of the rulers, which is an effective mixture of personal politics and diplomacy. Our Ambassadors have commented to me on this personal relationship of French Ambassadors and the rules of the countries in which they serve. When I was in Senegal in 1968, I conferred with our Ambassador L. Dean Brown, and on a visit to the Ivory Coast in 1973, I discussed this subject with Ambassador John R. Root. Both told me of their problems in competing with the French Ambassadors. Ambassador Root said the Ivorians were very much impressed with the French Ambassador's relationship with their President, while in contrast Ambassador Root had difficulty in dramatizing his access to our President. The principle is the same in these cases as in those where our Ambassador has a personal relationship with the President of the United States. A real or perceived personal relationship between the President of a country and an Ambassador is a great asset in diplomacy.

Mr. Chairman, to the extent possible, we want the best Ambassador in the right place at the right time. I have long felt that no post should be excluded from the possibility of being filled by a career Foreign Service Officer including London, Paris, Rome and Brussels, which are usually reserved for people of means who can afford to underwrite their service in those capitals. This is penny-wise and pound-foolish. If the situation would logically dictate at any given time that our relations with Great Britain, France, Italy or Belgium would be served best with a career officer filling the post of Ambassador, we ought to allocate sufficient funds for their representation allowance so that a Foreign Service Officer could take the post. Budgetary flexibility would permit this.

I do not believe we should have any quota system or any restraints at all on appointments an Administration makes to fill ambassadorial posts. Looking back on 24 years of service in the Congress, during which I have specialized in foreign affairs, I can recall very few Ambassadors who were not effective representatives of our country.

What we really need is more administrative flexibility to help an individual meet the financial obligations of a specific post. Arbitrary quotas would really not enhance the representation our country would be receiving from appointed Ambassadors.

Senator MATHIAS. We are very grateful to you and to Ambassador Whitehouse for being with us this morning. I think there have been some helpful suggestions.

I hope you will feel free to continue, Ambassador Tuthill, as the conscience of the committee. And if we are moving forward in implementing some of these ideas, that you will remind us that we have unfinished work, it is a good thing.

Thank you all very much.

This committee is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:35 p.m., the committee adjourned, subject to call of the Chair.]

APPENDIX

PREPARED STATEMENT BY JOHN KRIZAY, A FORMER FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICER, REGARDING A BILL TO LIMIT THE PRESIDENT'S AUTHORITY TO APPOINT NON-CAREER AMBASSADORS

The bill, introduced by Senator Mathias to restrict the President's authority to appoint non-career ambassadors to 15% of the total number of ambassador positions, would appear to be based on two supporting arguments: (1) that it would create additional opportunities for advancement in the Foreign Service Officer Corps, thus enhancing morale and incentive; and, (2) that the quality of ambassadorial appointments would be improved if fewer "political" appointments were permitted.

As a former Foreign Service Officer with considerable experience outside government, I challenge these premises. Indeed, I would argue that any arbitrary limit on the number of non-career ambassadors would be detrimental both to the interests of national policy and to the well-being of the Foreign Service. The Foreign Service is already an overly in-bred organization, its outlook is already too narrow, and its views are too often thought to represent the interests of other governments over those of the United States. The appointment of non-careerists to key diplomatic positions strengthen—not weaken—the Foreign Service for they can bring to this tightly knit operation greater understanding of domestic political and economic interests that ultimately underly all our foreign affairs activities. The effort to improve the quality of diplomatic appointments should turn not toward limiting the number of non-careerists but toward setting standards and devising an appointments mechanism that would apply to careerists and non-careerists alike.

It is no secret that, over the past 30 years, the State Department and the Foreign Service have steadily lost influence over the conduct of foreign relations. "Strong" Secretaries of State, typically, have kept this elite corps at arms length. And, in dealing with the myriad international problems, too technical or too obscure to warrant the Secretary's attention, State is frequently overshadowed or overruled by other Departments and Agencies who mistrust the State Department view.

This is a harsh judgment, and it gives me no joy to make this statement. But, one only has to read the memoirs of national leaders from the Truman Administration through Nixon and Kissinger to have this judgment corroborated.

Why has the State Department become such a minor cog in the foreign affairs machinery? The reasons are many and complex as I pointed out in an article in Policy Review in 1978. But, there is no question that the incestuous nature of the Foreign Service personnel system is central to any analysis of this phenomenon. This elite corps of talented—even brilliant—men and women operates with all the characteristics of an exclusive club, impervious to outside influence. Its system of selection, assignment, training, and promotion all revolve around the subjective judgments of those who are already club members, and even these judgments are closely monitored and scrutinized by those senior members under whose charge the club is managed. In service abroad, where relationships are often uncomfortably close, even one's social behavior and personal habits enter into the composite of impressions that are certain to influence recommendations regarding an officer's career direction and potential.

This is not an atmosphere where bold new ideas are readily accepted or where departures from a traditional mode of thinking can flourish. This overwhelming pressure to conform takes on an added significance when one considers that the entire operating structure of the Department of State and its posts abroad is geared entirely toward the observation and analysis of events occurring in other countries. Knowledge of even obscure happenings in obscure countries are valued highly; events of greater importance occurring in the United States are considered hardly at all. Members of this elite club may sneer at outsiders who cannot name the President of Zimbabwe while, they, themselves, are ignorant of the plight of International Harvester or of Firestone and the implications of these developments on our relations with important trading partners.

New ideas and, above all, reminders that Americans, too have interests that extend beyond our borders can come to this organization, as now structured, only through new infusions of personnel. Presently, with few exceptions new entrants into the Foreign Service Officer Corps can occur at only two levels: at the very bottom and at the very top. Those coming in at the very bottom quickly learn the virtues of conformity. Only those entering at the very top can bring to the organization some sense of the opinions and concerns of the nation and some willingness to fashion the making and management of foreign policy to accommodate those opinions and concerns.

Non-career appointments in the Foreign Service thus, serve an important purpose and are needed. It is of particular significance to note that no evidence has ever been developed that establishes that career ambassadors, as a group, are superior to non-career ambassadors. Criteria on which such evaluations can be made are. to begin with, most difficult to construct. On the other hand, anecdotes are common, and they, typically, focus on the non-careerist who makes for better copy in the press and juicier gossip within the organization. Outsiders are seldom welcome in exclusive clubs. The career service, too, has produced inept and even embarassing ambassadors, but tales of their ineptitude rarely escape the confines of the Club. Additionally, criticisms of the non-careerist will almost inevitably be harsher if, for no other reason, because he may bring to the institution an approach to foreign affairs totally at variance with the traditional foreign service viewpoint. Innovations always run a greater risk of criticism and ridicule than safe, conventional ideas that deviate little from the established path.

There is, in other words, no objective basis for arguing that ambassadors drawn from the career service better serve our interests in dealing with other nations. Of course, ambassadorial appointments should be of the highest quality no matter whether from the career service or from sources outside. What is required is an accepted standard that may include background, language or language aptitude, managerial ability, and prior service in some capacity involving dealings with other nations. Restricting the numbers of outside appointments is a crude way to achieve a better quality of ambassadors, and it holds little prospect of success.

Nor will the professional Foreign Service Corps be better off as a result of such restrictions. The added 20 or 30 ambassadorial posts that might become available to the careerists over a given year would add little to the real opportunities of a Foreign Service career. Indeed it may be argued that passage of this bill would only contribute to an already unhealthy obsession with titles that diverts the energies of too many Foreign Service Officers away from the real purpose of their careers. For too long, the Department has pandered to this penchant for titles, creating a kind of phony aristocracy where no task is worth undertaking unless adorned with a title that exaggerates its substantive significance. Over the past 30 years, with no increase in total personnel, the number of Office Directors has increased from under 40 to over 150; the number holding the title of Deputy Assistance Secretary of State has increased from 7 to over 60; ambassadorships have been created where no ambassadorial function exists.

The Department of State does not need more titles to offer its professional staff. It needs, rather, a new sense of mission and a sense of greater and more effective participation in the foreign affairs process. Non-career appointments should be viewed as helpful in this regard, for they offer the professional Foreign Service a source of protection against the kind of pernicious in-breeding that, in decades past, has contributed so much to its decline.

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